Service collaborations often must confront risks arising from problems of coordination, division, and defection. U.S. scholars have focused on understanding the efficacy of three general strategies to reducing these risks. First, the use of adaptive and restrictive contracts to reduce the risks from service characteristics has received a lot of attention. Second, scholars have studied how the use of different institutional arrangements reduces the risks of collaborative service provision. Third, attention has been devoted to understanding how the social networks of administrators and elected officials mitigate risk in sharing services. This article concludes with suggestions for future research on this topic.
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