Our study summarizes the state of knowledge on the topic of multimarket competition. We classify the current research into four broad themes: (1) the antecedents of multimarket contact (MMC), (2) the outcomes of MMC, (3) the contingencies that moderate the mutual forbearance hypothesis, and (4) extensions beyond traditional multimarket competition research. We also highlight several areas and research questions that we believe will be particularly promising for future research.
AlexanderD. L.1985. An empirical test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis: The case of bank holding companies. Southern Economic Journal, 52: 122–140.
2.
AnandJ.MesquitaL. F.VassoloR. S.2009. The dynamics of multimarket competition in exploration and exploitation activities. Academy of Management Journal, 52: 802–821.
3.
AudiaP. G.SorensonO.HageJ.2001. Tradeoffs in the organization of production: Multi-unit firms, geographic dispersion and organizational learning. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 75–105. London: Emerald.
4.
BarnettW. P.1993. Strategic deterrence among multipoint competitors. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2: 249–278.
5.
BaronD. P.1995. Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California Management Review, 37(2): 47–65.
6.
BaumJ. A. C.KornH. J.1996. Competitive dynamics of interfirm rivalry. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 255–291.
7.
BaumJ. A. C.KornH. J.1999. Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 251–278.
8.
BernheimB. D.WhinstonM. D.1990. Multimarket contact and collusive behavior. RAND Journal of Economics, 21: 1–26.
9.
BoekerW.1997. Executive migration and strategic change: The effect of top manager movement on product-market entry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 213–236.
10.
BoekerW.GoodsteinJ.StephanJ.MurmannJ. P.1997. Competition in a multimarket environment: The case of market exit. Organization Science, 8: 126–142.
11.
BondE. W.SyropoulosC.2008. Trade costs and multimarket collusion. RAND Journal of Economics, 39: 1080–1104.
12.
BowerJ. L.1970. Managing the resource allocation process. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
13.
CassidyC. M.LoreeD.2001. Dynamics of knowledge transfer among multimarket competitors. In SilvermanB. (Ed.), Advances in strategic management: 141–174. London: Emerald.
14.
ChangM.-H.HarringtonJ. E.Jr.2003. Multimarket competition, consumer search, and the organizational structure of multiunit firms. Management Science, 49: 541–552.
15.
ChenM.-J.1996. Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration. Academy of Management Review, 21: 100–134.
16.
ChenM.-J.SmithK. G.GrimmC. M.1992. Action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses. Management Science, 38: 439–455.
17.
CoughlanA. T.WernerfeltB.1989. On credible delegation by oligopolists: A discussion of distribution channel management. Management Science, 35: 226–239.
De BonisRFerrandoA. 2000. The multimarket contacts theory: An application to Italian banks. Paper no. 387, Bank of Italy.
21.
DunneT.RobertsM. J.SamuelsonL.1988. Patterns of firm entry and exit in US manufacturing industries. RAND Journal of Economics, 19: 495–515.
22.
EdwardsC. D.1955. Conglomerate bigness as a source of power. In Business concentration and price policy: 331–352. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
23.
EvansW. N.KessidesI. N.1994. Living by the “golden rule”: Multimarket contact in the US airline industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 341–366.
24.
FanT. P. C.2010. De novo venture strategy: Arch incumbency at inaugural entry. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 19–38.
25.
FeinbergR. M.1984. Mutual forbearance as an extension of oligopoly theory. Journal of Economics and Business, 36: 243–249.
26.
FeinbergR. M.1985. “Sales at risk”: A test of the mutual forbearance theory of conglomerate behavior. Journal of Business, 58: 225–241.
27.
FernandezN.MarinP. L.1998. Market power and multimarket contact: Some evidence from the Spanish hotel industry. Journal of Industrial Economics, 6: 301–315.
28.
FerrierW. J.SmithK. G.GrimmC. M.1999. The role of competitive action in market share erosion and industry dethronement: A study of industry leaders and challengers. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 372–388.
29.
FuentelsazL.GómezJ.2006. Multipoint competition, strategic similarity and entry into geographic markets. Strategic Management Journal, 27: 477–499.
30.
GimenoJ.1994. Multipoint competition, market rivalry and firm performance: A test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the US airline industry, 1984–1988. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
31.
GimenoJ.1999. Reciprocal threats in multimarket rivalry: Staking out “spheres of influence” in the U.S. airline industry. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 101–128.
32.
GimenoJ.2002. The performance effects of unintended and purposive multimarket contact. Managerial and Decision Economics, 23: 209–224.
33.
GimenoJ.2004. Competition within and between networks: The contingent effect of competitive embeddedness on alliance formation. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 820–842.
34.
GimenoJ.WooC. Y.1996a. Economic multiplexity: The structural embeddedness of cooperation in multiple relations of interdependence. Advances in Strategic Management, 13: 323–361.
35.
GimenoJ.WooC. Y.1996b. Hypercompetition in a multimarket environment: The role of strategic similarity and multimarket contact in competitive de-escalation. Organization Science, 7: 322–341.
36.
GimenoJ.WooC. Y.1999. Multimarket contact, economies of scope, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 239–259.
37.
GoldenB. R.MaH.2003. Mutual forbearance: The role of intra-firm integration and rewards. Academy of Management Review, 28: 480–495.
38.
GrahamE. M.1985. Intra-industry direct foreign investment, market structure, firm rivalry and technological performance. In ErdilekA. (Ed.), Multinationals as mutual invaders: Intra-industry direct foreign investment: 67–88. New York: St. Martin’s.
39.
GrahamE. M.1990. Exchange of threats between multinational firms as an infinitely repeated noncooperative game. International Trade Journal, 4: 259–277.
40.
GranovetterM.1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481–510.
GreveH. R.2000. Market niche entry decisions: Competition, learning, and strategy in Tokyo banking, 1894–1936. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 816–836.
43.
GreveH. R.2003. Why are there so many multiunit organizations?Strategic Organization, 1: 109–115.
44.
GreveH. R.2006. The intent and extent of multimarket contact. Strategic Organization, 4: 249–274.
45.
GreveH. R.2008. Multimarket contact and sales growth: Evidence from insurance. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 229–249.
46.
GreveH. R.BaumJ. A. C.2001. Introduction: A multiunit, multimarket world. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 1–28. London: Emerald.
47.
HannanT. H.2006. Retail deposit fees and multimarket banking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30: 2561–2578.
48.
HannanT. H.PragerR. A.2004. The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28: 1889–1914.
49.
HannanT. H.PragerR. A.2009. The profitability of small, single-market banks in an era of multimarket banking. U.S. Federal Reserve Board Finance & Economic Discussion Series. U.S. Federal Reserve, Washington, DC.
50.
HavemanH. A.NonnemakerL.2000. Competition in multiple geographic markets: The impact on growth and market entry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 232–267.
51.
HeggestadA. A.RhoadesS. A.1978. Multimarket interdependence and local market competition in banking. Review of Economics and Statistics, 60: 523–532.
52.
HeniszW. J.DeliosA.2001. Uncertainty, imitation, and plant location: Japanese multinational corporations, 1990–1996. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 443–475.
53.
HennartJ.-F.1985. Comment on intra-industry direct foreign investment, market structure, firm rivalry, and technological performance, by Edward M. Graham. In ErdilekA. (Ed.), Multinationals as mutual invaders: Intraindustry foreign direct investment: 88–93. Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm.
54.
HughesK.OughtonC.1993. Diversification, multimarket contact and profitability. Economica, 60(238): 203–224.
55.
IngramP.BaumJ. A. C.1997. Chain affiliation and the failure of Manhattan hotels, 1898–1980. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 68–102.
56.
JansI.RosenbaumD. I.1997. Multimarket contact and pricing: Evidence from the US cement industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15: 391–412.
57.
JayachandranS.GimenoJ.VaradarajanP. R.1999. The theory of multimarket competition: A synthesis and implications for marketing strategy. Journal of Marketing, 63(3): 49–66.
58.
KalninsA.2004. Divisional multimarket contact within and between multi-unit organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 117–128.
59.
KangW.BayusB. L.BalasubramanianS.2010. The strategic effects of multimarket contact: Mutual forbearance and competitive response in the personal computer industry. Journal of Marketing Research, 47: 415–427.
60.
KarnaniA.WernerfeltB.1985. Multiple point competition. Strategic Management Journal, 6: 87–96.
61.
KimE. H.SingalV.1993. Mergers and market power: Evidence from the airline industry. American Economic Review, 83: 549–569.
62.
KnickerbockerF. T.1973. Oligopolistic reaction and multinational enterprise. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
63.
KornH. J.BaumJ. A. C.1999. Chance, imitative, and strategic antecedents to multimarket contact. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 171–193.
64.
KornH. J.RockT. T.2001. Beyond multimarket contact to mutual forbearance: Pursuit of multimarket strategy. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 53–74. Oxford, UK: JAI.
65.
LiS. X.GreenwoodR.2004. The effect of within-industry diversification on firm performance: Synergy creation, multi-market contact and market structuration. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1131–1153.
66.
MaH.1998. Mutual forbearance in international business. Journal of International Management, 4: 129–147.
67.
MacMillanI. C.Van PuttenA. B.McGrathR. G.2003. Global gamesmanship. Harvard Business Review, 81(5): 62–71.
68.
MakadokR.2010. The interaction effect of rivalry restraint and competitive advantage on profit: Why the whole is less than the sum of the parts. Management Science, 56: 356–372.
69.
MarkmanG. D.GianiodisP. T.BuchholtzA. K.2009. Factor-market rivalry. Academy of Management Review, 34: 423–441.
70.
MartinezJ. E.1990. The linked oligopoly concept: Recent evidence from banking. Journal of Economic Issues, 24: 589–595.
71.
Mas-RuizF.Ruiz-MorenoF.2011. Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: The firm-size effects. Strategic Management Journal, 32: 1286–1308.
72.
MasonC. F.PhillipsO. R.2000. Vertical integration and collusive incentives: An experimental analysis. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18: 471–496.
73.
McGrathR. G.ChenM.-J.MacMillanI. C.1998. Multimarket maneuvering in uncertain spheres of influence: Resource diversion strategies. Academy of Management Review, 23: 724–740.
74.
MesterL. J.1987. Multiple market contact between savings and loans. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 19: 538–549.
75.
ParkerP. M.RöllerL.-H.1997. Collusive conduct in duopolies: Multimarket contact and cross-ownership in the mobile telephone industry. RAND Journal of Economics, 28: 304–322.
76.
PenningsJ. M.1981. Strategically interdependent organizations. In NystromP. C.StarbuckW. H. (Eds.), Handbook of organizational design. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
77.
PhillipsO. R.MasonC. F.1992. Mutual forbearance in experimental conglomerate markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 23: 395–414.
78.
PhillipsO. R.MasonC. F.1996. Market regulation and multimarket rivalry. RAND Journal of Economics, 27: 596–617.
79.
PhillipsO. R.MasonC. F.2001. Collusion in horizontally connected markets: Multimarket producers as conduits for learning. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 205–227. London: Emerald.
80.
PorterM. E.1984. Strategic interactions: Some lessons from industry histories for theory and antitrust policy. In LambR. B. (Ed.), Competitive strategic management: 415–445. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
81.
PrinceJ. T.SimonD. H.2009. Multimarket contact and service quality: Evidence from on-time performance in the US airline industry. Academy of Management Journal, 52: 336–354.
82.
RhoadesS. A.1973. The effect of diversification on industry profit performance in 241 manufacturing industries: 1963. Review of Economics and Statistics, 55: 146–155.
83.
RhoadesS. A.HeggestadA. A.1985. Multimarket interdependence and performance in banking: Two tests. Antitrust Bulletin, 30(Winter): 975–995.
84.
SandlerR. D.1988. Market share instability in commercial airline markets and the impact of deregulation. Journal of Industrial Economics, 36: 327–335.
85.
ScottJ. T.1982. Multimarket contact and economic performance. Review of Economics and Statistics, 64: 368–375.
86.
ScottJ. T.1991. Research diversity induced by rivalry. In AcsZ.AudretschD. B. (Eds.), Innovation and technological change: 132–151. London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
87.
ScottJ. T.2001. Designing multimarket-contact hypothesis tests: Patent citations and multimarket contact in the product and innovation markets of the chemicals industry. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 175–200. London: Emerald.
88.
ScottW. R.2001. Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
89.
SengulM.GimenoJ.2012. Constrained delegation: Allocation of decision rights and resources in firms that compete across multiple industries. Working paper, Boston College, Boston, MA.
90.
ShankarV.1999. New product introduction and incumbent response strategies: Their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact. Journal of Marketing Research, 36: 327–344.
91.
ShipilovA. V.2009. Firm scope experience, historic multimarket contact with partners, centrality, and the relationship between structural holes and performance. Organization Science, 20: 85–106.
92.
SimmelG.1950. Superordination and subordination and degrees of domination and freedom. In WolffK. (Ed.), The sociology of Georg Simmel: 268–303. New York: Free Press.
93.
SingalV.1996. Airline mergers and multimarket contact. Managerial and Decision Economics, 17: 559–574.
94.
SmithF. L.WilsonR. L.1995. The predictive validity of the Karnani & Wernerfelt model of multipoint competition. Strategic Management Journal, 16: 143–160.
95.
StephanJ.BoekerW.2001. Getting to multimarket competition: How multimarket contact affects firms’ market entry decisions. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 229–261. London: Emerald.
96.
StephanJ.MurmannJ. P.BoekerW.GoodsteinJ.2003. Bringing managers into theories of multimarket competition: CEOs and the determinants of market entry. Organization Science, 14: 403–421.
97.
StricklandA. D.1985. Conglomerate mergers, mutual forbearance behavior and price competition. Managerial and Decision Economics, 6(3): 153–159.
98.
ThomasC. J.WilligR. D.2006. The risk of contagion from multimarket contact. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24: 1157–1184.
99.
van WegbergM.van WitteloostuijnA. 2001. Strategic management in the new economy: Modern information technologies and multichannel contact strategies. In BaumJ. A. C.GreveH. R. (Eds.), Advances in strategic management: 263–304. London: Emerald.
100.
VaradarajanP. R.JayachandranS.WhiteJ. C.2001. Strategic interdependence in organizations: Deconglomeration and marketing strategy. Journal of Marketing, 65(1): 15–28.
101.
VerbovenF. L.1998. Price discrimination and tax incidence: Evidence from gasoline and diesel cars. Discussion paper no. 1998–129, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg, Netherlands.
102.
VonortasN. S.2000. Technology policy in the United States and the European Union: Shifting orientation towards technology users. Science and Public Policy, 27(2): 97–108.
103.
WaldfogelJ.WulfJ.2006. Measuring the effect of multimarket contact on competition: Evidence from mergers following radio broadcast ownership deregulation. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(1): 1–23.
104.
WhiteheadD. D.1978. An empirical test of the linked oligopoly theory: An analysis of Florida holding companies. In Conference on bank structure and competition: 119–140. Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
105.
YoungG.SmithK. G.GrimmC. M.SimonD.2000. Multimarket contact and resource dissimilarity: A competitive dynamics perspective. Journal of Management, 26: 1217–1236.
106.
YuT.CannellaA. A.Jr.2007. Rivalry between multinational enterprises: An event history approach. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 663–684.
107.
YuT.SubramaniamM.CannellaA. A.Jr.2009. Rivalry deterrence in international markets: Contingencies governing the mutual forbearance hypothesis. Academy of Management Journal, 52: 127–147.
