Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how coups influence a country’s long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the public good and provide a boost to the state’s democratization prospects. Causal mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic interdependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups: the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator’s ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national exploration of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more likely to oversee democratic transitions following military coups. Beyond contributing to a broader literature on civil–military relations, the article points to important policy implications for developing nations.
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