Abstract
This study examines the evolving power dynamics between OGN, the world’s first esports-dedicated TV network, and Riot Games, the developer and publisher of League of Legends, since 2012, with a specific focus on sponsorship and league administration. As esports takes place in a virtual world, it necessarily requires mediated delivery platforms, such as broadcasters and streaming platforms. At the same time, game publishers hold exclusive rights to their software, protected as intellectual property (IP). Through the lens of critical political economy, this study analyzes the power relations between the broadcaster and game publisher. The findings indicate a gradual decline in OGN’s influence over the South Korean professional League of Legends league (LCK), while Riot Games progressively strengthened its power through streaming technologies and IP ownership. This study highlights the closure of OGN as indicative of the consolidation between global game publishers and media platforms in esports. This consolidation, however, weakened team finances and fan experiences within the esports ecosystem, undermining both economic sustainability and audience engagement. The findings also point to potential tensions between publishers and streaming platforms, suggesting that users may face growing constraints in how they access and experience esports content.
Keywords
Introduction
In November 2024, the Worlds 2024 final, an international esports (competitive video gaming) tournament for League of Legends, developed and published by Riot Games, reached a peak audience of 50 million viewers (6.7 million excluding China; LoL Esports [@lolesports], 2024). This viewership indicates that esports is more than a gaming event; it is attracting growing attention from audiences worldwide. According to Newzoo (2022), a game-specialized research firm, global esports revenue exceeded $1.3 billion in 2022 and is expected to continue growing through 2025. This suggests that esports is more than just gaming; it has evolved into a complex entertainment industry ecosystem with multiple stakeholders.
One key difference between esports and traditional sports is the ownership of rights over the game and its associated components, including tournament organization, broadcasting, and league administration. Unlike in traditional sports, where major leagues like NFL own exclusive rights to their respective leagues but not the sport itself, in esports, game publishers own exclusive rights to the games, leagues, events, and related content. This monopoly over esports Intellectual Property (IP) gives game publishers significant power over downstream sectors (Miroff, 2019). Consequently, stakeholders in the esports industry (e.g. players, teams, broadcasting platforms, viewers) can be significantly influenced by the business decisions of game publishers.
Furthermore, as IP holders’ business has concentrated on media rights, it also influences media platforms’ sponsorship revenue and advertising (Kim and Kim, 2022). The issue of IP underscores an unequal power dynamic between game publishers and other actors in the esports industry. This study aims to explore the asymmetric power dynamics between game publishers and other stakeholders, focusing on esports content distribution (e.g. broadcasting, livestreaming, VOD). Specifically, the study focuses on the case of South Korea, examining the relationship between OGN, a gaming TV network, and Riot Games, the publisher of League of Legends. While Riot Games functions as both a game developer and publisher, this study specifically addresses its role as a publisher.
This study investigates the evolving power dynamics between OGN and Riot Games since 2012, with a specific focus on sponsorship, broadcasting rights, and league administration. Through case studies, this study reveals that over time, Riot Games has gained more power over League of Legends in Korea, while OGN’s influence has diminished, leading to marginalized local actors, weakened team finances, and diminished fan experiences. This study investigates the shift of power among various actors over different stages and explores its implications for audiences. It provides background on the esports industry and explains critical political economy as the theoretical framework. The study then elucidates the results of a case study and concludes by discussing the impact of power shift and consolidation on the esports ecosystem.
Esports and media technology
Esports, also known as electronic sports, is a complex concept with no single, universally accepted definition. However, several common elements have emerged from various studies. Many defined esports as a form of competitive video gaming or video gaming competition (e.g. Gawrysiak et al., 2020; Jonasson and Thiborg, 2010; Pedraza-Ramirez et al., 2020). Previous studies suggest that sports, competitiveness, and video game are the core components of esports. For instance, Wagner (2006, p. 440), the most cited definition, described esports as “an area of sport activities in which people develop and train mental or physical abilities in the use of information and communication technologies.” Similarly, Hamari and Sjöblom (2017) examined esports as a form of sport where electronic systems play a crucial role in facilitating its primary aspects. Jeong and Youk (2023) collected 327 esports articles and conducted a co-word analysis to refine the existing definitions of esports, arguing that “
Throughout the maturation of the esports industry, media have played a central role. Unlike traditional sports, esports audiences cannot directly observe players’ gameplay without mediated platforms. This aligns with Hamari and Sjöblom’s (2017, p. 213) point that esports systems are mediated through “human-computer interfaces,” which implies that esports activities happen digitally and can be delivered to audiences through mediation platforms. Likewise, both Wagner (2006) and Hamari and Sjöblom (2017) emphasize the role of media technologies, including information and communication infrastructures, electronic systems, and platforms—indicating that esports is a fully mediated experience enabled by media technology.
South Korea holds a unique position in the history of esports broadcasting, as it was the birthplace of the world’s first game-dedicated cable network, Ongamenet (OGN), which launched in 2000 (Jin, 2010). In March 1999, another cable channel, Tooniverse, aired the professional tournament Hitel KPGL, marking the first televised esports event in South Korea (Jin, 2020). Several staff members from Tooniverse, including producer Hwang, went on to establish Ongamenet—the world’s first esports dedicated TV network (see OGN’s introduction on the website: https://www.op.gg/ogn/about)—in July 2000. Ongamenet changed its name to OGN in 2015. In addition to OGN, there was MBC Game, another game-specializing TV network affiliated with the Korean terrestrial TV network MBC that also contributed to the esports broadcasting landscape.
Esports broadcasting shares similarities with sports broadcasting, as it involves producers, professional casters, commentators, camera technicians, and other staff, and esports content also includes sponsors, advertising, and audiences, mirroring the main characteristics of sports broadcasting. These elements are prominent on esports livestreaming platforms, such as YouTube and Twitch. However, because esports visibility depends on mediated platforms, shifts in distribution technologies are likely to reshape who can exercise power over esports content, a dynamic that can be examined through a critical political economy lens.
Critical political economy (CPE) and esports content distribution
This study analyzes the power dynamics of esports through the lens of the critical political economy of the media. Political economy is an approach that highlights and critiques dominant economic elements within a larger multifaceted perspective on the dynamics of resources regarding human existence: production, distribution, and consumption (Hardy, 2014; Mosco, 2009). Traditionally, media scholars have been drawn to political economy due to the increasing influence of mass media on information acquisition and the substantial time individuals spend consuming media outside of work (Smythe, 1960). Smythe (1960), for instance, focused on ownership and strategies surrounding the availability, quality, and allocation of scarce goods and services of communications. In essence, the political economic approach has explored questions of “who” and “how,” concerning the perspectives on the production and allocation of scarce resources, capital, and organization.
Critical political economy (CPE) further examines power inequalities in the production, distribution, and consumption of resources (Hardy, 2014). In this sense, this study defines the critical political economy of media as a theoretical framework to investigate power inequalities of the production, distribution, and consumption in media industries. Regarding production, Hardy (2014) examines CPE considering ownership and revenue mechanisms. While CPE scholarship has often been criticized for focusing primarily on ownership and finance in media production (Hardy, 2014), other aspects have also been explored. CPE scholars examine a diverse range of production aspects, including media ownership, finance, labor processes, governance, regulations, and advertising. For instance, within video game studies, scholars have investigated labor disparities present in game production (Bulut, 2015, 2020; de Peuter and Young, 2019).
In the context of esports, the notion of production encompasses gameplay by professional players in esports events (e.g. professional leagues, tournaments) and the creation of gaming content. Professional players’ gaming relates to labor processes, particularly focusing on inequalities in the esports labor market. For instance, McLeod et al. (2022) analyzed the esports labor market by scrutinizing the allocation of prize money and found that earnings are concentrated among top gamers, leading to increased market inequality.
Since esports is played through electronic media, its production involves mediating tools which can be represented as content distribution, such as broadcasting and livestreaming. Esports content can be distributed through various media platforms, including traditional TV networks and livestreaming platforms like YouTube and Twitch, the premier platform for gaming and esports content. Most studies on esports distribution have focused on the multifaceted characteristics of livestreaming platforms, particularly focusing on Twitch. Specifically concerning esports distribution, studies have explored audiences’ engagement with Twitch from a labor perspective, examining the commodification of viewership (Carter and Egliston, 2021; Taylor, 2016). Carter and Egliston (2021), for instance, investigated how interactive components on Twitch, such as chat window, emotes, donations, and others influence the platform’s economic value through viewers’ watching as a form of labor.
Beyond labor and audience perspectives, there is room for political economic analysis to explore and critique tensions between game publishers and media platforms. This is because the game itself plays a significant role in esports production, and distribution is inevitably influenced by game publishers. Purewal and Davies (2016) examined the extent of legal control game publishers can exert and the entities with rights related to broadcast. This complicated interplay suggests that power relationships in esports distribution are intricate. While game publishers traditionally held monopolistic power due to IP, they did not typically have broadcasting channels or livestreaming platforms. However, with the emergence of platforms such as YouTube and Twitch, game publishers gained the ability to broadcast game events. This development has likely led to power struggles between game publishers and these platforms. These studies imply the possibility of a shift in power dynamics between traditional media, emerging platforms, and IP owners in the media industry, with significant implications for who becomes marginalized and how structural changes affect key stakeholders, including local actors and consumers.
In addition, as media technology has evolved, power relations have shifted between legacy media and emerging platforms. Compared to legacy media, audiences now access content primarily through digital platforms, such as Netflix, YouTube, and TikTok, which has diminished the power of traditional media in both local and global cultural production chains (Jin, 2024). These platforms are no longer mere distributors of media content. They also produce cultural goods and expand global dominance (Jin, 2024). As Jin (2022, p.51; as cited in Jin, 2024) points out, global digital platforms “control, manipulate, and design” the entire production and distribution process to maximize their power. However, esports is unique since any actor that creates and distributes content must rely on the game publisher’s software, which is protected as IP. Thus, based on the popularity of a video game, game publishers can wield more power than digital platforms and other actors.
Existing literature on esports indicates that the shift from traditional broadcast to digital platforms did not weaken game publishers’ power. For instance, since game software is copyrighted work, game publishers can control the overall esports tournaments, including who can hold tournaments and leagues, as well as who can participate in these events (Holden et al., 2020; Walton et al., 2020). Based on this, we can infer that game publishers control how the broadcast of tournaments takes place and who can deliver the content. However, platforms also exercise a degree of power because publishers benefit from platform users’ streaming of their games, which turns those users into ambassadors for the publisher and therefore reduces publishers’ incentive to pursue copyright claims (Holden et al., 2020). These dynamics indicate that power over esports distribution is shared in a negotiated and sometimes unstable way. Publishers have a structural advantage due to their IP, while platforms can leverage power as their users promote publishers’ IP and they deliver audience to publishers. Thus, analyzing the power dynamics of OGN and Riot Games, with a focus on the shift from broadcast to streaming technology, is suited for critical political economic analysis.
This study adopts the perspective of the critical political economy, emphasizing the analysis of social totality (Mosco, 2009). By examining the power asymmetries between a game publisher and a broadcaster in South Korea, this study aims to reveal how technological development has reshaped the esports industry and to explore the economic and cultural implications of the closure of OGN. In accordance with Jin (2024), this study also emphasizes the impact of content distribution technologies (e.g., broadcasting and streaming) on transforming the power relations in the esports industry in South Korea and on digital platforms. Thus, from the perspective of critical political economy, this study addresses (1) the shift of power relations over time, (2) the strategies through which power is exercised, and (3) the implications of these power shifts for the esports ecosystems, including consumers.
Method
To investigate the power dynamics between game publishers and stakeholders, this study employs a case study approach, focusing on the League of Legends Champions Korea (LCK). The case study method is a qualitative approach that investigates the unique characteristics and intricacy of a single case or group of cases (Stake, 1995). Specifically, it sheds light on the context of decisions, focusing on why and how they were made, as well as their outcomes (Schramm, 1971). Given that this study examines the closure of the world’s first esports TV network and its broader implications, the case study approach is appropriate to the research objectives.
The LCK is a professional League of Legends league in Korea. The analysis centers on the relationship between OGN and Riot Games. OGN, a pioneer in esports broadcasting both domestically and globally, ceased content creation in 2021 and was sold to the game data platform, Op.GG, in 2022. This case provides insight into how shifts in power dynamics and strategies for gaining power between a global game publisher and a local TV network influenced the shutdown of an esports pioneer. This study investigates the power relations between OGN and Riot Games, from 2012 to 2020.
The author collected news articles related to the LCK and its broadcasting, announcements and press releases from League of Legends Korea and OGN, program information from Wikipedia, information from Korea e-Sports Association (KeSPA), and pictures from media events. The study then analyzes power dynamics based on sponsorships, broadcasting, and league administration. Given that sponsorship is the primary revenue source in esports, this study examines the dynamics, focusing on sponsor selection. Specifically, this study explores the decision-makers behind selecting partnership companies, the entities involved in the selection process, and the parties responsible for announcing the official sponsor firms.
Results
In March 2012, OGN launched the first professional League of Legends league in Korea, The Champions Spring 2012. Based on their expertise and experiences from StarCraft, they named the 2012 league Azubu the Champions Spring 2012. Table 1 shows the League of Legends content that OGN broadcast from 2012 to 2020. This study classifies OGN’s broadcasting into three stages chronologically, based on the following criteria.
The league of legends programs that OGN broadcast from 2012 to 2020.
To a co-broadcasting with SPOTV. LoL is an abbreviation of League of Legends. From 2019, since OGN did not have the broadcasting rights, they could not create LCK content.
Stage 1 spans from 2012 to 2014, during which OGN established the league’s structure. Stage 2, covering 2015 to 2018, involved collaboration among three entities: Riot Games, OGN, and KeSPA, in managing the league. During this phase, KeSPA, Riot Games, and OGN collaborated on reforms to Korea’s professional League of Legends league, focusing on the league’s institutional framework, including the promotion-relegation system, league regulations, and player protection policies (Seo, 2014). Consequently, beginning in 2015, the official name of the Korean league was changed to League of Legends Champions Korea (LCK). In 2019, at the beginning of stage 3, Riot Games chose not to grant OGN the broadcast rights to LCK, and instead the league was delivered through YouTube and Twitch.
Power dynamics
To investigate power dynamics, a political economic analysis of this case study identifies two major perspectives: sponsorship and league administration. Sponsorship represents the power of financial dimension, while league administration implies broader authority within the nascent industry.
Sponsors
As sponsorship accounts for the largest portion of esports revenue streams (Newzoo, 2022), analyzing the discourse surrounding sponsors can illustrate the power relations between OGN and Riot Games. Evidence from sponsor interviews suggests that OGN had greater leverage than Riot Games during stage 1. This is supported by interviews between OGN and sponsors in news articles. For instance, during the opening ceremony of 2012, a reporter asked Azubu, a game-specialized media company and the main sponsor of the 2012 season, why they decided to sponsor the league. Robert Cheek, Azubu’s general manager, stated that sponsoring the league with OGN would help expand their business, indicating that at the beginning of LCK, the sponsor regarded OGN as a potential collaboration partner (Kang, 2012).
Cheek: “Azubu is a global game media company based in Germany, focusing on distributing high-quality gaming content. We saw sponsoring the official league as a good business expansion model, and thus decided to collaborate with Ongamenet (OGN) to host the league.” (Oh, 2012)
The interview suggests that Azubu viewed OGN as a main actor in the league and had engaged in discussions with OGN regarding sponsorship. Similarly, in 2013, Olympus, the main sponsor of LCK and a global camera company, explained that they could benefit from collaborating with OGN.
Lee (Olympus Korea): “We anticipate that the Ongamenet LOL League sponsorship will provide a chance to promote Olympus’ dynamic and youthful image even more, given the league’s explosive popularity among the younger generation worldwide” (Jeon, 2012) Hwang (OGN): “We believe that with the support of the global brand Olympus, the league’s own brand can be upgraded to the next level.” (Jeon, 2012)
In the interview, Lee, the director of Olympus Korea mentioned “Ongamenet LoL League” as the object of sponsorship. Additionally, OGN had sponsorship power for the winter 2013–2014 league. In the sponsorship agreement ceremony picture, only the CEO of Pandora TV, a sponsor for the season, and the director of OGN appear. Although the banner from the sponsorship signing ceremony features the logos of Pandora TV, Riot Games, and OGN, it is evident that the primary sponsorship agent in the picture is OGN rather than Riot Games (e.g., Kim, 2013). Furthermore, during the media day of the 2013–14 winter season, Hyungwoo Choi, the CEO of Pandora TV, and Heonjoo Kang, the general manager of OGN, participated and addressed questions from reporters. Based on Kang’s interview, this study infers that OGN retained the power to select a sponsor company. Kang highlighted that, when compared to the previous companies, Pandora TV can offer novel prospects in the business domain.
Kang (OGN): “Pandora TV was chosen since it offered business partnership opportunities, unlike the previous sponsors which were limited to brand and corporate promotion.” (Oh, 2013)
Thus, in the initial period, OGN had more power than Riot Games in league sponsorship, despite co-administration with Riot Games.
The power relations between Riot Games and OGN have gradually changed. In 2015 and 2016, it was still OGN that announced the sponsor for LCK 2015 and LCK 2016. However, sponsor companies’ statements were now oriented toward the overall development and growth of the Korean League of Legends league, rather than toward OGN as a broadcaster. For example, Hyojin Hwang, the CEO of SBENU, a sponsor of LCK 2015 spring and summer, stated that they expected a synergy effect of collaborating with the esports league, and would contribute to the promotion of Korean esports. Additionally, Yongsoo Kim, the CEO of Lotte Confectionery, a sponsor of LCK 2016 Spring, expressed their satisfaction in being part of the premier Korean esports league.
Hwang (SBENU): “We will do our best to contribute to developing Korean esports, and become a fashion brand that represents Korea, along with League of Legends Champions which is globally broadcasted” (Etoday, 2015) Kim (Lotte Confectionery): “We are pleased to be a part of the top esports event. We will endeavor to ensure the event’s success.” (Ko, 2016)
However, in 2017, Riot Games announced the sponsors for the next season via the official homepage of LCK. The announcement suggested that many firms wanted to be a title sponsor of LCK and had negotiations, and Riot Games had exclusive power to decide which sponsors would participate. As of October 2025, as Riot Games does not redirect to the link for the announcement (https://www.leagueoflegends.co.kr/?m=esports_intro&mod=esports_news), this study cites Kim (2017), which reproduces the notice.
LCK: “As esports has gained increasing attention not only domestically but also worldwide, many brands have shown interest in sponsoring in the LCK. After long and extensive discussions, Riot Games ultimately decided to have multiple sponsors for the LCK Spring 2017 season” (Kim, 2017)
Interestingly, the league sponsors no longer mentioned or expressed appreciation for the opportunity to partner with OGN. Given the importance of sponsorship revenue in esports, it can be said indicates that the asymmetrical power relationship has changed, with Riot Games having more power than OGN. Additionally, their announcement put pressure on OGN, indicating that LCK could collaborate with other platforms regarding broadcasting. This is closely related to the broadcasting conflict, which will be discussed in the next section.
LCK: “Over the long term, Riot Games will focus on maintaining the LCK’s competitiveness as a leading global league and on improving the quality of broadcasts and commentary. We hope that partners who share this vision will come on board” (Kim, 2017)
Since 2019, Riot Games has administered, managed, and broadcast the LCK. The pictures of the signing of the sponsorship are completely different from those of 2013. In the 2013–2014 sponsorship signing photo, only the CEO of the sponsor company and the general manager of OGN are present, highlighting OGN’s role in the sponsorship. However, in 2019 and 2020, a country manager of Riot Games Korea and an executive from the sponsoring corporation were present in the picture. Moreover, the logo of OGN no longer appeared on the banner. From a political economic interpretation, this suggests that Riot Games’ ultimate power over sponsorship decisions, combined with the absence of OGN’s logo, has led consumers to view OGN as no longer a major player in the industry. Thus, the power dynamics on sponsorship indicate that OGN had more power in stage 1. However, Riot Games incrementally displaced OGN’s position in stage 2, and Riot Games attained exclusive rights to sponsorship in stage 3.
League administration
In 2012, Riot Games and OGN jointly administered the Korean League of Legends league. As previously noted, Riot Games benefited from OGN’s expertise and resources during the initial period, but eventually excluded OGN from league operations beginning in 2019. As such, this co-administration became another site of contested power. On March 14, 2012, the opening ceremony for the league took place with executive members and employees from Riot Games, OGN, players, coaches, and other staff in attendance. In images of the ceremony, the logos of both OGN and Riot Games appeared together, signaling that both parties were primary actors in the launch of the league. Additionally, during the question-and-answer sessions, reporters asked both Riot Games and OGN about their plans to compete with North America and Europe, as well as how they would solve the cable TV broadcasting problems. This suggests that, in stage 1, administrative power was broadly shared between Riot Games and OGN.
Later, in 2015, a significant change occurred in the Korean league; its title was unified under the name League of Legends Champions Korea, LCK. On November 11, 2014, Korea e-Sports Association (KeSPA), announced their final plan for reforming the Korean LoL league for sustainable growth (see Gafford, 2014). In the press release, KeSPA mentioned “three parties (KeSPA, Riot Games, and OGN),” emphasizing continuous discussions among them. As the main content of the plan focused on fundamental systems (e.g. new format, mandatory roster, semi-pro tier league), it can be inferred that all three parties held authority over the league at this point.
However, in October and November 2015, Riot Games applied for the trademark for “LEAGUE OF LEGENDS CHAMPIONS KOREA” in the U.S. and South Korea, respectively. Trademarks, within the realm of IP law, protect holders from misappropriation by others and prevent consumer confusion regarding the products or services being consumed (Gravely, 2023). Having a trademark not only gives monopolistic power but also enhances the power of the owner (Pugatch and Perez, 2004). If Riot Games became the sole owner of the LCK trademark, OGN would no longer be able to use the LCK name and logo without Riot Games’ permission. Consequently, audiences may perceive Riot Games as the primary actor in the LCK. Although Riot Games’ trademark application was published in the U.S., the Korea Intellectual Property Office rejected it in 2018. In this context, the application can be interpreted as Riot Games’ attempt to exercise greater symbolic power under the protection of trademark registration. Given that this event unfolded during the dispute over the split broadcast, fans in online communities speculated that it is related to the conflict. 1 Addressing this, Riot Games Korea stated, “This aspect is a general trademark registration which has been discussed and prepared with OGN for a long time. There is no particular association with the issue[co-broadcasting issue], so hopefully, it will not be overly interpreted” (Park, 2015).
The trademark attempt can be read together with Riot Games’ plans for the future. In concert with its plans to construct a new stadium (Choi, 2017), Riot Games was moving to dominate this space and nascent industry. With the intention of establishing its own facilities and broadcasting system, Riot Games seemingly aimed to consolidate rights over a globally popular league. Their recognition of the widespread brand awareness of LCK, not only in Korea but also in other countries, was evident. For instance, during the LoL Pro Player Summit on July 6, 2015, Junghyun Kwon, the managing director of Riot Games’ esports communications division, emphasized “In the process of League of Legends esports evolving into regular sports, domestic league and players are increasingly gained more spotlight in foreign media, raising their awareness” (Ko, 2015). Furthermore, in 2017, Riot Games acknowledged the significant global brand awareness of LCK. As a whole, these moves suggest that in stage 2, Riot Games actively sought to expand its influence over other stakeholders, while KeSPA, Riot Games, and OGN jointly administered the league.
Co-broadcasting was one of the strategies that Riot Games implemented to gain power over league administration. In 2015, a conflict arose between Riot Games and OGN when Riot Games attempted to allow another TV network to broadcast LCK. According to OGN, there was no prior discussion with Riot Games, and it was a sudden announcement from Riot Games (Ko, 2015). On December 3, Riot Games announced that it was considering splitting the broadcast rights and granting some matches to another TV network, SPOTV, stating that the goal was to improve the fan experience through competition (Shin, 2015). In this announcement, Riot Games Korea CEO Seunghyun Lee expressed his expectation: “If the new broadcaster’s quality improves quickly, fans will be able to enjoy high-quality coverage on two channels. In the longer term, friendly competition between broadcasters will gradually improve the overall quality of LCK broadcasts” (Shin, 2015). However, Riot Games later revised its initial plan to maintain OGN as the primary broadcaster for all LCK games while also granting SPOTV the rights to broadcast selected matches. While Riot Games’ agreement announcement emphasized “providing fans with the best possible LoL esports experience” (Park, 2015), there is a view that this change reflected fan pushback over losing the opportunity to watch OGN’s high-quality broadcast (Lingle, 2015). Thus, this study interprets that Riot Games introduced co-broadcasting as a strategy to diminish OGN’s broadcasting power over LCK content by splitting audiences and revenues, but later withdrew the plan in response to fan opinion.
Lastly, on November 13, 2017, Riot Games hosted “A session for the construction and operation of an LCK executive stadium.” During this session, Riot Games announced its plans to construct the stadium in September 2018 and to independently broadcast esports from 2019 onward. Additionally, Seunghyun Lee, the representative of Riot Games Korea, and Sanghun Oh, the head of esports division at Riot Games Korea, announced the changes in league management and broadcasting systems. Lee stated that these changes had been discussed since the beginning stage of the decision-making process and they would collaborate with two stations.
Lee: “Even though we are taking charge of the broadcast production, it doesn’t mean our association with OGN and SPOTV is over. The collaboration will continue” (Seo, 2017) Lee: “We have been discussing this since the stage of finding a venue. We have been in touch up until recently about what will happen today. We have special trust and respect for both broadcasting companies.” (Choi, 2017)
Moreover, Riot Games Korea indicated that, beginning in 2019, broadcasters would need to purchase broadcast rights rather than receive production support. In response to the question, “In the past, broadcasters carried the league with production support. If Riot Games moves to in-house production, would broadcasters then have to buy the broadcast rights themselves?” (Shin, 2017), Riot Games Korea said Riot Games Korea: We have considered that. In traditional sports, popular events are typically broadcast by networks that purchase broadcasting rights, while less popular ones receive production cost support to air. We expect the LCK to follow a similar pattern. Most importantly, we aim to support the platforms that fans prefer. (Shin, 2017)
On January 11, 2019, during the media day of LCK 2019, Riot Games announced that they would broadcast LCK and esports leagues with several partners, including SBS (a terrestrial TV network), Afreeca TV (a Korean streaming and VOD platform), Naver TV (a Korean streaming and VOD platform owned by the largest search engine in South Korea), and Facebook Gaming. Riot Games also granted broadcasting rights to global platforms, such as Twitch and Facebook. Significantly, OGN and SPOTV were excluded from Riot Games’ plan.
On April 5, 2020, Riot Games (2020) announced that it would apply its franchise system, a long-term partnership model, to the LCK in 2021. It renamed the web link of the LCK to “The Future of LCK” (https://thefutureoflck.com/en/index.html) and broadcast through livestreaming platforms. For instance, the official LCK YouTube channel was launched on January 14, 2019 (https://www.youtube.com/@LCK/about). Riot Games (2020) explained that this long-term partnership model and emphasized that it would support the LCK to become a global leading league, assist professional teams to manage more stably, and focus on fans. In its plan, Riot Games stated that it would manage the LCK, abolish the promotion and relegation system, and not operate League of Legends Challengers Korea, a semi-pro tier league. Instead, Riot Games would create an academy league called LCK CL which would be managed by KeSPA. By 2023, therefore, Riot Games had succeeded in consolidating its power by controlling the entire long- term partnership system and ultimately deciding who participates in the league.
Discussion
Summary
This study applied critical political economy to examine the power dynamics between OGN and Riot Games across three stages, showing a gradual decline in OGN’s influence within the LCK and a concurrent increase in Riot Games’ power. These changes in power can be attributed to OGN’s historical prominence as an early pioneer in esports broadcasting, and to the emergence of livestreaming platforms. When Riot Games entered the Korean market, its strategies likely focused on emulating OGN’s past achievements and expertise. Initially, Riot Games appears to have leveraged OGN’s accumulated resources and knowledge. Likewise, OGN likely perceived itself as the primary platform in Korea for collaboration with Riot Games.
The implications of the world’s first esports TV network’s closure
The findings of this study highlight the growing concentration of power in the distribution of esports content by game publishers. This shift has been enabled by emerging technologies, most notably streaming, which have reduced the need for intermediaries such as OGN. The closure of OGN implies a broader consolidation of the esports industry, centering power among game publishers and global media platforms such as YouTube and Twitch. Given OGN’s position as the world’s first esports TV network with a dedicated venue for esports events, its closure indicates a diminishing role of local TV networks in esports. Distribution of esports has since become increasingly concentrated among a small number of transnational platforms, mainly YouTube and Twitch. In addition, Riot Games further consolidated the ecosystem through its IP power and the introduction of a league franchising system, which locked in teams, sponsors, and revenue distribution under its governance, effectively excluding local actors, such as broadcasters and KeSPA.
This study further examines how the loss of local actors and market consolidation affect the esports ecosystem, particularly professional teams, fan experience, and viewer access. When Riot Games introduced the franchise system for the LCK, teams were initially asked to pay 10 billion KRW (8.34 million USD in 2020), later reduced by 33%, to create a “sustainable esports ecosystem from the perspectives of teams, players, and fans” (Riot Games, 2020). Despite this rhetoric, 10 LCK teams issued a joint statement in 2024 urging the league to establish a sustainable revenue model, revealing that such promises of prosperity were not fulfilled (Park, 2024).
The transformation of fan culture also reflects the effects of consolidation. Riot Games announced that post-match fan meetings would be suspended due to a lack of space at the venue. However, reporters later found that part of the space had been converted into commercial facilities such as ticket booths and merchandise shops (Kim, 2024). Although Riot withdrew the plan following fan backlash, ticket prices sharply increased, by 33% on weekdays and 25% on weekends. This reconfiguration shows how fan experience, a longstanding element of Korean esports culture, has been subsumed to commercial logic—an example of how corporate consolidation can commodify community practices.
Conflicts between Riot Games and streaming platforms have also revealed negative consequences for users. When negotiations with Twitch over the Korean language contract broke down for the Spring 2023 season, 2 Korean viewers and streamers had to switch to domestic platforms that could not handle the sudden traffic surge, imposing switching costs on streamers and causing service disruptions for audiences. This example highlights how audiences and smaller domestic platforms become victims of corporate power struggles in a concentrated esports environment.
From the perspective of critical political economy, these consequences indicate that the shift from OGN to Riot Games engenders the spatialization and commodification of the Korean esports industry. Mosco (2009, p. 158) viewed spatialization as an “institutional extension of corporate power” that can be measured through corporate concentration. Due to streaming technology, IP power, and franchise systems, Riot Games can exert power beyond the geographical boundaries and can eliminate domestic actors. The shift from OGN to Riot Games does not merely show power asymmetries; rather, it indicates the agglomeration of capital and resources of global firms, led by Riot Games.
Conclusion: from broadcast to streaming with IP and league franchising
With the rise of streaming technologies and IP power, game publishers no longer had to rely on local broadcasters to make esports visible. Unlike traditional broadcast, streaming platforms allow users to stream their gameplay, which in turn promotes the publishers’ game at little cost. This environment enabled Riot Games to extend and centralize its control over esports not only in South Korea but also globally. When distribution shifted from dedicated TV networks such as OGN to streaming platforms such as YouTube and Twitch, game publishers did not lose power. Rather, they restructured it on top of the platforms by operating official league channels and providing media rights directly to selected partners.
Even though Riot Games does not run its own streaming platform, it hosts other platforms (e.g. YouTube and Twitch) on its official site (lolesports.com), where international tournament events such as the 2025 League of Legends World Championship are streamed through Riot Games’ YouTube and Twitch channels. Viewers who watch through Riot Games’ own site receive exclusive brand-new rewards known as “Drops,” while Twitch viewers receive Twitch-relevant rewards, such as ad-free viewing and channel points. This shows how the publisher can layer its own distribution and incentive on top of third-party platforms. Additionally, Riot Games tried to develop its own stream system, Riot Esports Network (REN), but it canceled the development plan in January 2024 (D’Anastasio, 2024). These attempts suggest potential future tensions between vertically integrated global publishers and global streaming platforms. If global game publishers continue to internalize streaming and distribution functions, this may further accelerate the platformization of the global esports industry. In this environment, we need to focus on how this battle affects audiences, including fewer options during disputes, switching costs across platforms, degraded quality of experience, and the loss of local voices. Audiences’ access, choice, and quality of experience must not be treated as bargaining chips in publisher-platform disputes.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr. Christopher Ali for his insightful feedback on a draft of this manuscript.
Ethical considerations
This article does not contain any studies with human or animal participants.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.