Previous studies have attested to leaders “coup-proofing” their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. “Structural” coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army’s capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup’s success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.
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