Since the early 2000s, the terms ‘re-municipalization’ and ‘reverse privatization’ entered the lexicon as several examples emerged of governments taking ownership of assets and services that had previously been privatized or outsourced. Various methods are used to implement re-municipalization decisions and differences are observed across countries and sectors. The approaches most frequently adopted are re-municipalization through contract termination and contract expiration. We utilize a wide database of re-municipalizations worldwide to analyse the factors that influence governments’ choice between these two approaches. The results from our multivariate analysis find a pattern of historical recurrence in the characteristics of the current re-municipalization process.
Points for practitioners
Most governments wait for contracts to expire but the number of contract terminations is sizeable. Re-municipalization in larger cities, network sectors (particularly water) and implemented by municipal governments have a positive association with termination. Re-municipalization of energy utilities and conducted in countries of French legal origin is positively associated with contract expiration. Patterns of contemporary re-municipalization closely resemble those witnessed in the ‘Progressive Era’.
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