How does an anti-corruption policy shape bureaucrats’ intentions to whistle-blow? Anti-corruption research suggests that civil servants with certain characteristics are more or less likely to blow the whistle, due to a discrepancy in perceptions of expected outcomes within the organizational hierarchy. We test this logic by examining how civil servants’ gender, age, and civil service rank shape changes in their whistle-blowing intentions, leveraging the recent implementation of an anti-corruption policy in South Korea. By analyzing original survey data on over 5,000 civil servants, matching pre- and post-implementation groups, we find that male, older, and high-ranking civil servants, respectively, are more willing to whistle-blow than female, younger, and low-ranking civil servants when the anti-corruption policy is implemented. The implication of this finding is that the greater power and prestige granted to the former groups within the organizational hierarchy may make them more willing to do so.
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