The closest brush: How a UN secretary-general averted doomsday

Abstract

A half-century after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world still overlooks the role played by U Thant—the quiet, unassuming UN secretary-general from Burma—in helping the superpowers resolve their crisis and avert nuclear war. Thant sent early and important messages to President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The first requested a moratorium on the conflict at sea. Although many of Kennedy’s advisers looked upon Thant’s initiative with derision, Kennedy asked Thant to send another message requesting a cessation of Soviet shipping. The message gave Khrushchev a way to stop his ships but still save face. This ended the threat of a naval confrontation and enabled the superpowers to focus on the deeper issues of the conflict. Early on, Thant also proposed and pushed the idea that eventually formed the basis of agreement: Soviet missile withdrawal in exchange for guarantees of Cuban security. During moments in the crisis when many were calling for an attack on Cuba, Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk cited Thant’s initiatives as reasons for restraint. Thant also shuttled to Cuba to mollify Prime Minister Fidel Castro and to confirm that missile dismantlement had begun. He then aided the negotiations between Soviet and American teams at the United Nations to resolve remaining issues, such as how the missile withdrawal was to be verified.

Fifty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the full story of how the world was saved from nuclear annihilation remains untold. The public record describes how President John F. Kennedy shocked the world on October 22, 1962, by revealing the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and announcing a US “quarantine”—a blockade by another name—of all ships bound for Cuba. What is not widely known, however, is how the UN’s secretary-general from Burma, U Thant, helped the protagonists pull back from the brink and avert nuclear destruction. The popular understanding is that a US show of military force compelled the Russians to back down, or, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk euphemistically put it: “We went eyeball to eyeball [with the Russians], and … the other fellow just blinked” (Blanton, 1997), referring to the decision by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba. But Rusk’s verbal bravado conceals how the Cuban Missile Crisis, much more than a mere contest of wills, was also a mediated settlement.

Documents in UN archives and oral histories indicate that Secretary-General Thant received a direct yet secret request from the United States, initiated by President Kennedy himself, to perform intermediary functions during the crisis. Thant also took bold initiatives of his own accord. Indeed, Thant was lauded by newspapers of the day for his efforts to de-escalate the crisis, even though the media did not know the full extent of his actions. Afterward, American historians depicted the conflict as a victory achieved by US military might and Kennedy’s resolve, but Kennedy himself stated his deep appreciation to Thant for helping avert nuclear midnight: “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt” (Samuels, 1964).

Thant’s bold initiative

Thant’s first initiative in the crisis occurred immediately after the US blockade took effect on October 24, when the world feared that a naval battle and a wider war would soon follow. To reduce tensions at this critical juncture, Thant sent identical appeals to Kennedy and Khrushchev, asking them to allow time to negotiate a peaceful settlement. In New York, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Valery Zorin privately admonished Thant for not forcefully criticizing the US blockade of a sovereign state. However, Premier Khrushchev replied very positively to Thant, stating, “I welcome your initiative” and “I agree to your proposal” (Thant, 1978; UN Security Council, 1962). Khrushchev turned back many of his ships, but he kept some en route toward Cuba so as not to appear to be backing down to the US blockade. Herein lay the continuing problem: The two navies could soon clash. For Thant’s proposal to take effect, it would also need US approval.

The American response to Thant’s message was initially guarded, because Thant had not called for a freeze on missile-site construction nor a verified withdrawal of the missiles. In fact, in a telephone conversation discussing Thant’s message, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told Kennedy, “I think that’s a very dangerous message he’s sent” (May and Zelikow, 1997: 388). Some American military leaders—such as General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force’s chief of staff—were openly hostile to Thant’s proposals, and instead pressed for an immediate invasion of Cuba. Following the peaceful resolution of the crisis, LeMay characterized the agreement as “the greatest defeat in our history,” an indication of a military eagerness for war and the pressures that the president faced (Stern, 2003).

In spite of the apprehensions by some British and American officials, Kennedy, in the darkest hour of the crisis, embraced Thant’s initiative. On the evening of October 24, the president was under enormous pressure. Khrushchev had not yet accepted Thant’s proposal. Instead, the Soviet leader had sent Kennedy a hostile cable, accusing him of issuing an ultimatum that the United States itself would never accept, thereby pushing mankind toward nuclear war. Moreover, a Soviet ship called the Bucharest was rapidly approaching the interception zone and Kennedy was being pressed to issue orders for boarding it, risking a naval clash and possibly war. To let the ship pass, however, would suggest that the United States lacked the resolve to enforce the “quarantine.” It was at this highly strained moment that Kennedy reached out to Thant to help the Soviets save face and permit the dispute to be resolved peacefully.

Kennedy’s plea to Thant

At 11:15 p.m. on October 24, Kennedy telephoned Under Secretary George Ball at the State Department and suggested a “message we would send to U Thant” (FRUS, 1996: 190). Kennedy elaborated that he wanted “to give … [the Soviets] enough of an out to stop their shipments without looking like they completely crawled down” (FRUS, 1996: 190). He directed the State Department to get “back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping… [to allow] conversations about how the situation could be adjusted” (FRUS, 1996: 191). The president wanted Thant to propose that the Soviets stop their ships for a few days so talks could be arranged. He concluded that, if this proposal came from the UN secretary-general rather than from the American president, Khrushchev could more easily accept it. As Kennedy put it, it would give the Russians “a way out” (FRUS, 1996: 190).

That night, US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson telephoned Thant, waking him to ask if he would send such a message to the Soviets. Thant agreed to do so in the morning. To ensure that Thant’s message contained exactly what the Americans wanted, Secretary of State Rusk sent a cable to Stevenson in New York at 2 a.m. on October 25, stating precisely what Thant’s message to the Soviets should contain. At 10:30 a.m., Stevenson handed this message to Thant in the form of a single typed page that was to be the basis for Thant’s own proposal, which he then cabled almost word for word to Moscow and Washington. Because it came as a request from the UN secretary-general rather than a demand from the American president, Khrushchev more easily accepted the proposal and kept the remainder of his ships away from the interception zone.

Ambassador Stevenson later described Thant’s action to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in glowing terms. “At a critical moment—when the nuclear powers seemed set on a collision course—the secretary-general’s intervention led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was the indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis” (Stevenson, 1963). Kennedy put it even more bluntly to British Prime Minister Macmillan: “We have U Thant, and we don’t want to sink a ship… right in the middle of when U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out” (May and Zelikow, 1997: 428–429).

Both the American president and the Soviet premier embraced Thant’s proposal despite their subordinates’ criticisms of its content. The superpower leaders saw that they could use Thant to disengage from a naval standoff. The lesson here is that, even if a mediator is initially criticized for proposing moderation, he can soon afterward be acclaimed and utilized by the protagonists to help de-escalate and resolve the crisis. Thant, by helping the two sides settle their confrontation at sea, allowed them to finally move past the overwhelming danger of a naval battle and focus on the underlying issues of the conflict, notably the nuclear missiles in Cuba and Cuban security.

Missile negotiations

In the ensuing negotiations about the missiles, Thant once again played a vital role. With the missiles becoming operational, Kennedy was under enormous pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to invade Cuba. The only peaceful solution the president could foresee involved an immediate freeze on all Cuban missile activity, followed by prolonged negotiations with Moscow on dismantling the missiles. Thant proposed a faster solution. He told Ambassador Stevenson that the Russians would dismantle their missiles immediately in exchange for a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. Thant even phoned Secretary Rusk to push the idea. He also advocated it publicly in the UN Security Council, albeit in more diplomatic and less direct language. A mere two days later, after Thant’s tireless advocacy, his proposition became the centerpiece of the agreement ending the immediate crisis. The public agreement was accompanied by a secret American commitment to remove US missiles from Turkey, made in undisclosed talks between the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin.

Some historians believe the Russians asked Thant to sound out American receptivity to this non-invasion-for-missile-withdrawal proposal (May and Zelikow, 1997). If true, Moscow was also using Thant to transmit their proposals as his own.

Thant’s intervention gave the decision makers hope for a possible way out of the dire situation. After 11 grueling days of crisis, many of Kennedy’s top advisers—called the Executive Committee, or ExComm—felt helpless. All US calls for even a temporary cessation of Cuban missile activity had been futile. The committee leaders felt the only route for success, short of war, lay in negotiations involving Thant’s good offices.

Numerous excerpts from the ExComm discussions indicate that Thant was giving the Americans hope and exerting a powerful influence for restraint. Both Kennedy and Rusk frequently argued in favor of restraint rather than escalatory actions against Cuba, citing Thant’s efforts and their hopes that Thant would secure a Soviet pullout. For example, when discussions in the ExComm turned to whether the United States should prohibit petrol, oil, and lubricants (POL) from entering Cuba, Secretary Rusk wanted to wait to give Thant more time before making that decision. Rusk said: “I think there would be some advantage in having a real shot at the U Thant talks for 24 hours before we consider putting on the POL. We really need to have another round there” (May and Zelikow, 1997: 448). Similarly, when discussion turned to escalating night surveillance by using flares, Rusk again cited Thant’s efforts: “I wonder really again… whether we ought to start that tonight, until we’ve had a crack at the U Thant discussions” (May and Zelikow, 1997: 449). When a Soviet ship called the Grozny was approaching the quarantine line on October 27, Kennedy’s response was to ask Thant to convey a message to the Russians stating exactly where the quarantine line was drawn.

Clearly the unassuming but persistent Thant was fostering restraint and had won the respect of the protagonists. As early as October 26, with pressure still mounting, Kennedy, Rusk, and even Macmillan were thinking of sending Thant on a mission to Cuba. They had come to appreciate his value as an intermediary.

Thant goes to Cuba

When an agreement was finally reached to remove the missiles from Cuba, and Prime Minister Fidel Castro threatened to upset it, Thant flew to Havana and convinced Castro to tone down his rhetoric. Thant was unable, however, to convince the Cuban leader to allow UN inspectors to verify the missile withdrawal, something on which the superpowers had agreed. Thant was offered the opportunity to visit missile sites personally but he declined, instead opting to rely on personal reports from the Soviet military commander in Cuba. Thant also arranged for the return to the United States of the remains of an American pilot whose U-2 plane had been shot down in Cuban airspace on October 27. In support of Thant’s mission, Kennedy even lifted the quarantine of Cuba while Thant was in the country.

As a final contribution to the resolution of the crisis, Thant assisted in the UN-mediated post-agreement negotiations on verification issues. Kennedy had sent John McCloy, former World Bank president, to New York to head the American delegation (called the “UN team” by administration officials), while Khrushchev had sent First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasily Kuznetsov to lead the Soviet side. Several stormy meetings were held on the 38th floor of UN headquarters, with Thant sometimes shuttling between the rooms of the two delegations to help them find a way to verify the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In these UN talks, the Soviets agreed to open their ships’ cargo holds and uncover their missiles so they could be counted by US planes above and ships alongside. When the two negotiating teams developed draft protocols to formalize their leaders’ deal, Thant provided constructive input, though a common protocol was never finalized.

Certainly US strength played a role in resolving this conflict, but unlike many of his military advisers, Kennedy realized that he had to give his opponent an honorable way out. Most significantly, he appreciated how an internationally respected intermediary could help him do so. Kennedy made significant concessions, especially the secret withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey, and exercised enormous restraint, even to the point of refusing to allow America’s military leaders—furious over the downing of an American pilot in Cuba—to attack the missile crew that had shot the plane down. It was primarily the moderation shown by both Kennedy and Khrushchev, augmented by the lines of communication that Thant had opened and the respect he commanded, that prevented nuclear war. Kennedy also displayed wisdom during the most desperate hours of the crisis: When others were girding for confrontation, the young president made use of the secretary-general to allow his opponent to gracefully disengage without appearing to surrender.

Thant’s legacy

For Thant and his UN organization, the Cuban Missile Crisis was their finest hour, though inadequately acknowledged even after 50 years. It was the week the United Nations helped the superpowers pull back from nuclear destruction. The nuclear clock did not strike midnight, largely because Thant facilitated face-saving and de-escalation, transmitted messages, traveled to Cuba, fostered restraint and hope, and made significant proposals, including the idea for the final settlement of the crisis.

As the world heaved a sigh of relief, Thant became one of history’s great peacemakers. His contributions, however, have received too little weight and recognition in the history books, as the focus has remained on Kennedy and his Executive Committee. On the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is appropriate to finally give U Thant credit for his remarkable contribution to averting doomsday.