Does One Size Fit All? Investigating Pay–Future Performance Relationships Over the “Seasons” of CEO Tenure

Abstract

Boards of directors must navigate between adopting standardized “best practices” for their CEOs’ pay plans, on the one hand, and customizing their CEOs’ pay to align their particular CEO’s goals with those of shareholders, on the other. We build theory proposing that the incentive effects of different CEO compensation types vary consistently over CEO tenures and, therefore, that overstandardization of CEO pay plans actually can hurt shareholders. Our analysis of a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor’s 500 firms from 1998 to 2005 shows declining benefits to shareholders from performance-based compensation (i.e., options and bonuses) as CEO tenure increases but an opposite effect for non-performance-based (i.e., salary) pay. These findings can be considered a preliminary warning that normative “best practices” should not become the exclusive approach to determining CEO pay packages; instead, boards should consider more holistic approaches that incorporate the fit between CEO characteristics and organizational goals.

Keywords

CEO tenure executive compensation shareholder returns upper echelons

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Agrawal

A. K.

2012. Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: Evidence from proxy voting. Review of Financial Studies, 25: 187-226.

Aiken

L. S.

West

S. G.

1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ainslie

1992. Picoeconomics: The interaction of successive motivational states within the individual. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Alchian

A. A.

Demsetz

1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. The American Economic Review, 62: 777-795.

Amihud

Lev

1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell Journal of Economics, 12: 605-617.

Anabtawi

Stout

2008. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. Stanford Law Review, 60: 1255-1308.

Antia

Pantzalis

Park

J. C.

2010. CEO decision horizon and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16: 288-301.

Ashraf

Jayaraman

Ryan

H. E.

Jr.

2012. Do pension-related business ties influence mutual fund proxy voting? Evidence from shareholder proposals on executive compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 47: 567-588.

Bainbridge

S. M.

2006. Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment. Harvard Law Review, 119: 1735-1758.

10.

Barkema

H. G.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

1998. Managerial compensation and firm performance: A general research framework. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 135-145.

11.

Barker

V. L.

Mueller

G. C.

2002. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. Management Science, 48: 782-801.

12.

Bebchuk

2005. The case for increasing shareholder power. Harvard Law Review, 118: 833-914.

13.

Bebchuk

2007. The myth of the shareholder franchise. Virginia Law Review, 93: 675-732.

14.

Bebchuk

Cohen

Spamann

2010. The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Yale Journal of Regulation, 27: 257-282.

15.

Bebchuk

L. A.

Fried

J. M.

2004. Pay without performance: The unfulﬁlled promise of executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

16.

Berger

P. G.

Ofek

Yermack

D. L.

1997. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. Journal of Finance, 52: 1411-1438.

17.

Bertrand

Mullainathan

2001. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 901-932.

18.

Bhagat

Romano

2009. Reforming executive compensation: Focusing and committing to the long-term. Yale Law & Economics research paper no. 374, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

19.

Bizjak

J. M.

Lemmon

M. L.

Naveen

2008. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation? Journal of Financial Economics, 90: 152-168.

20.

Bizjak

J. M.

Lemmon

M. L.

Nguyen

2011. Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design. Journal of Financial Economics, 100: 538-555.

21.

Blettner

D. P.

Chaddad

F. R.

Bettis

R. A.

2012. The CEO performance effect: Statistical issues and a complex fit perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 986-999.

22.

Bodolica

Spraggon

2009. The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions. Strategic Management Journal, 30: 985-1011.

23.

Boeker

1997. Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics and organizational growth. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 152-170.

24.

Boivie

Lange

McDonald

M. L.

Westphal

J. D.

2011. Me or we: The effects of CEO organizational identification on agency costs. Academy of Management Journal, 54: 551-576.

25.

Borges

Silverman

2003. All equity plans now need shareholder approval. Mercer Perspective Alert, July 7.

26.

Boyd

B. K.

1995. CEO duality and firm performance—A contingency model. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 301-312.

27.

Brandes

Goranova

Hall

2008. Navigating shareholder influence: Compensation plans and the shareholder approval process. Academy of Management Perspectives, 22: 41-57.

28.

Bryan

Hwang

Lilien

2000. CEO stock-based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants. Journal of Business, 73: 661-693.

29.

Cadman

B. D.

Rusticus

T. O.

Sunder

2013. Stock option grant vesting terms: Economic and financial reporting determinants. Review of Accounting Studies, 18: 1159-1190.

30.

Campbell

J. T.

Campbell

T. C.

Sirmon

D. G.

Bierman

Tuggle

C. S.

2012. Shareholder influence over director nomination via proxy access: Implications for agency conflict and stakeholder value. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 1431-1451.

31.

Cannella

A. A.

Jr. Park

J. H.

Lee

H. U.

2008. Top management team functional background diversity and firm performance: Examining the roles of team member colocation and environmental uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 51: 768-784.

32.

Carpenter

M. A.

Geletkanycz

M. A.

Sanders

W. G.

2004. Upper echelons research revisited: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition. Journal of Management, 30: 749-778.

33.

Carpenter

M. A.

Sanders

W. G.

2002. Top management team compensation: The missing link between CEO pay and firm performance? Strategic Management Journal, 23: 367-375.

34.

Carpenter

M. A.

Sanders

W. G.

2004. The effects of top management team pay and firm internationalization on MNC performance. Journal of Management, 30: 509-528.

35.

Child

1974. Managerial and organizational factors associated with company performance: Part I. Journal of Management Studies, 11: 175-189.

36.

Coffee

J. C.

Jr.

1988. Shareholders versus managers: The strain in the corporate web. In Coffee

J. C.

Lowenstein

Rose-Ackerman

(Eds.), Knights, raiders and targets: The impact of the hostile takeover: 77-134. New York: Oxford University Press.

37.

Core

J. E.

Guay

W. R.

2010. Is CEO pay too high and are incentives too low? A wealth-based contracting framework. Academy of Management Perspectives, 24: 5-19.

38.

Crossland

Hambrick

D. C.

2011. Differences in managerial discretion across countries: How nation-level institutions affect the degree to which CEOs matter. Strategic Management Journal, 32: 797-819.

39.

Dalton

D. R.

Hitt

M. A.

Certo

S. T.

Dalton

C. M.

2007. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation: Independence, equity, and the market for corporate control. The Academy of Management Annals, 1: 1-64.

40.

Denrell

2005. Should we be impressed with high performance? Journal of Management Inquiry, 14: 292-298.

41.

Devers

C. E.

Cannella

A. A.

Reilly

G. P.

Yoder

M. E.

2007. Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33: 1016-1072.

42.

Devers

C. E.

McNamara

Wiseman

R. M.

Arrfelt

2008. Moving closer to the action: Examining compensation design effects on firm risk. Organization Science, 19: 548-566.

43.

Devers

C. E.

Wiseman

R. M.

Holmes

R. M.

2007. The effects of endowment and loss aversion in managerial stock option valuation. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 191-208.

44.

Dimitrov

Jain

P. C.

2011. It’s showtime: Do managers report better news before annual shareholder meetings? Journal of Accounting Research, 49: 1193-1221.

45.

Dowell

G. W. S.

Shackell

M. B.

Stuart

N. V.

2011. Boards, CEOs, and surviving a financial crisis: Evidence from the Internet shakeout. Strategic Management Journal, 32: 1025-1045.

46.

Economist. 2009. Clearing out the corner office. October 3-9: 93.

47.

Efendi

Srivastava

Swanson

E. P.

2007. Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 667-708.

48.

Eisenhardt

K. M.

1989. Agency theory—An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14: 57-74.

49.

Eisenmann

T. R.

2002. The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 513-534.

50.

Ertimur

Ferri

Muslu

2011. Shareholder activism and CEO pay. Review of Financial Studies, 24: 535-592.

51.

Fama

Jensen

1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-325.

52.

Ferri

Sandino

2009. The impact of shareholder activism on financial reporting and compensation: The case of employee stock options expensing. Accounting Review, 84: 433-466.

53.

Finkelstein

Hambrick

D. C.

1988. Chief executive compensation—A synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 543-558.

54.

Finkelstein

Hambrick

D. C.

1989. Chief executive compensation—A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal, 10: 121-134.

55.

Finkelstein

Hambrick

D. C.

1990. Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes—The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 484-503.

56.

Finkelstein

Hambrick

D. C.

1996. Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations. New York: West.

57.

Finkelstein

Hambrick

D. C.

Cannella

2009. Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards. New York: Oxford University Press.

58.

Fong

E. A.

Misangyi

V. F.

Tosi

H. L.

2010. The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 629-651.

59.

Freudenheim

1993. Experts see tax curbs on executives’ pay as more political than fiscal. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/12/us/experts-see-tax-curbs-on-executives-pay-as-more-political-than-fiscal.html. Accessed July 11, 2014.

60.

Frey

B. S.

Osterloh

2005. Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats. Journal of Management Inquiry, 14: 96-111.

61.

Gabaix

Landier

2008. Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123: 49-100.

62.

Gabarro

J. J.

1987. The dynamics of taking charge. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

63.

Geletkanycz

M. A.

Hambrick

D. C.

1997. The external ties of top executives: Implications for strategic choice and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 654-681.

64.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

1994. Executive compensation: A reassessment and a future research agenda. In Ferris

(Ed.), Research in personnel and human resources management, vol. 12: 161-222. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

65.

Gomez-Mejia

Wiseman

R. M.

1997. Reframing executive compensations: An assessment and outlook. Journal of Management, 23: 291-374.

66.

Greene

W. H.

2003. Econometric analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

67.

Hall

B. J.

Murphy

K. J.

2002. Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 3-42.

68.

Hambrick

D. C.

2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review, 32: 334-343.

69.

Hambrick

D. C.

Finkelstein

1995. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top—The case of CEO pay raises. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 175-193.

70.

Hambrick

D. C.

Fukutomi

G. D. S.

1991. The seasons of a CEO tenure. Academy of Management Review, 16: 719-742.

71.

Hambrick

D. C.

Geletkanycz

M. A.

Fredrickson

J. W.

1993. Top executive commitment to the status quo: Some tests of its determinants. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 401-418.

72.

Hambrick

D. C.

Mason

P. C.

1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reﬂection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-207.

73.

Hanlon

Rajgopal

Shevlin

2003. Are executive stock options associated with future earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36: 3-43.

74.

Hausman

1978. Speciﬁcation tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46: 1251-1271.

75.

Healy

1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 85-107.

76.

Henderson

A. D.

Miller

Hambrick

D. C.

2006. How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and company performance. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 447-460.

77.

Hendry

2002. The principal’s other problems: Honest incompetence and the specification of objectives. Academy of Management Review, 27: 98-113.

78.

Hermalin

B. E.

Wallace

N. E.

2001. Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and loan industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 61: 139-170.

79.

Hill

C. W.

Phan

1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 707-717.

80.

Hoechle

2007. Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional dependence. Stata Journal, 7: 281-312.

81.

Holthausen

R. W.

Larcker

D. F.

Sloan

R. G.

1995. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19: 29-74.

82.

Hoskisson

Hitt

1994. Downscoping: How to tame the diversified firm. New York: Oxford University Press.

83.

Hoskisson

R. E.

Hitt

M. A.

Hill

C. W. L.

1993. Managerial incentives and investment in research-and-development in large multiproduct firms. Organization Science, 4: 325-341.

84.

Ittner

C. D.

Larcker

D. F.

Rajan

M. V.

1997. The choice of performance measures in annual bonus contracts. Accounting Review, 72: 231-255.

85.

Jensen

M. C.

1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48: 831-880.

86.

Jensen

M. C.

Meckling

W. H.

1976. Theory of the ﬁrm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.

87.

Jensen

M. C.

Murphy

K. J.

1990. CEO incentives—It’s not how much you pay, but how. Harvard Business Review, 68: 138-153.

88.

Jensen

Zajac

E. J.

2004. Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 507-524.

89.

Kaplan

S. N.

2008. Are US CEOs overpaid? Academy of Management Perspectives, 22: 5-20.

90.

Kaplan

S. N.

2013. CEO pay and corporate governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, facts, and challenges. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25: 8-25.

91.

Kapner

2013. Citi awards CEO $11.5 million in pay. Wall Street Journal, February 21. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323864304578318392155532904.html. Accessed March 9, 2013.

92.

Kohn

1993. Why incentive plans cannot work. Harvard Business Review, 71: 54-63.

93.

Kor

Y. Y.

2003. Experience-based top management team competence and sustained growth. Organization Science, 14: 707-719.

94.

Lambert

R. A.

Larcker

D. F.

Weigelt

1991. How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size? Strategic Management Journal, 12: 395-402.

95.

Larcker

D. F.

1983. The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5: 9-30.

96.

Larkin

Pierce

Gino

2012. The psychological costs of pay-for-performance: Implications for the strategic compensation of employees. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 1194-1214.

97.

Lee

P. M.

James

E. H.

2007. She’-e-os: Gender effects and investor reactions to the announcements of top executive appointments. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 227-241.

98.

Lewellen

W. G.

Huntsman

1970. Managerial pay and corporate performance. American Economic Review, 60: 710-720.

99.

Luo

Kanuri

V. K.

Andrews

in press. How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships. Strategic Management Journal. doi:10.1002/smj/2112

100.

Macey

J. R.

2010. Corporate governance: Promises kept, promises broken. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

101.

Martin

G. P.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

Wiseman

R. M.

2012. The life cycle of CEO compensation. Harvard Business Review, October: 26.

102.

Martin

G. P.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

Wiseman

R. M.

2013. Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model. Academy of Management Journal, 58: 451-472.

103.

Matsunaga

S. R.

Park

C. Q.

2001. The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. The Accounting Review, 76: 313-332.

104.

Meulbroek

L. K.

2001. The efficiency of equity-linked compensation: Understanding the full cost of awarding executive stock options. Financial Management, 30: 5-44.

105.

Miller

1991. Stale in the saddle—CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment. Management Science, 37: 34-52.

106.

Miller

1993. The architecture of simplicity. Academy of Management Review, 18: 116-138.

107.

Miller

Hickson

Wilson

2008. From strategy to action involvement and influence in top level decisions. Long Range Planning, 41: 606-628.

108.

Morck

Shleifer

Vishny

R. W.

1988. Management ownership and market valuation. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315.

109.

Murphy

K. J.

1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 11-42.

110.

Naveen

2006. Organizational complexity and succession planning. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41: 661-683.

111.

Ndofor

H. A.

Priem

R. L.

Rathburn

J. A.

Dhir

A. K.

2009. What does the new boss think? How new leaders’ cognitive communities and recent “top-job” success affect organizational change and performance. Leadership Quarterly, 20: 799-813.

112.

Neter

Wasserman

Kutner

1985. Applied linear statistical models. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

113.

Nyberg

A. J.

Fulmer

I. S.

Gerhart

Carpenter

M. A.

2010. Agency theory revisited: CEO returns and shareholder interest alignment. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1029-1049.

114.

Ocasio

1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 285-312.

115.

Ocasio

1999. Institutionalized action and corporate governance: The reliance on rules of CEO succession. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 384-416.

116.

Pepper

Gore

2015. Behavioral agency theory: New foundations for theorizing about executive compensation. Journal of Management. 41: 1045-1068

117.

Perry

Zenner

2001. Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts. Journal of Financial Economics, 62: 453-488.

118.

Rajgopal

Shevlin

2002. Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 145-171.

119.

Rappaport

1978. Executive incentives vs. corporate growth. Harvard Business Review, 56: 81-88.

120.

Raviv

1985. Management compensation and the managerial labor markets: An overview. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 239-245.

121.

Roodman

2006. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to “difference” and “system” GMM in Stata. Working paper no. 103, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.

122.

Rothberg

Lilien

2006. Mutual funds and proxy voting: New evidence on corporate governance. Journal of Business and Technology Law, 1: 157-184.

123.

Salancik

G. R.

Pfeffer

1978. A social information processing approach to job attitudes and task design. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23: 224-253.

124.

Sanders

W. G.

2001. Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 477-492.

125.

Sanders

W. M. G.

Hambrick

D. C.

2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 1055-1078.

126.

Scherb

Chingos

2004. Getting dramatic shift to occur in your compensation strategy. Paper presented at the annual meeting of World at Work, Boston, MA.

127.

Schiehll

Bellavance

2009. Board of directors, CEO ownership, and the use of non-financial performance measures in the CEO bonus plan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 90-106.

128.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2005. Commission amends compliance dates for FASB statement no. 123R on employee stock options. April 14. http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-57.htm

129.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2006a. Proposals to amend rules for disclosure of executive compensation. January 17. http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706rcc.htm

130.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2006b. Executive compensation and related person disclosure: Final rule 33-8732a, item 402(b)(2)(xiv). http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf

131.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2011a. SEC proposes rules on disclosure of incentive-based compensation arrangements at financial institutions. March 2. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch030211ebw-icomp.htm

132.

Securities and Exchange Commission. 2011b. Shareholder approval of executive compensation and golden parachute compensation. January 25. http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf

133.

Shaw

K. W.

Zhang

M. H.

2010. Is CEO cash compensation punished for poor firm performance? The Accounting Review, 85: 1065-1093.

134.

Shen

2003. The dynamics of the CEO-board relationship: An evolutionary perspective. Academy of Management Review, 28: 466-476.

135.

Shen

Cannella

A. A.

2002. Power dynamics within top management and their impacts on CEO dismissal followed by inside succession. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 1195-1206.

136.

Silver-Greenberg

Schwartz

N. D.

2012. Citigroup’s chief rebuffed on pay by shareholders. New York Times, April 17. http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-executive-pay-plan/?_php=true&_type=blogs&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2_20120418&_r=0. Accessed July 11, 2014.

137.

Simon

H. A.

1964. On the concept of organizational goal. Administrative Science Quarterly, 9: 1-22.

138.

Simsek

2007. CEO tenure and organizational performance: An intervening model. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 653-662.

139.

Sonnenfeld

1988. The hero’s farewell: What happens when CEOs retire. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

140.

Souder

Bromiley

2012. Explaining temporal orientation: Evidence from the durability of firms’ capital investments. Strategic Management Journal, 33: 550-569.

141.

Souder

Shaver

J. M.

2010. Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1316-1336.

142.

Steel

Konig

C. J.

2006. Integrating theories of motivation. Academy of Management Review, 31: 889-913.

143.

Tolia

1997. The CEO compensation puzzle: Theory and practice. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

144.

Tosi

H. L.

Werner

Katz

J. P.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

2000. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26: 301-339.

145.

Vancil

1987. Passing the baton: Managing the process of CEO succession. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

146.

Van Essen

Otten

Carberry

E. J.

2015. Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to understanding the determinants of CEO compensation. Journal of Management. 41: 164-202

147.

Vanguard. 2002. [Letter to Securities and Exchange Commission]. December 5. http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/rgbarton1.htm. Accessed January 16, 2008.

148.

Wiersema

M. F.

Bantel

K. A.

1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 91-121.

149.

Winograd

Aisenbrey

2001. Designing state-of-the-art executive stock ownership guidelines. Compensation and Benefits Review, 33: 32-38.

150.

Wowak

A. J.

Hambrick

D. C.

2010. A model of person-pay interaction: How executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 803-821.

151.

Wowak

A. J.

Hambrick

D. C.

Henderson

A. D.

2011. Do CEOs encounter within-tenure settling up? A multiperiod perspective on executive pay and dismissal. Academy of Management Journal, 54: 719-739.

152.

Wright

Kroll

Krug

J. A.

Pettus

2007. Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 81-89.

153.

S. B.

Levitas

Priem

R. L.

2005. CEO tenure and company invention under differing levels of technological dynamism. Academy of Management Journal, 48: 859-873.

154.

Yanadori

Marler

J. H.

2006. Compensation strategy: Does business strategy influence compensation in high-technology firms? Strategic Management Journal, 27: 559-570.

155.

Zahra

S. A.

Neubaum

D. O.

Huse

2000. Entrepreneurship in medium-size companies: Exploring the effects of ownership and governance systems. Journal of Management, 26: 947-976.

156.

Zajac

E. J.

Bazerman

M. H.

1991. Blind spots in industry and competitor analysis: Implications of interfirm (mis)perceptions for strategic decisions. Academy of Management Review, 16: 37-56.

157.

Zajac

E. J.

Westphal

J. D.

1996. Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 507-529.

158.

Zhang

2008. Information asymmetry and the dismissal of newly appointed CEOs: An empirical investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 859-872.

159.

Zhang

Rajagopalan

2003. Explaining new CEO origin: Firm versus industry antecedents. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 327-338.

160.

Zhang

Rajagopalan

2004. When the known devil is better than an unknown god: An empirical study of the antecedents and consequences of relay CEO successions. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 483-500.

161.

Zhang

Rajagopalan

2010. Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO origin, strategic change, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 334-346.

162.

Zheng

2010. The effect of CEO tenure on CEO compensation: Evidence from inside CEOs vs. outside CEOs. Managerial Finance, 36: 832-859.