Abstract
This study examines hegemonic personalist regimes (HPRs) and argues that semi-presidential dictatorships are more likely to evolve into HPRs than parliamentary systems or presidential autocracies. In presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators who control the military to eliminate threats from the opposition. In parliamentary systems, elites are more likely to build power-sharing parties through which parliamentary opposition can be defeated, often evolving into single-party regimes. In semi-presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators in exchange for investments, support of their agendas, or defeat of the opposition, which can lead to personalist rule supported by a dominant party or HPR. This study verified this phenomenon using logistic regression. In addition, this study examined three possible challenges: unstable equilibrium, reverse causality and institutional variation within semi-presidentialism. In sum, the incentive structure inherent in semi-presidential systems paves the way for the rise of HPRs.
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