This article focuses on relations between army and politics in the Czech Republic after the 1989 Velvet Revolution. This article concludes that these relations in the Czech Republic achieved the parameters typical of consolidated democracies. The many problems that continue to exist in this area in the Czech Republic do not in any significant way deviate from what is typical of consolidated democracies. Therefore, the transformation of civil —military relations can be regarded as successful.
The Czech Republic is a small Central European country comparable, in terms of its size and population, to the Netherlands, Belgium (Western Europe), and Austria (Central Europe). The aim of its military is to defend Czech territory and take part in peacekeeping operations. The defense of the territory of the Czech Republic against external aggression is perceived as a rather unlikely variant of the use of the Czech Armed Forces in the near future. But if such a situation were to arise, the defense should be realized within the frame of the NATO collective defense.
2.
Douglas L. Bland, "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 27, 4 (2001): 525-40; Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil -Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 26, 1 (1999): 7-26; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil -Military Problematigue: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (1996): 149-78; Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political Science Review 50, 3 (1956): 676-99; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil- Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces & Society 22, 1 (1995): 7-24; Rebecca L. Schiff, "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism," Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (1996): 277-83; Richard S. Wells, "The Theory of Concordance in Civil/Military Relations: A Commentary," Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (1996): 269-75.
3.
Huntington, Soldier and the State; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960); Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).
4.
Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, and Stanislav Stach, "Democratic Control over Security policy and Armed Forces," in Demokratische und Zivile kontrole von Sicherheistpolitik und Streitkräften, ed. Laurent F. Carrel, Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Andreas Schaer and Stanislav Stach (Zurich: Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule 8092 Zürich, 1997), 76-120; and Zdeněk Kříž, "K některým aspektům aplikace západního modelu civilního řízení a demokratické kontroly ozbrojených sil v podmínkách ČR," Politologický časopis 4, 2 (1997): 142-51.
5.
Robert A.Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 250-51.
6.
Larry L. Watts, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control," Journal of Political and Military Sociology30, 1 (2002): 54.
7.
Huntington, Soldier and the State, 143-62.
8.
The same is true with respect to communist countries. Also see David E. Albright, "Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," World Politics 32, 4 (1980): 574; and Dale R. Herspring, "Samuel Huntington and Communist Civil -Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 25, 4 (1999): 574.
9.
Sam C. Sarkesian , "Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West," International Science Review2, 3 (1981): 291.
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos ( New York: Warner Books, 1993), 73-93.
14.
Act no. 222/1999 coll., "On the Czech Defense Provision," consolidated version, art. 5; and act no. 219/1999 coll., "On the Czech Armed Forces," consolidated version, art. 6.
15.
Act no. 110/1998 coll., "On Security of the Czech Republic," consolidated version, art. 9.
16.
Constitution of the Czech Republic, act no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 43.
17.
Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Vojáci důvěřují ve stejné míře ministrovi obrany i náčelníkovi GŠ [Trust of soldiers in Minister of Defence is the same as their trust in the Chief of General Staff] (Prague: Ministry of Defence, 2004), 2-3.
18.
It should be noted that a rather illogical definition of armed forces is used in the Czech Republic. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic consist of the Army, the Military Office of the President of the Republic, and the Castle Guard (i.e., the presidential guard). The police and the customs service personnel are not included in the legal definition of the armed forces.
19.
Constitution of the Czech Republic, act. no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 63.
With respect to the civil-military relations, it is very important that the Chief of General Staff appointment is usually not a bone of contention among political parties. The right of the president to appoint the Chief of General Staff is deduced form the Constitution of the Czech Republic, act. no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 63.
22.
Constitution of the Czech Republic, act no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 15, 30, 31, 42, 43, and 53.
23.
Paradoxically, it seems to be a variant of the promise to defend socialism that can be found in the 1961 oath. Only the specific values preferred by society were exchanged; the frame remained unchanged.
24.
For more about Poland, see Elizabeth P. Coughlan, "Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case," Armed Forces & Society24, no. 4 ( 1998): 525-29.
25.
Antonín Rašek, "Demokratizace, humanizace, armáda: zkušenosti čtyř let" [Democratization, humanization, military: Experience of four years], Vojenské rozhledy2, 10 ( 1993): 19.
26.
Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Vojáci důvěřují, 2-3.
27.
Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Postoje vojáků k naší účasti v Kosovu, Afghánistánu a Iráku [The attitudes of soldiers to our participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq] ( Prague: Ministry of Defence, 2004 ), 1.
28.
Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Kritika reform souvisí s nízkou informovaností [Criticism relates to low soldier awareness] (Prague, Ministry of Defence, 2004), 1.
29.
Unfortunately, no opinion research results directly describing the levels of support among soldiers for the democratic regime and the orientation of Czech foreign policy are available.
30.
Pick, Sarvas, and Stach, " Democratic Control," 111-12.
31.
This pressure had a negative impact on the structure of the Czech officer corps because especially young officers decided to leave the military.
Stefan Sarvas , "Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe," Armed Forces & Society26, 1 ( 1999): 103.
34.
Ministry of Defence, "Vývoj skutečných počtů osob v resortu MO ČR v letech 1993-2009," http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5342 (accessed October 25, 2009).
35.
For more in English, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil -Military Relations ( Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 60-133; and for more in Czech, see Bohuslav Pernica, "Obranné plánování České republiky. Tři kritické poznámky ," Obrana a strategie4, 2 (2004): 105-9.
36.
Bohuslav Pernica, Profesionalizace ozbrojených sil. Trendy, teorie a zkušenosti (Prague: Avis, 2007).
37.
Act no. 221/1999 coll., "On Career Officers," consolidated version, art. 44 and 45.
38.
For more about Poland, see Coughlan , "Democratizing Civilian Control"
39.
Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 142.
