Defections within the ruling elite often endanger authoritarian rule, emboldening opposition groups and paving the way for regime breakdown. Yet, the consequences of elite defections are better understood than their causes. Why do some authoritarian regimes experience more defections to the opposition than others? This paper develops a theory of the origins of elite defection and tests it using a novel dataset based on the political careers of 15,013 legislative deputies and ministers in 12 electoral autocracies. The theory predicts that regime elites defect when there are greater opportunities to capitalize on the discontent of other regime elites and voters. Regimes with weak party mechanisms that are also supported by many factions experience more defections. Finally, defections increase during economic downturns and when the government’s control of mass media declines, which helps potential defectors coordinate with anti-regime voters.
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