Why should it be so difficult for the United States, with its overwhelming military edge, to counter low-level conflict? An answer is suggested by the paradigmatic example of U.S. operations in Falluja in April 2004. Falluja shows that the Bush administration and its military commanders treat power as a possession or capability independent of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas power in Iraq is better understood in terms of relationships. Considered in this light, Falluja clarifies several issues shaping U.S. understanding of power and offers insight into the application of conventional force against insurgents
“Family Who Escaped Bombing in Falluja,”Guardian, April 12, 2004. What follows is based on accounts in the U.K.-based Daily Telegraph, Economist, Financial Times, Guardian, Jane’s Defence Weekly (JDW), and Sunday Times, supplemented by the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post. Additional information is provided by Internet-based news reports, such as BBC News and CNN (http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk). Secondary news reports have their limitations, but in the absence of hard data or personal experience, they represent important, if partial, sources of information.
2.
and Steven Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,”Washington Quarterly27, no. 1 (2003): 25-36.
3.
See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James Faubion (London: Penguin, 1994), 219-219.
4.
See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James Faubion (London: Penguin, 1994), 345-345.
5.
and Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).
6.
For an overview, see Henry Goverde, Philip Cerny, Mark Haugaard, and Howard Lentner, Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (London: Sage, 2000).
7.
Charles Clover, “The Fighters of Falluja,”FT Magazine, April 24, 2004, 18-23.
8.
This statement may seem presumptuous, but it reflects the opinion of most non-U.S. commentators—see almost any U.K. broadsheet from 2003. Quantifying the appropriate application of force is always difficult, not least because military necessity must be balanced by strategic objectives and political claims to legitimacy, as well as by professional and/or personal morality. In other words, the assessment of what constitutes arrogant or heavy-handed action cannot be a purely technical issue; it is a relative and subjective matter.
9.
“Falluja’s Message of Hate for US Troops,”Financial Times, January 12, 2004. The use of such quotes runs the risk of selectivity, but they are representative of U.K. reportage.
10.
“Chaos, Killing and Kidnap,”Guardian, April 9, 2004.
11.
“Alarm over Iraq as US Tries to End Rebellion,”Financial Times, April 10, 2004.
12.
“Rumsfeld Pessimistic over Negotiations,”Financial Times, April 20, 2004.
13.
“Death Toll Hits 600 in Bloody Siege of Falluja,”Guardian, April 12, 2004.
14.
See any U.K. news, broadsheet, or tabloid account from the period.
15.
and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). U.S. foreign policy and decision making in the Bush administration attracts high levels of attention, though the role of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has yet to be systematically analyzed.
16.
“US Army Promises Punishment and Pacification after Falluja Killings,”Financial Times, April 2, 2004.
17.
CPA briefing, Baghdad, Iraq, March 31, 2004, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040331_Mar31_KimmittSenor.html.
18.
See “Key General Criticizes April Attack in Fallujah: Abrupt Withdrawal Called Vacillation,”Washington Post, September 13, 2004, A17-A17, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16309-2004Sep12.html.
19.
Ibid.
20.
The number of those killed varies in English-language newspapers, but the assault is thought to have involved about twenty deaths. U.S. Marine Corps casualties for the three weeks of the siege were more than one hundred; personal communication (U.K.-based academic), November 8, 2004.
21.
quoted in “US Options in Dealing with a Widening War,”Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 2004.
22.
Quoted in “Iraqis Hold Key to Legitimizing Their Own Security Forces,” April 12, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04122004_200404125.html.
23.
and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations (Washington, DC: 2000), IV-39-IV-48.
24.
Similar considerations applied to their adversaries. Rival Sunni groups spoke of the international community’s failure to stop the “genocide” resulting from America’s “blind hatred for Muslims.” See “We Told You So, but What Now?”Economist, April 17, 2004.
25.
CompareJosephNye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
26.
See, for example, James Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq,”Survival45, no. 4 (2003-2004): 87-110.
27.
and Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound.
28.
“Wolfowitz Criticizes ‘Suspect’ Estimate of Occupation Force,”Washington Times, February 28, 2003.
29.
and The President’s 2002 State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
30.
For the administration’s unwillingness to discriminate between threats, see Jeffrey Record, “Threat Confusion and Its Penalties,”Survival46, no. 2 (2004): 51-72.
31.
See Toby Dodge, Evidence to Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, “Iraq Transition: Civil War or Civil Society?” April 20, 2004, http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040420a.html.
32.
A view supported by some senior officers. See “Dissension Grows in Senior Ranks on War Strategy,”Washington Post, May 9, 2004, A01-A01.
33.
Compare Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: Norton, 2003).
34.
“Transcript: Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing,” April 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi-freedom_briefs.htm.
35.
J. M. Mattis, “Message from the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division,” March 25, 2004, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/1104985/posts.
36.
Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, 28-28, 32-32.
37.
Human Rights Watch, “Violent Response: The U.S. Army in al-Falluja,”HRW Report15, no. 7 (June 2003): 1-1.
38.
Compare Evan Wright, Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War (London: Bantam, 2004).
39.
“Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns,”New York Times, December 7, 2003.
40.
See “Why Falluja Remains a Crossroads for Collision,”New York Times, April 9, 2004.
41.
BBC News, “US Puts Pressure on Shia Cleric,” April 14, 2004.
42.
Army Magazine, vol. 53, no. 7 (2003), http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.
43.
“Interview: Maj Gen Yiftah Ron-Tal,”JDW, March 24, 2004, 34-34.
44.
BBC News, “US Defends Its Falluja Onslaught,” April 28, 2004.
45.
and “General Calls Insurgency in Iraq a Sign of U.S. Success: Political Achievements Are Cause of Uprising, Myers Says,”Washington Post, April 16, 2004, A10-A10.
46.
Comparealso Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005).
47.
Compare “Military and the Media: Weaponising the Truth,”JDW, June 8, 2005, 22-25.
48.
Quoted in “Secretary of War,”Time, December 29, 2003, 84-84.
49.
Frederick Kagan, “War and Aftermath,”Policy Review120 (2003), http://www.policyreview.org.
50.
Quoted in Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Operations Concepts (Washington, DC, 2003), 9-9.
51.
quoted in Joint Staff J-7, Joint Operations Concepts, 18-19.
