India finalized its nuclear command structure and formalized its nuclear doctrine in January 2003, nearly five years after coming out of the nuclear closet and openly declaring itself as a nuclear-weapon state. While a clearly enunciated nuclear doctrine and command structure are seen by some as essential in enhancing regional stability and assuaging the concerns of the international community, its implications for the civil-military relations in India remain far from clear. Strategic imperatives and political pressures concerning civil-military relations seem to be pulling Indian nuclear policy in opposite directions. This article examines Indian nuclear doctrine and command structure with an attempt to decipher its implications for the future of civil-military relations in India with respect to the management of its nuclear arsenal.
A detailed historical analysis on the evolution of strategic thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in the United States can be found at Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 3–46.
2.
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995).
3.
For the first detailed explication of Waltz's provocative analysis, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,”Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
4.
Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,7-7.
5.
Ibid., 108.
6.
Ibid., 47–92.
7.
Ibid., 49.
8.
Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
9.
Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,”Annual Review of Political Science2 (1999): 214–216.
10.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
11.
Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993): 160–87; Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 66–107.
12.
Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 21-21.
13.
Ibid., 28.
14.
John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”International Security15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–56; Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990–1991): 7–57.
15.
For arguments and evidence about the less than perfect command-and-control arrangements and the resulting complications in the two superpowers during the Cold War, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1993); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993); Feaver, Guarding the Guardians. For arguments about the problems that are likely to emerge in the emerging nuclear states, see Sagan, “Perils of Proliferation,” 66–107; Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.”
16.
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.”
17.
The neo-optimist position is best exemplified by David Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,”International Security21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–1970): 87–119; Jordan Seng, “Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 49–91.
18.
Seng, “Less is More,”53-53.
19.
Neil Joeck, “Nuclear Relations in South Asia,” in Repairing the Regime: Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), available from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Repairing_09.pdf.
20.
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 127–130.
21.
Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 17–173.
22.
Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 212-212.
23.
P. R. Chari, “Civil-Military Relations in India,”Armed Forces & Society4, no. 1 (November 1977): 13–15.
24.
Ibid., 15–17.
25.
Cohen, The Indian Army, 176-176.
26.
P. R. Chari, “Civil-Military Relations of India,”Link, August 15, 1977, p. 75-75.
27.
For details, see George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 60–105.
28.
Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), 287-287.
29.
Ibid., 297–300.w
30.
Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 167-167.
31.
Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 300–301.
32.
Ibid., 322–29.
33.
Ibid., 326–27.
34.
Cohen, The Indian Army, 207-207.
35.
For details, see “Suo Moto Statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian Parliament on May 27, 1998,”India News, May 16–June 15, 1998, pp. 1–2. Also see “Paper Laid on the Table of the House on Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy,” India News, May 16–June 15, 1998, pp. 3–6.
36.
For an overview of these negotiations, see Harsh V. Pant, “India and Nuclear Arms Control: A Study of the CTBT,”Comparative Strategy21no. 2 (April 2002): 99–102.
37.
For the text of the draft Indian nuclear doctrine, see “Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,”India News, October 1, 1999, pp. 2–3.
38.
D. Shyam Babu, “India's National Security Council: Stuck in the Cradle?”Security Dialogue34, no. 2 (June 2003): 222-222.
39.
“BJP Election Manifesto: Our National Security,” available from http://www.bjp.org/manifes/chap8.htm.
40.
P. R. Chari, “India's Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions,”The Nonproliferation Review (fall/winter 2000): 125-125.
41.
Ibid., 125.
42.
Personal communication via e-mail with K. Subrahmanyam.
43.
G. Balachnadran, “India's Nuclear Doctrine,”Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies newsletter (September 1999): 5-5.
44.
Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 2002), 442-442.
45.
For a sample of reactions to the draft Indian nuclear doctrine, see Raja Menon, “The Nuclear Doctrine,”Times of India, August 26, 1999; Kuldip Nayar, “Between Welfare and Weapons,”Indian Express, August 31, 1999; Monoj Joshi, “The ABC and Whys of India Nuclear Doctrine,” Times of India, August 22, 1999; Kanti Bajpai, “ A Flawed Doctrine,” Times of India, September 7, 1999; W. P. S. Sidhu, “This Doctrine is Full of Holes,” Indian Express, September 8, 1999; and “ Congress Flays Nuclear Doctrine,” Asian Age, August 19, 1999.
46.
See “Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,”India News, October 1, 1999, pp. 2–3, par. 5.2 and 3.1.
47.
For Pakistan's reaction, see “Pak Reacts Strongly to India's Assertion,”Times of India, August 19, 1999. On China, see Chen Yali, “Nuclear Arms Race Looms,” China Daily, August 24, 1999. For details on the reaction of the United States, see Howard Diamond, “India Releases N-Doctrine, Looks to Emulate P-5 Arsenals,” Arms Control Today, July/August 1999.
48.
C. Raja Mohan, “Fernandes unveils ‘limited war’ doctrine,”The Hindu, January 24, 2000.
49.
For a detailed examination of the views of India and Pakistan on the significance of Pakistan's foray into the Kargil-Dras sector in a limited war that has come to be known as the Kargil conflict, see Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 29–59.
50.
This has been made clear by the Kargil Review Committee that was appointed by the Indian government to look into the events leading up to the Kargil conflict and to make appropriate recommendations to strengthen Indian security apparatus. From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (London: Sage, 1999), 77, 206–209.
51.
Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,”Policy Paper series (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002).
52.
V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (London: Sage, 2003), 65–77.
53.
See, for example, Shireen M. Mazari, “Re-Examining Kargil,”Defence Journal3, no. 11 (June 2000): 44–46.
54.
For example, Parveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: Left Word Books, 1999), 19-19.
55.
Gen. V. P. Malik, “Indo-Pak Security Relations: Kargil and After,”Indian Express, June 21, 2002.
56.
S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe?”International Security30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 148-148.
57.
A detailed explication of this viewpoint can be found in Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 118–144.
58.
President Pervez Musharraf's “Address to the Nation” on January 12, 2002, available from http://www.janggroup.com/thenews/spedition/speech_of_musharraf/index.html.
59.
Subhash Kapila, “India's New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” paper no. 991, South Asia Analysis Group, available from http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper991.html.
60.
B. Murlidhar Reddy, “Musharraf Had Warned of N-War,”The Hindu, December 31, 2002.
61.
J. N. Dixit, “World Should Not Expect India to Remain Restrained,”Hindustan Times, January 5, 2003.
62.
See “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India's Nuclear Doctrine,” available from http://meaindia.nic.in/prhome.htm.
63.
For a detailed examination of India's nuclear doctrine, see Harsh V. Pant, “India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India and the World,”Comparative Strategy24, no. 3 (July 2005): 277–293.
64.
For a discussion of the genesis and operation of India's traditional command-and-control arrangements, see Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 444–464.
65.
John Cherian, “The Nuclear Button,”Frontline, January 31, 2003.
66.
For details, see Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “India's Nuclear Forces, 2005,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists61, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 73–75.
67.
Vishal Thapar, “Agni-I Tested, Ready for Induction,”Hindustan Times, July 4, 2004.
68.
“NCA Councils Review Nuclear Deterrence,”Indian Express, September 8, 2003.
69.
Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 444–464.
70.
“Musharraf Heads Pak's Nuke Command,”Indian Express, January 28, 2003.
71.
Manoj Joshi, “India Needs to Spell Out Its Nuclear Command Structure,”Times of India, February 5, 2000.
72.
Rahul Bedi, “A Credible Nuclear Deterrent?”Frontline, April 11, 2003.
73.
“Three Forces to Train, Deliver and Service Nukes,”Indian Express, January 17, 2003.
74.
Rajat Pandit, “Nuclear Force Chief Set to Retire,”Times of India, June 1, 2004.
75.
For details on some of the achievements of the IDS in increasing the levels of interaction among the three services of the Armed Forces, see http://ids.nic.in/reportfirst.html.
76.
Shishir Gupta, “No Eyeball to Eyeball Any More in New War Doctrine,”Indian Express, March 6, 2004.
77.
Cohen, The Indian Army, 220-220.
78.
Bedi, “A Credible Nuclear Deterrent?”
79.
Rahul Bedi, “A New Doctrine for the Navy,”Frontline, July 16, 2004.
80.
For details on the effort to base tactical, liquid-fueled SRBMs such as the Dhanush on the Indian Navy's Sukanya-class offshore patrol vessels, see http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Sukanya.html.
81.
Norris and Kristensen, “India's Nuclear Forces, 2005.”
82.
On India's support to the United States' controversial ballistic missile-defense program and the ensuing debate in India on its implications, see Harsh V. Pant, “India Debates Missile Defense,”Defence Studies5, no. 2 (June 2005): 228–246.
83.
Ashok K. Mehta, “A Strategic Forces Command, Finally!” available from http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/feb/10ashok.htm.
84.
“Finally, Hawk Gets Cabinet Nod,”Press Trust of India, September 3, 2003.
85.
Indian silence on alternative chains of command is premised on a reasonable belief that deterrence would be strengthened if the adversary knows that there are alternative arrangements but does not know where. See C. Raja Mohan, “Nuclear Command System Credible: India,”The Hindu, January 8, 2003.
86.
Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): 250–253.
87.
Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 450-450.
88.
Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, 444-444.
89.
Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 436-436.
90.
“We are Prepared: Army Chief,”The Hindu, January 12, 2002.
91.
“Uncalled For Concerns: Fernandes,”The Hindu, January 12, 2002.
92.
D. K. Palit, “War in the Deterrent Age,”United Services Institution of India Journal124 (January–March 1999): 21-21.
93.
Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 280–292.
94.
The ranges of weapon-making capacities of India have been estimated variously at forty-five to ninety-five (David Albright, “India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear Inventories, End of 1999,”Institute of Science and Security, October 11, 2000) and fifty to ninety (Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction [Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2002]).
95.
India's NCA at its first meeting also decided to expand the delivery systems for carrying nuclear weapons. Rajat Pandit, “Nuke Panel Reviews State of Arsenal,”The Economic Times, September 2, 2003.
96.
A detailed explication of the “always/never” dilemma can be found in Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, 12–21.
97.
For a detailed enunciation of India's force-in-being nuclear posture, see Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 366–475.
98.
Raj Chengappa, “Nuclear Arsenal: Who Controls the Button?”India Today, January 20, 2003.
99.
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,”167-167.
100.
Jasjit Singh, “Pak N-button: US Eyes on Army Chief's Finger,”Indian Express, January 9, 2003.
101.
Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,”174–178.
