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Abstract

This paper builds on the situation of seafarers, who found themselves stuck in the global crew change crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. This crisis, caused by countries going into lockdown and closing their borders, had affected more than 400,000 seafarers worldwide. Some were stranded overseas, some were trapped aboard ships and others were waiting in transition. A number of international organizations highlighted safety and human rights issues of what was recognized as a humanitarian crisis. They called out the international responsibility of allowing seafarers to cross borders and access health services, and for governments to facilitate safe journeys home for seafarers. The year 2021 was proclaimed as the “year of action for seafarers” to recognize them as essential workers. Building on media and other materials, this paper explores the global crisis and difficulties for many governments in dealing with this exceptional global pandemic with a particular focus on seafarers from Kiribati.

Keywords

COVID-19 pandemic maritime labor mobilities human rights occupational health Kiribati SDGs

Introduction

On World Maritime Day, 24 September 2020, Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York with his concerns for seafarers. He highlighted the professionalism and sacrifices of global seafarers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary-General also noted that despite extenuating circumstances, seafarers have continued to transport more than 80 percent of world trade (UNRCCA, 2020). At the time, approximately 1.65 million seafarers were transporting 11.08 billion tons of cargo across the globe while dealing with this unprecedented crisis that had interrupted global transport mobilities and therewith also world trade (ICS, n.d.; UNCTAD, 2020). Guterres’ concerns were voiced as follows (UNRCCA, 2020):

Despite the unprecedented conditions brought about by the pandemic, seafarers have continued to tirelessly support the often invisible global logistics chain. Physically and mentally exhausted, away from their families and loved ones, their time at sea has now been extended far beyond the standards stipulated in international conventions, with some tours of duty now stretching more than 17 months. Fatigued seafarers cannot operate indefinitely, and disruptions to international shipping would have devastating consequences. I renew my appeal to Governments to address their plight by formally designating seafarers and other marine personnel as “key workers,” ensuring safe crew changes and implementing the protocols developed by UN agencies, as well as the International Chamber of Shipping and the International Transport Workers’ Federation, allowing stranded seafarers to be repatriated and others to join ships.

In his appeal, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General underlined the importance of healthy global standards for sustainable contributions of the shipping industry to world trade. Sharing these concerns in dealing with this crisis, a Seafarer Crisis Action Team (SCAT) was constructed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), working together with the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS). This team aimed to find solutions for the 400,000 seafarers stranded on ships worldwide, unable to return home because of COVID-19-related lockdowns and border closures (IMO, n.d.a). Others were stuck in transition. The IMO also noted a similarly high number of seafarers stuck at home waiting for employment on ships (De Beukelaer, 2021). In search of solutions and lacking a clear guideline for this unexpected situation, SCAT contacted governments, trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) foremost working towards repatriation, and in some cases evacuation.

This paper explores how seafarers were affected by this prolonged crew change crisis. It looks at the consequences of strandedness for seafarers from a human rights perspective as this crisis had brought to the surface a need to understand and act towards strategies that would protect seafarers on a global level. One example will be explored more specifically: The exacerbated situation for I-Kiribati seafarers, who during this crisis had lost their employers—and therewith their best chances to be employed in the future.

Considering that more than 400,000 seafarers were stranded globally, the number of affected I-Kiribati seafarers seems relatively small, with 320 stranded and dispersed overseas (IMO, 2021d), and approximately 250 who were waiting at home to join a new employment contract (Borovnik et al., 2021). And yet, for Kiribati, with only small chances for paid employment and with seafarers as the main contributors of remittances that count for approximately 11.3 percent to Kiribati’s national income (The World Bank, n.d.; Borovnik, 2011b), these job losses have significant consequences. The information presented in this paper ties in with my longstanding research since 1999 with seafarers, families and key personnel in marine training and employment. Drawing on newspapers and other media, and some personal conversations, this paper analyses the problematic situation and places it in a wider context of uneven geographies of development.

The global crew change crisis within uneven geographies of development

At the peak of the crew change crisis, in June 2020, the heading of an opinion piece by David Osler (2020) said:

If seafarers were tourists, crew changes would not be a problem. For too many governments, reopening bars is a higher priority than sending stranded crews back home, and that is morally unacceptable.

With this candid comparison, the author continued to elaborate that European countries were negotiating air bridges and lowering quarantine conditions “to ensure that as many of the electorate as possible have a foreign holiday this year, coronavirus or no coronavirus” (Osler, 2020). He questioned that visas were given to European tourists, while hundreds of thousands of seafarers were unable to leave their vessels as a result of the pandemic, many had already stayed well over the maximum legal time of less than 12 months. The reason why governments were slow in ratifying agreements towards acknowledging seafarers as essential workers, a status that would allow not only repatriation but also shore leave, could be queried. In comparison, he felt that the tourism industry had a stronger position as they “banded together” towards legal action against COVID-19 restrictions (Osler, 2020), while seafarers were still waiting for global guidance and arrangements for their repatriation, which needed countries to recognize them as essential workers.

This example underlines the deep embeddedness of global seafarers in what David Harvey (2015: 146) had labeled “uneven geographical development.” In this system, those workers originating from poor economies remain in a marginalized position, while being integrated into a world system of unequal power, trading and finances, and as Mimi Sheller (2018) added, uneven geographies of transport. The pandemic-induced crew change crisis has made these uneven geographies more obvious, as the crisis also articulates the inequalities within movement itself. Hagar Kotef (2015) argued that movement, too, is uneven and creates political spaces, which Sheller concluded turned these spaces into unequal mobile regimes. In these systems, the concept of the “freedom of the sea” is mostly coercive for seafarers, who are embedded in a restricted system of labor mobilities determined by global trade. Seafarers, as recognized by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres (see quote above), are the professional drivers of global trade, as they facilitate the transport of traded goods and keep globalization afloat. And yet, they remain invisible to most consumers. Nonetheless, the global crisis and border closures have triggered a slowing down of global transport and with this a supply chain crisis, affecting consumers, businesses and hospitals. Hence, the coronavirus pandemic itself, with its financial implications, has contributed to this widening, unequal global economic structure, and the uneven distribution of vaccinations was one symptom of this inequality (Horner, 2022). It can be expected that the pandemic exacerbated economic inequalities, as Sokol and Pataccini (2020) argued. Within the field of mobilities research, there has been a focus on the underlying inequalities of “who can travel, when, where and how” (Adey et al., 2021), as a reflection on ongoing hierarchies and postcolonial structures (Sheller, 2018).

In Sheller’s (2018) view, borders function as complex assemblages, facilitating movement but also moorings, which could be seen as both an inability to move or a temporary stand-still. These immobilities are differently distributed between privileged groups and others who are excluded from privileged access (Sheller, 2018: 130). Nation-state border controls have had a strong role in the continuation of this uneven system of (in)justice, when seafarers are not allowed to enter, or where seafarers’ border crossing is discriminated against, depending on their nationality, or conditioned by their travel routes. During the pandemic, restrictions were laid against some regions, and depending on whether a vessel had passed a restricted area before landing at their border, seafarers were unable to disembark.

The type of vaccination that seafarers had received, which depended on product availability in different locations, also had an impact on whether seafarers were able to transit or go ashore. Not all vaccination types were accepted at all borders. Many seafarers were not even permitted to return to their home country during the pandemic, as in the case of Kiribati, where the government announced a “zero COVID” border policy to protect their approximately 115,000 citizens from the coronavirus.¹

Another factor that contributes to the continuation of an uneven geographical system is determined by the United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which regulates maritime law. While the legal systems of shore nations include exclusive economic zones (EEZ) that reach into the maritime space, outside these zones, on the high sea, it is the registered flag state of a vessel that provides jurisdiction. This complex maritime law system was already used strategically during the prohibition years in the 1920s, when United States (US) ships would utilize Panama flags that would allow them to keep carrying alcohol. During war times, ships used foreign flags when sailing through zones of conflict. Later, starting around the early 1960s, a Flag of Convenience (FOC) system was established by companies in the Global North, where the use of foreign flags was normalized, as they offer relatively relaxed labor and safety regulations for ships and allow employers to recruit multinational crews and officers from the Global South and Eastern Europe, with longer contracts and lower wages (Alderton et al., 2004). This system contributes to the global regime of uneven movement. Despite these costs, FOCs have opportunities for seafarer source countries, of which the Philippines, Indonesia, China and India are the biggest suppliers for both ratings and officers (ICS, n.d.), and smaller suppliers, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, as they have options to integrate in the global labor market.

During the COVID-19-induced crew change crisis, flag states were in a difficult situation. Flag states recognized in 2020 that the crisis needed an international plan. As such, their representatives worked with the ITF to find solutions during the pandemic. Yet, even after urgent calls to sign the important Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), 2006 (ILO, 2013), which organizes labor conditions for maritime workers, not all states have signed the MLC, 2006 (IMO, 2021a; Sampson, 2022).² Depending on the contract stipulations signed by flag states and the degree of decency of companies, seafarers may have received care and fair treatment during stranded operations. By the end of February 2022, 200,000 seafarers had remained stuck overseas, and the Lloyd Register³ explained that 8.5 percent of these were well beyond the less than 12 months maximum time agreed by the MLC, 2006 (Lloyd Register, n.d.). The UN reported in 2022 that the surge of the Omicron variant caused prolonged concerns—especially highlighting effects on seafarers originating from the Global South (ILO et al., 2022).

In light of this ongoing crisis, Human Rights at Sea, an NGO advocating for people at sea, published the Geneva Declaration of Human Rights at Sea in January 2022, which raises awareness of human rights breaches observed at sea and serves as a guideline and reminder that seafarers are human beings and that basic human rights principles “apply at sea as they do on land” (Human Rights at Sea, 2022a: 4).⁴

In April 2022, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)⁵ published its second edition of a “Seafarer Shore Leave Principle” report (ICS, 2022), emphasizing the importance of shore leave, which “can help to mitigate fatigue, and reduce stress from voyages and a long time away from home,” warning that a “lack of shore leave has far-reaching consequences,” because, not being able to go ashore, “or not accessing normal social respite and changes of scenery, can seriously impact seafarers’ mental health” (ICS, 2022: 1). The ongoing shore leave denial as a human rights issue and its impacts on the well-being of seafarers are discussed further below. The following section will explore concerns related to prolonged confinement, caused by the global crew change crisis, from a human rights perspective.

Stranded seafarers—a human rights issue

There have been several human rights-related complications with the ongoing global crew change crisis during the onset of COVID-19, especially during the peak of the pandemic and the continuation of highly infectious variants, such as Omicron. Problems occur when seafarers are not allowed to access port states. During the peak of the crisis, the inability for shore leave resulted in constrained freedom of movement, and no or limited access to medical care, vaccinations and mental health support (Brooks and Greenberg, 2022; IMO 2021b). These rights to freedom of movement and safe access to facilities and medical care are secured for all human beings in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN, 2015). In particular, Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 24 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) relate to the right to rest, leisure and limited work hours (UN, 2015). The UDHRs are binding for signatory states. A breach in the right to freedom of movement is related to seafarers who are unable to access shore or are in confined accommodation during lockdown over longer periods of time. Confinements have tough consequences for their mental health and well-being (IMO 2021b), breaching Article 25 of the ICESCR. When seafarers are unable to move freely across borders, which is dependent on smooth and safe crew changes, global trade is affected.

For this reason, the UN General Assembly’s formal resolution on 01 December 2020 to designate seafarers as key workers has played a significant role in addressing vaccine access and securing crew changes (IMO, 2020; UNRCCA, 2020). The UN has continued to encourage states to sign this resolution (UN, 2021) and to create “blue corridors” for seafarers who are leaving their vessels in exchange for those who are replacing these (Human Rights at Sea, 2022a). Originally, only 60 states signed this UN resolution by March 2021 (Van Pallandt, n.d.) and three more signatories were added in February 2022, giving rise to 63 states (Safety4Sea, 2022).

Many seafarers continued to experience “restrictions on access to medical care ashore including access to vaccinations” and only 24 countries had allowed access to vaccination (Insight, 2021). The right to repatriation, as outlined in Article 2.5 of the MLC, 2006, was affected when home countries did not allow seafarers to return. States globally were unprepared to deal with a major pandemic as worldwide border closures were at first a prompt and safe option in dealing with the unknown, fast-spreading coronavirus that had turned deadly for many.

Even after signing the UN resolution that dedicated seafarers as key workers, states were reluctant or unable to implement quarantine space and other strategies that would enable repatriation, due to fear of the coronavirus entering their territories (Athanasiou and Patsalides, 2022; Tang, 2022). Surprisingly, seafarers were waiting for governments to enable international voyages for their return home, when other citizens were provided with chartered flights to be repatriated (Athanasiou and Patsalides 2022: 129; Osler, 2020). There is an obvious unevenness of human rights application that have placed seafarers on a lower priority list than others when it comes to repatriation.

As outlined earlier, one of the main issues was the extended stuckness aboard vessels well beyond the less than 12 months’ time that were agreed upon by states that have signed the MLC, 2006, which was addressed by the ILO (2022) and the UN Global Compact (UNGC) et al. (2021) report in their calls for safe ship crew changes. Even though back-to-back contracts are possible under some circumstances (ILO, 2013), an unpredicted prolonged time of being aboard ship is breaching not only basic human rights as was noted above, but also a number of global agreements as outlined by the UN. For example, the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) requires UN members to follow the objective of “safe, orderly and regular migration” (IOM, 2016).⁶ Seafarers are categorized as migrant workers and therefore fall under the GCM; stuck on international merchant vessels or cruise ships, they were experiencing unsafe situations, where some cases were labeled as a “matter of life or death” (IMO, 2021b). Although the Global Compact is a non-binding agreement, it links with the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, which was adopted by the UN in 1990, and ratified by only 56 states (UN, 1990). This agreement recognizes that international migrant workers, such as seafarers, face vulnerabilities during their time in contracts that affect not only themselves but also their families.

Another binding global agreement related to human rights conventions is the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development, with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that member states have agreed to in 2015 (UNDP, n.d.). At least 10 of the SDGs are directly relevant to migration, and SDG 8 specifically aims at decent work and economic growth and to protect labor rights in promoting safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers (Target 8.8), a category that applies to international seafarers, yet was not achieved during the crew change crisis (UNDP, n.d.; Migration Data Portal, n.d.).

The prolonged time aboard ships without the choice to leave impacts seafarers from the Global South the most. Crewing cost savings for shipping companies are related not only to lower wages but also to prolonged contract time (Borovnik, 2022). For example, in contrast to European seafarers, who normally work between 10 weeks and six months aboard ships (Borovnik, 2011a; Devereux, 2021; Oldenburg et al., 2009), Filipino junior officers have a choice to work for four to nine months, and ratings are usually employed for nine months (Turgo, 2020: 7). As mentioned above, these contracts can be extended. Merchant seafarers from Kiribati usually work nine months on tankers or 11 months on container and other cargo ships (Borovnik, 2011a).⁷ During the crew change crisis, seafarers would quickly extend the maximum allowed time on vessels. The seafaring job with its continuing mobility can be rather isolating, due to the remoteness of their sea-based workplace, the sophisticated technology that facilitates fast turnarounds in remote containership port locations and the strong transport sector security measures since 2001 (Borovnik, 2011a). These factors have caused stress, and prior to the pandemic, shore leave was hard to attain as seafarers were dependent on permission from senior officers or were simply too fatigued to go (Bloor et al., 2000; Borovnik, 2011b; Sampson, 2022). Not having a choice to go ashore over a long period is compounding the restraints that the pandemic has caused.

Nation-states have denied shore leave for fear of COVID-19 infections. Not being able to leave a ship and access the shore to attain essential supplies, or even just go for a walkabout, has severe impacts on the well-being of seafarers (ICS, 2022). In some cases, shore leave was denied for medical treatment (Brooks and Greenberg, 2022; Tang, 2022). After long-drawn-out time aboard ships, many seafarers are drained physically and mentally, and researchers have noted that the unpredictability of strandedness during the pandemic has caused hopelessness and mistrust in many (Beake, 2021; Borovnik, 2022; Lucas et al., 2021). Tang (2022: 120) quoted a captain who commented on the inhuman treatment received by his crew: “The port authorities treated us like we were viruses.” The mental health impacts of shore leave denial and limited access to essential supplies affecting the mental health among seafarers were identified by the ICS (ICS, 2022) and various studies (Brooks and Greenberg, 2022; Garbe, 2021; Lucas et al., 2021; Slišković, 2020). At the other side of the crew change spectrum, seafarers waiting at home—not being able to join ships because of contract delays—were also experiencing anxiety, related to concerns about their finances and future employment, as well as financial support for their families (Brooks and Greenberg, 2022; Garbe, 2021; Slišković, 2020). These severe restraints on seafarers’ well-being during the crew change crisis, seen in a human rights context, go against the binding UN Human Rights agreement, Article 23 of the ICESCR, which states that everyone has the right to work of their own choice, to protection against unemployment and to just and favorable conditions of work (UN, 2015). The crew change crisis and the strain on the well-being of seafarers and their families has not assured these rights.

Independent of the coronavirus crisis, authors have acknowledged seafaring as one of the most stressful occupations (Bailey et al., 2021; Bloor et al., 2000; Borovnik, 2011b; Markkula, 2021; Munoz, 2022; Sampson, 2021). This new COVID-19-related data is therefore of great concern. Slišković (2020), in her study on 750 COVID-19-affected seafarers of various backgrounds, found that while feeling trapped on ships, many deemed they were in jail, forgotten and abandoned: “I feel that I am abandoned by society; that I am good only like a slave but not as a part of human community;” that seafarers felt tired and that “our body and mind has reached its limits, but the shipping company doesn’t understand us. We are not safe in the vessel” (Slišković, 2020: 804).

The IOM noted during this humanitarian crisis the importance of keeping states and the shipping sector cognizant of their responsibilities and obligations (IMO, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c, n.d.a). Responsibilities must be upheld as a signatory to universal rights declarations and other international agreements. Other obligations follow the nation and flag state’s signature of the MLC, 2006 and recognize the importance of safe employment conditions to support seafarers’ well-being.

The following sections will exemplify some of these issues, illustrated by the prolonged stuckness of I-Kiribati seafarers, some of whom were waiting for 18 months or more to return home. First, some of the background of the more than 50-year collaboration between the Kiribati government and shipping companies, the skill-building and training opportunities for the I-Kiribati and finally the challenges faced by I-Kiribati seafarers will be explained.

Contributions of marine training and seafarer employment to the Kiribati economy

The Republic of Kiribati became independent from the British Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony in 1979. Currently, the estimated population is just above 115,000 with a growth rate of 1.79 percent (CIA, 2023), spread across 33 islands⁸ in the center of the Pacific with a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 3.5 million square kilometers and a small land area of 810.5 square km (CIA, 2023). The extensive ocean space offers opportunities for economic agreements with fishing companies. Kiribati has quite a low employment-to-population ratio. This ratio was 11 percent in 1995, of which seafarers were estimated to compose three percent (SPC, 1998: 25). In 2002, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated this ratio as 23 percent (ADB, 2002; Borovnik, 2007), and in 2019, the estimate was 32.73 percent (The World Bank, n.d.). However, this ratio includes even those who have worked only for one hour in paid employment during the reference period.

The UN categorized Kiribati as a Least Developed Country (LDC) since 1986. In particular, the economic and environmental vulnerability index is currently high (51.7), because of Kiribati’s exposure to climate change, which is higher than the total value of LDCs (39.1) (UN, n.d.). Considering the economic difficulties, and specifically the low rate of paid employment, the Kiribati government has been keen to find employment opportunities outside Kiribati. Some have permanently moved to New Zealand since the introduction of the Pacific Access Category (PAC) scheme in 2002, which requires a job offer from a New Zealand employer (ILO, 2015). There are also seasonal migration options for I-Kiribati workers, where 643 I-Kiribati men and women have participated in the Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme in New Zealand (Bedford and Bedford, 2021), and others in the Seasonal Work Programme (SWP) in Australia. These numbers appear relatively small. And yet, for Kiribati, each of these workers brings much-needed income, of which the seafarers’ income has been a reliably continuing source. Kiribati has had a longstanding employment contract with merchant shipping companies based in Germany and Denmark.⁹ Other I-Kiribati seafarers work on Japanese, Korean and Chinese fishing vessels.

Remittances contributed 11.3 percent to Kiribati’s country’s GDP in 2019, but remittances fell to 6.7 percent in 2022 (The World Bank, n.d.). The decrease was likely influenced by the pandemic and the declining stability of migrants’ and seafarers’ earnings.

Historically, the I-Kiribati seafaring and navigation skills have had a strong reputation in the Pacific, as men and a small number of women were able to overcome vast distances in te wa ririki (outrigger sailing boats), built from plant materials, which were used to travel between the 16 Gilbert Islands—the Tungaru chain (Grimble, 1957; Grimble, 1972). These expert skills involved navigation using a star calendar system and the understanding of nuances in wind, weather and current systems (Couper, 2009). During British colonial times, in 1959, some men were employed by the British-owned China Navigation (Connell, 1983).

Then in 1966, the German shipping company Hamburg Süd Schiffahrtsgesellschaft (Hamburg Süd),¹⁰ which later became a major driver within the South Pacific Marine Services (SPMS), discovered the recruitment potential in Kiribati, when one of their ships had to stop over in Tarawa because a crew member needed urgent medical assessment (Sieg, 1999).¹¹ At this time, the company was experiencing labor shortages on their vessels and was seeking alternatives. This coincidence would not only fill labor gaps in the German marine sector but also had strong beneficial consequences for the Kiribati economy (Borovnik, 2006). One year later, the Marine Training School (MTS) was established. This school is now operating as Marine Training Centre (MTC) to comply with Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements by the IMO (IMO, n.d.b). Between 1967 and 2017, more than 5,000 seafarers were trained in this facility (Hamburg, 2017). At the beginning and during colonial times, the MTS was supported with funds from the United Kingdom (UK), assisted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), China Navigation Company (CNCo and Swire Shipping) and Hamburg Süd (Whitley, 1980). Following the establishment of marine training, only two years later the SPMS was established in 1969. The press release by Hamburg Süd in July of 2017 quoted then Managing Director Christoph Gessner regarding the 50^th Anniversary of the MTC (Hamburg, 2017):

The founding of the MTC is a win-win situation for everyone involved. To this day, we as shipping companies can rely on the expertise of the seafarers, who are trained here over an 18-month period for their service at sea. And many young [I]-Kiribati obtain a stable job thanks to the training.

The MTC is the only fully internationally accredited training institution in Kiribati. The MTC merged in 2015 with the Fisheries Training Centre (FTC) (Nunns and Borovnik, 2014). The FTC was established in 1989 and geared towards recruitment on Japanese tuna fishing vessels. The now combined training center includes facilities for all merchant departments: Deck, engine and catering; it contains a fisheries training department and provides language education in English and Japanese. Those working on Japanese tuna vessels receive training in the fishing sector of the MTC and enjoy training combined with merchant trainees towards international seafaring standards (Nunns and Borovnik, 2014; IMO, n.d.b). The catering department also was extended between 2008 and 2012, facilitating not only SPMS needs but also training for the US-based Norwegian Cruise Liners (NCL) company, which is part of Star Cruise Limited. NCL employed 120 young I-Kiribati women between 2004 and 2011 (NCL Manager, 2012, personal communication; Kagan, 2015). At this time, the SPMS has also trialed the employment of female stewards on their containerships and 26 I-Kiribati women worked with two of the SPMS companies between 2004 and 2012.

Cruise ship-related catering courses were assisted by the MTC, which had these courses set up for merchant steward training for both men and women. Some of these catering courses now, too, serve seasonal employment in the Australian hotel sector under the Seasonal Work Programme (SWP) scheme, in collaboration with the Kiribati Institute of Technology (KIT) (Director of KIT, 2017, personal communication). Therefore, the MTC has been one of the leading training facilities in Kiribati, offering international certification with guaranteed first placings on German and Danish tankers, cargo and containerships, facilitated by the SPMS; or Japanese fishing vessels, facilitated by a number of local recruitment companies collaborating with Japanese fishing companies (see more information about the structure of the MTC on their website, MTC, n.d.).

For more than 50 years, from 1969 until its closure by the end of 2021, the SPMS, a joint venture conglomerate of six shipping companies, had successfully recruited trained seafarers from Kiribati to work on their merchant vessels. Starting with the recruitment of deckhands, engine workers and stewards, over time several I-Kiribati gained the opportunity to upskill into leadership roles, such as cooks, officers and—in recent years—also captain ranks. Employment of I-Kiribati was steadily increasing with 788 I-Kiribati seafarers working on SPMS vessels in 1989 and up to 1,366 I-Kiribati in 1999 (Borovnik, 2003). In 2006, seafarer employment from Kiribati peaked at 1,452; however, when the global economy experienced a downturn, numbers started declining with only 750 I-Kiribati on SPMS vessels in 2015 (ILO, 2015). In 2019, the year preceding the pandemic, there were 548 I-Kiribati seafarers registered with SPMS. In 2020, the number had slightly increased to 564—a majority of these were waiting for new contracts in Kiribati, and more than two hundred I-Kiribati were stuck overseas with some still aboard vessels during 2021.

There are a number of reasons for the longstanding success of the employment relations between SPMS companies and I-Kiribati seafarers. One important factor voiced by employers was the I-Kiribati’s ability to sustain the physically and mentally challenging work on ships over a long period of time. The length of time seafarers perform on ships is one of the cost-saving aspects for companies. The length of time on ships was a compromise negotiated for long-distance travel required to board merchant vessels and the comparatively expensive and complex visa applications needed for I-Kiribati. The effective negotiations of the Kiribati government in securing and maintaining a private-public partnership with SPMS and the assistance from the United Nations Development Programme, the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Germany contributed to the success (Borovnik, 2003). In addition, the SPMS shipping companies aided large parts of the bureaucracy needed for the I-Kiribati to enable certification, visa and health requirements (Borovnik, 2003). The SPMS facilitated management and the MTC personnel since its establishment in 1969. The Captain Superintendent, specialist trainers and the manager of the SPMS office in Tarawa have usually been of European origin with local I-Kiribati employed as deputy managers. The conglomerate also provided a medical department, certified by the German Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport that allowed medical certification (Nunns and Borovnik, 2014). Companies associated with the SPMS together with overseas assistance delivered useful, contemporary technical training equipment to the MTC to keep up with the international training requirements (Nunns and Borovnik, 2014). Thus, the combined efforts and financial support have generated a high-quality, internationally recognized training and recruitment option for Kiribati.

Stranded I-Kiribati during the Zero-COVID border closure

Similar to most other countries, reacting to the announcement of the World Health Organization (WHO) in January 2020 about the highly infective coronavirus, the Kiribati government declared a state of emergency on 28 March 2020, closed its borders and only allowed a few exemptions for citizens to repatriate (Garbe, 2021). In March 2021, the IMO (2021b) had information from Kiribati that “320 of its seafarer nationals were currently stranded, mainly in Brazil, Denmark, Germany and Spain” and that they had “plans to repatriate them, in groups of 20, via Germany and Fiji.” By April 2021, 210 seafarers had returned to Kiribati; but further repatriation came to a halt when Fiji experienced a COVID-19 outbreak (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 9). Until 18 May 2021 there were no positive cases in Kiribati. However, two positive cases were later detected that involved seafarers from a fishing vessel (Radio Kiribati News, 2021). Consequently, the government suspended further repatriation of seafarers.

On 03 March 2021, the BBC published a disheartening video on 130 I-Kiribati seafarers stranded in Germany. With serious faces, holding back their emotions, several men faced the BBC camera, saying they had not seen their families in 14 to 24 months. When borders were closing, many of these men had already been working for one year. Some needed medical attention. All needed a place to stay while waiting for repatriation. In consideration of these circumstances, the SPMS booked a youth hostel and facilitated daily meals and accommodation, with the support of the German Seamen’s Mission in Hamburg.¹² In this BBC documentary, seafarers were voicing their concern and lack of understanding about the Kiribati border closure. They felt left behind, hopeless and not appreciated by their government: “There is no hope” (Beake, 2021). Captain Tekemau Kiraua, who was among these men, voiced his concerns about possible barriers to I-Kiribati employment resulting from this situation. He explained to BBC (Beake, 2021):

They (the Kiribati government) have to be more flexible with this pandemic. Otherwise, we will go down. We have been replaced now from our job onboard, being replaced by other nationalities. And coming back [to our jobs], we’re not sure.

The seafarers' situation was even more confined when they were transferred to Fiji. As Captain Kiraua explained to ABC Pacific: “It’s frustrating our crew are not good. There’s a lot of anger. There’s a lot of worries and problems within the family [in Kiribati]” (Wasuka, 2021).

Another group of 38 seafarers had been stranded in Brisbane since May 2021 (Berlage, 2021; Voloder, 2021), many of whom were staying in a hotel for almost two years. The group was supported by the Mission of Seafarers in Brisbane, while the shipping company Maersk, which had become part of the SPMS when they purchased Hamburg Süd in 2017, paid for their food, accommodation and vaccines while negotiating with the Kiribati government for their repatriation. The seafarers stuck in Brisbane feared that they would lose the payments of their small wages that SPMS provided if they left Brisbane for Fiji¹³ (Voloder, 2021). Bwerentetaake Toanuea explained to ABC Pacific on 25 November 2021: “We are stressed and depressed. Due to Covid, it has been hard to get home” (Voloder, 2021). This situation was shared by many among those in Brisbane. A young able-bodied (AB) seafarer stranded in Brisbane explained to Williams and Nicholls (2021: 13):

Sometimes you feel bad, sometimes you feel depressed. I don’t know about the others, but for me, that’s what I think—you feel stressed like this because you’re only here inside your room and cannot go out sometimes, because also here [we have lockdowns]. But for me, I feel bad sometimes. […] I want to go back and see them (my family) as well because […] I miss them so much because I haven’t seen them for a long time. For me it’s very hard and very sad. But what can I do? In the pandemic, there’s nothing we can do. We just wait.

Those in Brisbane, however, knew that there were others in even more difficult situations. In 2021, the Kiribati government planned for transitional repatriation of their seafarer citizens via cruise ship from Fiji. They were supposed to stay in quarantine in a hotel in Nadi for 14 days. However, the repatriation did not come to fruition and 165 seafarers had to wait for several months (Wasuka, 2021).

Spokesperson Bwerentetaake Toanuea (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 21) explained that those in Spain and Indonesia were experiencing very similar confined circumstances and no organization came to see them:

The seafarers staying in Jakarta told me they feel so lonely. They feel afraid. The Delta variant in Indonesia is getting worse and they still cannot get the vaccine as well in Indonesia. They need the non-government organization to give them support there while staying in Jakarta, but at the moment, they cannot contact any organization in Jakarta. […] They say they feel afraid to go out to walk around. They always stay in their hotel […] and there is nothing they can do there.

Shipping companies continued paying for food, accommodation and wages while seafarers were under their responsibilities overseas. By September 2021, 11 seafarers from Kiribati took up jobs with Swire Shipping, and 14 of those waiting in Brisbane have taken up fruit picking in South Australia (Berlage, 2021). There were then 165 seafarers stranded in Nadi, Fiji; 20 in Hamburg, Germany; 39 in Brisbane, Australia; 15 in Busan, South Korea; and 12 in Indonesia, while 17 had continued working aboard vessels (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 8).

Since seafarers waiting in Fiji were not receiving basic wages anymore, they felt stressed about not being able to provide for their families. Captain Tekemaua Kiraua, explained to ABC Pacific in August 2021 (Wasuka, 2021):

We have kids who go to school, some of our seamen lost their wives, they went for another husband […]. It’s a very sad thing, sitting down here doing nothing, earning nothing, and all the time you’re occupied with problems.

In August 2021, I-Kiribati seafarers who were waiting in Fiji or elsewhere overseas had become aware that the SPMS had announced the termination of their longstanding agreement with Kiribati but they were anxiously waiting for their government to do something to address the situation (Wasuka, 2021; Williams and Nicholls, 2021). Seafarers and their families in Tarawa marched to the Parliament House on 26 August 2021 and “pleaded with the government to repatriate the I-Kiribati Nationals stranded on foreign shores and secure the nation’s future in seafaring” (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 12). A young seafarer, still working on a Maersk containership in August 2021, upon hearing about the possible termination explained: “The biggest thing I worry about is my family, and if someone will feed them when my salary stops” (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 16). Losing their jobs would be devastating for communities in Kiribati and people were then still hopeful that a solution would be reached before their contract had run out in December (Garbe, 2021; Wasuka, 2021).

What was described as a “perfect storm of challenges” by Williams and Nicholls (2021: 6) as reviewing the I-Kiribati situation in 2021 became a severe reality when the government did not negotiate for the SPMS to stay on as employers. While the SPMS shipping companies adhered to MLC 2006 guidelines by paying for expenses while seafarers were waiting for repatriation overseas, they also negotiated with the Kiribati government to take over responsibilities for their citizens and to cover costs (Borovnik et al., 2021; Human Rights at Sea, 2021). By August 2021, Maersk announced to “freeze the enlistment of I-Kiribati nationals” (Williams and Nicholls, 2021: 10). Among the remaining five shipping companies that comprised the SPMS, there were some who showed a willingness to stay on if the Kiribati government would decide to swiftly repatriate and have fully vaccinated seafarers transported with regular flights (Borovnik et al., 2021). However, the Kiribati government was in a difficult position having to decide between protecting the health of their general populace or repatriating seafarers. Finally, on 24 November 2021, 141 I-Kiribati seafarers were repatriated via cruise ship to Kiribati (Office of Te Beretitenti, 2021). At the end of December 2021, however, the SPMS no longer had a viable agreement with the Kiribati government. Consequently, they withdrew their office staff from Tarawa including the Captain Superintendent of the Marine Training Centre and their Deputy, the SPMS Manager in Tarawa and several administrators (Former SPMS staff, 2022, personal communication).

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused lockdowns for nation-states around the globe during 2020 and 2021. It is still not sure whether new variants may cause further commotion in the future. Not having anticipated the scale of such a crisis in 2020, states were at a momentary loss in how to deal with the coronavirus and its devastating consequences; this paralysis had impacted hundreds and thousands of seafarers. These seafarers have become a symbol of how the pandemic exacerbated the continuing global inequalities and uneven mobilities (Adey et al., 2021). More economically affluent states in the Global North were able to swiftly provide vaccines and other needs to their citizens (Horner, 2022). Yet, seafarers were at the bottom of states’ priorities. When borders closed, these workers were taken for granted (Osler, 2020) and elite or privileged mobilities were continuingly favored (Sheller, 2018). The rights breaches, caused by the inability or unwillingness to provide safe access to shore and the hesitance of some states (in both the Global North and South) to repatriate, had grave consequences for seafarers, whose physical and mental health were affected by these immobilizing decisions throughout the pandemic. While in waiting, seafarers were homesick, some lost their relationships with spouses and families, and many were concerned about the lack of income and well-being of their families. Considering that most contemporary seafarers originate from the Global South, Harvey’s (2015) view that uneven geographical developments are sustained with policies that favor the Global North with its accumulation of wealth and power is convincing. In these spaces, Sheller (2018: 11) found that complex, global mobility assemblages are “influenced by mobility regimes that govern who and what can move (or stay put), when, where, how, under what conditions and with what meanings.” Border practices and processes that discriminate against seafarers are then part of this hierarchical regime.

With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and as part of the uneven structures, nations in the Global South had to face even stronger challenges as it was difficult to find safe spaces for quarantine and access to vaccines, while also dealing with limited health systems (Horner, 2022). Having to navigate these structural circumstances and experiencing external pressure, the Kiribati government had to choose between citizens’ needs: Either to keep the island population safe or to repatriate seafarers. Yet, in their effort to protect their citizens’ health, the country is now facing serious economic costs. The longstanding successful employment collaboration with the SPMS is lost, which will have a severe impact on many extended families who depended in the past on seafarer remittances, due to a lack of other steady income opportunities (Borovnik, 2006, 2007). For a country with a low employment-to-population ratio, the lowering effect on GDP contributions will likely be difficult and have long-term effects (Garbe, 2021). Also, the internationally recognized certifications provided by the MTC are now at risk, while the well-established German or Danish employers are no longer involved.

Within these complex structures of inequalities, Human Rights at Sea has referred to the need for safe “blue corridors” for seafarers during maritime humanitarian crises that would allow seafarers priority access across borders (Human Rights at Sea, 2022b). “Blue corridors” are also needed during conflict, as highlighted by the dangerous situation for seafarers in the Black Sea, caused by the war in Ukraine (Foley, 2022; Human Rights at Sea, 2022b), where more than 2,000 seafarers were stranded on more than 100 vessels (Munoz, 2022), affecting the global maritime transport. The essential role that seafarers play in the global economy is painfully illustrated by any crew change crisis, but the most severe instance was during the peak of COVID-19. Yet, seafarers continue to be unappreciated and undervalued. It is hopeful to see increasing commitments to the MLC 2006, now that 100 states have ratified this convention (ILO, 2022). International commitments are important for the safety of seafarers, who have continued to work until exhaustion to keep the connection between production and consumption in flow.

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

My thanks go to the Journal and Special Issue editors and the anonymous referee for their invaluable comments and suggestions. This paper is based on a media analysis and my observations and conversations over a number of years since 1999. I want to thank the Massey University Research Fund committee for allowing a piloting visit to Kiribati in November 2022.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Maria Borovnik

Notes

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Trapped in the COVID-19 pandemic: Seafarers and the global crew change crisis

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

The global crew change crisis within uneven geographies of development

Stranded seafarers—a human rights issue

Contributions of marine training and seafarer employment to the Kiribati economy

Stranded I-Kiribati during the Zero-COVID border closure

Conclusion

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Notes

References