The present research conceptualizes open-minded cognition as a cognitive style that influences how individuals select and process information. An open-minded cognitive style is marked by willingness to consider a variety of intellectual perspectives, values, opinions, or beliefs—even those that contradict the individual’s opinion. An individual’s level of cognitive openness is expected to vary across domains (such as politics and religion). Four studies develop and validate a novel measure of open-minded cognition, as well as two domain-specific measures of religious and political open-minded cognition. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (controlling for acquiescence bias) are used to develop the scales in Studies 1 to 3. Study 4 demonstrates that these scales possess convergent and discriminant validity. Study 5 demonstrates the scale’s unique predictive validity using the outcome of Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980). Study 6 demonstrates the scale’s unique predictive validity using the outcomes of warmth toward racial, religious, and sexual minorities.
AbramowitzA. I.SandersK. L. (2008) Is polarization a myth?The Journal of Politics, 70, 542-555. doi:10.1017/s0022381608080493
2.
AlbarracínD.MitchellA. L. (2004). The role of defensive confidence in preference for proatttitudinal information: How believing that one is strong can be a weakness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1565-1584.
3.
AltemeyerR. (2006). The authoritarians. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2003.00020.x
4.
BaerJ. (2012). Domain specificity and the limits of creativity theory. Journal of Creative Behavior, 46, 16-29. doi:10.1002/jocb.002
5.
BatsonC. D.SchoenradeP. A. (1991). Measuring religion as a quest: Reliability concerns. Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 30, 430-447. doi:10.2307/1387278
6.
BillietJ. B.MatsuoH. (2012). Non-response and measurement error. In GideonL. (Ed.), Handbook of survey methodology for the social sciences (pp. 149-178). New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-3876-2_10
7.
BillietJ. B.McClendonM. J. (1998). On the identification of acquiescence in balanced sets of items using structural equation models. In FerligeA. (Ed.), Advances in methodology, data analysis, and statistics (pp. 129-150). Ljubljana, Slovenia: FDV. doi:10.1207/s15328007sem0704_5
8.
BillietJ. B.McClendonM. J. (2000). Modeling acquiescence in measurement models for two balanced sets of items. Structural Equation Modeling, 7, 608-628. doi:10.1207/s15328007sem0704_5
9.
BinderS. A. (1999). The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947-96. American Political Science Review, 93, 519-533. doi:10.2307/2585572
10.
BodenhausenG. V. (1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing process models of stereotype use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 726-737. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.726
11.
BryantF. B.YarnoldP. R. (1995). Principal components analysis and exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. In GrimmL. G.YarnoldR. R. (Eds.), Reading and understanding multivariate statistics (pp. 99-136). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
12.
BudnerS. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable. Journal of Personality, 30, 29-50. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1962.tb02303
13.
CacioppoJ. T.PettyR. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116-131. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116
14.
CattellR. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 1, 245-276. doi:10.1207/s15327906mbr0102_10
15.
CialdiniR. B.TrostM. R.NewsomJ. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 318-328.
ConwayL. G.SchallerM.TweedR. G.HalletD. (2001). The complexity of thinking across cultures: Interactions between culture and situational context. Social Cognition, 19, 228-250. doi:10.1521/soco.19.3.228.21472
18.
CooperJ. (2007). Cognitive dissonance: 50 years of a classic theory. London, England: SAGE. doi:10.4135/9781446214282
19.
CronbachL. J.MeehlP. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological Bulletin, 52, 281-302.
20.
DavisM. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
21.
DruckmanJ. N.PetersonE.SlothusR. (2013). How elite polarization affects public opinion formation. American Political Science Review, 107, 57-59. doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500
22.
EaglyA. H.ChenS.ChaikenS.Shaw-BarnesK. (1999). The impact of attitudes on memory: An affair to remember. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 64-89. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.1.64
23.
ElliotJ. C. (2010, August). Humility: Development and analysis of a scale. Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
24.
EpsteinS.LipsonA.HolsteinC.HuhE. (1992). Irrational reactions to negative outcomes: Evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328-339. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.328
25.
EstebanJ.SchneiderG. (2008). Polarization and conflict: Theoretical and empirical issues. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 131-141. doi:10.1177/0022343307087168
26.
FazioR. H.Towles-SchwenT. (1999). The MODE model of attitude-behavior processes. In ChaikenS.TropeY. (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp. 97-116). New York, NY: Guilford Press. doi:10.1017/s0003055432000500
27.
FergusonE.CoxT. (1993). Exploratory factor analysis: A users’guide. International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 1, 84-94. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2389.1993.tb00092.x
28.
GeniaV. (1997). The spiritual experience index: Revision and reformulation. Review of Religious Research, 38, 344-361. doi:10.1309/s15327752bpd5901_13
29.
HetheringtonM. J. (2009). Review article: Putting polarization in perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 39, 413-448 doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802331.002
30.
JonesD. R. (2001). Party polarization and legislative gridlock. Political Research Quarterly, 54, 125-141. doi:10.1177/106591290105400107
31.
JöreskogK. G.SörbomD. (2006). LISREL 8.80 for Windows [Computer Software]. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International.
32.
JostJ. T.GlaserJ.KruglanskiA. W.SullowayF. (2003a). Exceptions that prove the rule: Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and political anomalies. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 383-393.
33.
JostJ. T.GlaserJ.KruglanskiA. W.SullowayF. (2003b). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375. doi:10.1177/106591290105400107
34.
KayA. C.JostJ. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of “poor but happy” and “poor but honest” stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 823-837. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.823
35.
KruseE. T.ChancellorJ.LyubomirskyS. (2014). State humility: Measurement, conceptual validation, and intrapersonal processes. Manuscript submitted for publication.
36.
LaymanG. C.GreenJ. C. (2005). Wars and rumours of wars: The contexts of cultural conflict in American political behaviour. British Journal of Political Science, 36, 751- 777. doi:10.1017/S0007123406000044
37.
LuskinR. C. (1990). Explaining political sophistication. Political Behavior, 12, 331-361. doi:10.1277/107521290105600107
38.
Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC (2013, October). The cost of crisis-driven fiscal policy (Report prepared for the Peter G. Peterson Foundation). New York: Peter G Peterson Foundation.
39.
NickersonR. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitious phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2, 175-220. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175
40.
OttatiV.ClaypoolH. M.GingrichB. (2005). Effects of a group stereotype on memory for behaviors performed by a group member. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 797-808. doi:10.1002/ejsp.283
41.
PettyR. E.CacioppoJ. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. doi:10.2307/1422805
42.
PettyR. E.WegenerD. T. (1991). Thought systems, argument quality, and persuasion. In WyerR. S.SrullT. K. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. IV, pp. 147-162). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. doi:10.2307/1423264
43.
RattrayJ.JonesM. C. (2007). Essential elements of questionnaire design and development. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 16, 234-243. doi:10.1177/106591290105400107
44.
SamuelsonP. L.ChurchI. M. (2014). When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology. Philosophical Psychology, 28, 1095-1113. doi:10.1080/09515089.2014.904197
45.
ShowersC.CantorN. (1985). Social cognition: A look at motivated strategies. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 275-305. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.36.020185.001423
46.
StanovichK. E.WestR. F. (2007). Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability. Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 225-247. doi:10.1080/13546780600780796
47.
SullivanJ. L.PieresonJ.MarcusG. E. (1982). An alternative conceptualization of political tolerance: Illusory increases 1950s-1970s. American Political Science Review, 73, 781-794. doi:10.3307/1523264
48.
TabachnickB. G.FidellL. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). New York, NY: Allyn & Bacon. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73508-5
49.
TrodahlV. C.PowellF. A. (1965). A short-form dogmatism scale for use in field studies. Social Forces, 44, 211-214. doi:10.1093/sf/44.2.211
50.
WebsterD. M.KruglanskiA. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049-1062. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049
51.
ZukierH. (1986). The paradigmatic and narrative modes in goal-guided inference. In SorrentinoR. M.HigginsE. T. (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 465-502). New York, NY: Guilford Press. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73508-5
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
