We investigated how individuals judge politicians embroiled in scandal. Drawing on social identity and realistic group conflict theory, we predicted that beyond an overall ingroup bias, partisans would be particularly forgiving of in-party politicians who denied or justified their misconduct rather than apologize for it. By insisting that they did nothing wrong, these politicians defend the public image of their party and signal their commitment to partisan goals. We find qualified support for this prediction across three experiments. Participants did not respond negatively to in-party politicians who apologized but did react more positively to those who denied or justified wrongdoing (relative to silence). These accounts worked only for in-party politicians and were more effective for those whose misconduct furthered their party’s agenda or whose seat was high-status or pivotal for party goals. In intergroup contexts like politics, people may accept explanations for misconduct that they would otherwise find offensive.
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