The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward.

Abstract

As the writers in this symposium illustrate, dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made and what efforts are worth pursuing. In this Global Forum, leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on the options for how to move forward with Iran—from diplomacy to fuel swaps to military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering (2010), Lawrence J. Korb (2010), and Bennett Ramberg (2010); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2010); from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar; and from Israel, Emily B. Landau (2010). Over the months of November and December, this forum will continue at www.thebulletin.org.

Behind Iran’s nuclear program is a national will that supports Tehran’s defense of its nuclear activities—even in the face of sanctions, international pressure, and military threats. Historic confrontations between the West (EU-3, and then the P5 + 1) and Iran have achieved negligible results, at best.

But despite discrepancies in international understanding of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Iran’s nuclear issue has yet to reach an absolute stalemate—and pursuing a win-win strategy will better serve both parties’ interests. Iran’s nuclear strategy must be better understood as a means to a more diplomatic end to this dispute.

In short, Iran’s nuclear strategy is based on mastering the independent nuclear fuel cycle, seeking a cooperative relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to its Safeguards Agreement, and enhancing regional and global nuclear disarmament. While Iran’s progress in moving forward with the elements of this strategy brings challenges for the P5 + 1 group—namely reaching consensus on the mutual interests of all concerned parties—Iran supports continued discussions with this group to find a result acceptable to all parties in the diplomatic process.

Mastering the fuel cycle

Iran can master the independent nuclear fuel cycle in three ways: divide the elements of the fuel cycle among the nation’s plants, acquire nuclear know-how and technology, and/or ensure international support of its enrichment efforts. This is strategically important because, by becoming self-sufficient in the nuclear fuel cycle, Iran will be able to fuel its current and future reactors for electricity generation, and this will affect its sense of security, regional status, development, and role in the broader international community.

1. Diversify the fuel cycle

Iran seeks its own supply of fuel for its Bushehr and future nuclear plants. The Iranian Parliament (the Majlis) has ratified the government’s plan to construct 20 additional nuclear sites capable of generating 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power in the next 20 years. With this policy, Iran aims to diversify the different elements of the fuel cycle throughout the country. One of the main purposes of the Natanz fuel enrichment facility, for example, is to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor, so the country can gradually wean itself off Russian fuel. For Iran, fuel independence means nuclear power status and negotiating from a position of strength in future talks with the P5 + 1.

2. Obtain nuclear know-how and advanced technology

A strategic goal for Iran is to train Iranian nuclear engineers and technicians. This would mean reaching a strategic self-sufficiency that Iran has long sought, shoring up its position as an indispensable player in the region. The country’s current cooperation with Russian nuclear experts, for example, will result in Iran’s ability to construct and launch new reactors. Iran is now self sufficient to the extent that it can produce centrifuges, enrich uranium from 3.5 percent to 20 percent, and convert it into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

3. Strategic value in nuclear talks

In negotiations, the West has consistently pushed Iran to halt its enrichment activities. But the West has lacked political consensus on the appropriate policy for Iran’s nuclear program. The West’s fractured approach on Iran’s uranium enrichment has given—and will continue to give—Iran the upper hand in any future nuclear talks.

Punitive measures undertaken by the international community will fail and have failed to influence the current consensus among Iranian political factions that enrichment should continue; thus, the diplomatic option remains the only feasible one, barring an all-out military confrontation, which an overwhelming majority of experts agree would have catastrophic consequences. The United States has held out the hope that if the Iranian elite can be sufficiently rattled by sanctions and military threats, Iran will back pedal on its claims to the right of domestic enrichment. This policy has proven an abject failure.

If the United States is serious in its commitment to a diplomatic solution, it must recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil and accept Iran’s indispensability for maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf. Iran, in turn, will reciprocate by agreeing to more rigorous inspections by the IAEA to assure the international community of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Iran’s goodwill in this respect has already been demonstrated by the nuclear swap deal concluded with the support of Brazil and Turkey. If this channel could be re-opened and pursued to its conclusion with the tacit consent of the United States, the Iranian leadership would regard it as a sign of goodwill and a basis to address other outstanding issues. Obama’s vocal support of a nuclear swap deal has yet to translate into policy—such incongruity is why the Iranian leadership has thus far remained skeptical of US intentions.

Seeking cooperation with the IAEA

Iran, ultimately, aims to cooperate with the IAEA to create transparency and emphasize the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. It also focuses on avoiding any overt confrontation and tension over the nuclear issue. Iran’s relationship with the IAEA brings with it some challenges—as it only cooperates with the IAEA in the context of its Safeguards Agreement, and not the Additional Protocol.

Continuation of enrichment and the establishment of new nuclear sites in Iran have been the main subjects of the IAEA’s reports. While these reports do not prove Iran’s nuclear activities have been diverted toward military purposes, they implicitly relate the development of Iran’s nuclear activities to a possible military diversion.

Iran and the Additional Protocol

Iran’s strategy is based on not accepting the Additional Protocol as long as Iran’s nuclear dossier remains at the UN Security Council. From Iran’s perspective, the Additional Protocol is an instrument for exerting political pressure on Tehran and only increases the IAEA’s expectations of expanding its inspections of Iranian nuclear sites. In fact, from November 2004 to February 2006, Iran voluntarily cooperated in the context of the protocol; this was a confidence-building measure that yielded little in the way of tangible results. The EU-3 offered Iran a package in return for permanent cessation of enrichment. It included benefits in the political, trade, and nuclear fields, as well as long-term supplies of nuclear materials and assurances of non-aggression from the EU—but not from the US. Iran called the package “insulting” and an “empty box” (Ryan and Agencies, 2005).

Iran’s acceptance of the Additional Protocol must entail a strategic gain, and can only be accepted on the condition of basic confidence-building measures. The United States cannot claim good faith in negotiations while simultaneously pummeling Iran economically via sanctions or demanding the cessation of uranium enrichment. The Iranian leadership is skeptical of US intentions, and this skepticism finds its provenance in US support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, a conflict that left an indelible mark upon the minds of Iranian decision-makers.

The extraordinary authority conferred upon IAEA inspectors by the Additional Protocol undermines Iran’s sovereign right to accept or reject some inspections. Iran is likely to accept the protocol if Iran’s right to enrich uranium is recognized by the international community, but until such recognition is forthcoming, it will refrain from offering additional pretexts for invasive inspections that the US could use to further harm Iran’s case. With the Additional Protocol in force, the agency can demand that Iran allow inspectors to investigate sites and technologies not included in Iran’s safeguards commitments. Previous Iranian compromises that allowed such inspections—like the one of the Parchin military complex outside Tehran in January 2005—have served to further complicate relations between Iran and the IAEA, as when then-IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei reported that his organization had found no sign of nuclear-related activity at Parchin, which several US officials had said might be tied to secret nuclear weapons research (Sanger, 2005). Iran allowed these inspections, despite objections from Iranian political factions that it violated Iran’s sovereign rights.

Iran and the NPT

Iran’s nuclear strategy is based on full compliance with the NPT and further strengthening the balance of its three main principles: non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and comprehensive disarmament. From this perspective, the NPT’s rules and regulations are such that they guarantee the legitimacy and peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, making it unlikely that Iran would withdraw from the NPT. Some Iranian political factions doubt the NPT’s purpose and function and argue that Iran’s continued membership will only impose unwarranted pressure on the country. However, the dominant policy view is that withdrawal from the NPT would undermine the legal, technical, and peaceful aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and permit Iran’s international critics to focus on the potential military dimensions of the program.

Regional and global disarmament

Iran takes a three-pronged approach to disarmament: convince global public opinion that Iran’s nuclear program is legitimate, encourage peaceful nuclear energy expansion in the region, and intensify political pressure on Israel to sign the NPT. This strategy also has three dimensions:

1. No more “deterrence” and “weaponization.”

Iran has excluded the concept of “nuclear deterrence” from its nuclear strategy, focusing its defense strategy on conventional military deterrence alone. From Iran’s perspective, nuclear weapons have no deterrence value. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated this policy during the Tehran Nuclear Disarmament Conference in April 2010 (Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010a), and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, in a letter addressed to the conference, declared the use of nuclear weapons haram (religiously banned; Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010b).

Iran’s stance is that the interconnected nature of regional security in the Middle East is such that it can easily tackle military threats posed by the United States and Israel by resorting to conventional and asymmetric warfare. Military exercises and enhancement of missile systems are part of this defense strategy.

2. Support peaceful nuclear activities in the region.

Iran believes access to peaceful nuclear energy is a prerequisite for the sustainable development of the region and regional states, including the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Turkey and Egypt have accepted this logic and are proceeding accordingly. Agreements have been signed for nuclear energy cooperation—the United Arab Emirates has signed agreements with France and South Korea; Turkey and Egypt with Russia; Saudi Arabia with the United States; and recently, Kuwait with Japan. Increasing regional demand for nuclear energy enhances the legitimacy of Iranian nuclear activities. Russian cooperation to launch the Bushehr reactor was a turning point in terms of the increase in regional demand for nuclear energy.

The expansion of nuclear activities in the region will not necessarily end in a nuclear arms race. In fact, one can argue that, historically, the main reason behind conflicts in the region was foreign actors’ interests in accessing regional energy resources. For instance, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and subsequently the US invasion of Iraq in 1990 were widely perceived by analysts as a matter of accessing the region’s energy sources. The region’s access to nuclear energy will prevent the exacerbation of such traditional rivalries.

3. Comprehensive disarmament in the Middle East.

Iran initiated the Middle East Disarmament Plan in 1974 (Johnson, 2007); today, one of the main aspects of Iran’s nuclear strategy is the pursuit of comprehensive disarmament. Such a strategy results in active support of regional actors such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Further, it is a step toward challenging Israel’s nuclear program and exerting pressure on Tel Aviv to sign the NPT. Iran believes that Israel poses the most imminent security threat to the region and is the starting point for a conventional military arms race. Iran’s strategy in this regard is to form a new bloc seeking comprehensive disarmament in the region. This was articulated at Iran’s first disarmament conference, which boasted the motto: “Nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapon for none.”

Recommendations

Bolstered by the nation’s support of its nuclear program, Tehran will not freeze its nuclear activities under any circumstances. Tough confrontations have only backfired: Iran has increased the number of its centrifuges from a few ones in 2003 to some 8,000 today. Iran has also tested the fourth generation of IR centrifuges. US obstruction of low-enriched uranium deliveries for the TRR moved Iran to enrich uranium at a level of 20 percent.

It is in the interest of the international community, therefore, to interact and engage with Iran. The nature of Iran’s nuclear program is such that continuing a win-win strategy will better serve both parties’ interests:

Enriching uranium

Win for Iran: The P5+1 group accepts that Iran will enrich uranium to 3.5 percent for Iranian reactors (the Bushehr reactor and future reactors).

Win for the P5 + 1: Iran will limit its enrichment process to 3.5 percent (in this case, Iran will give up enriching uranium to 20 percent for the TRR), controlling the source of Iran's enriched uranium by accepting a swap deal (something like the Iran-Turkey-Brazil deal in May 2010); therefore, the P5 + 1 can oversee uranium enrichment, and acquire financial and economic benefits from selling the fuel.

The Additional Protocol

Win for Iran: The Security Council withdraws Iran’s nuclear dossier, and the P5 + 1 accepts Iran’s nuclear status.

Win for the P5 + 1: Iran accepts all necessary guarantees requested by the IAEA, including the Additional Protocol, to ensure Iran’s nuclear program will not have military objectives.

Regional nuclear disarmament

Win for Iran: Israel signs the NPT, and moves toward complete nuclear disarmament. From Iran’s perspective, the Israeli regime’s possession of nuclear weapons is the main security threat, as well as the main potential cause of a conventional arms race in the region.

Win for the 5 + 1: Iran will guarantee it will not pursue the weaponization of its nuclear program. This would reduce the conventional arms race, and regional tensions, moving toward sustainable solutions for regional crises, i.e. the Arab-Israel peace process, Iraq, and Afghanistan.