Coup “handbooks” emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d’état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of coup success. The findings also suggest that leader capture will be less likely if the regime pre-emptively creates a counterweight presidential guard unit, responsible for providing proximate security for the core leadership. These data and findings provide new insights into the dynamics of in-progress coups, focusing on the operational strategies employed by both sides. It also demonstrates the diversity of independent effects that specific types of counterweight forces have on specific coup outcomes, encouraging further study in this area.
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