Among many others, see John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002); and Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006). For an official statement of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, see U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
2.
Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977).
3.
D. Michael Shafer, "The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency,"Political Science Quarterly103, no. 1 (1988): 57-80.
4.
Stephen Hosmer , The Army’s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND , 1990); Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993); Thomas Mockaitis, "A New Era of Counterinsurgency,"RUSI Journal136, no. 1 (1991): 73-78.
5.
William Rosenau, "Subversion and Terrorism: Understanding and Countering the Threat," in The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Annual 2006 ( Oklahoma City, OK: National Memorial for the Prevention of Terrorism), 53-54.
6.
David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," undated paper available on Small Wars Journal Web site, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf (accessed September 3, 2009), 1.
7.
Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, xxii.
8.
Warren Chin , "Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq," Small Wars and Insurgencies18, no. 1 ( 2007): 1-26.
9.
Ibid., 22.
10.
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
11.
At the time of writing (fall 2009), it is uncertain whether the Obama administration will persevere with counterinsurgency in Afghanistan or switch to a strategy of selective targeting of Taliban leaders without counterinsurgency’s emphasis on the protection of the civilian population and the delivery of local services. Whether or not a shift in strategy occurs, advocates will continue to argue for counterinsurgency when the U.S. confronts future conflicts.
12.
Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, "Preface: Towards a Science of Counterinsurgency," Contemporary Security Policy28, no. 1 (2007): vi.
13.
Stathis Kalvyas and Matthew Kocher, "How ‘Free’ is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,"World Politics59, no. 2 (2007): 177-216.
14.
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One ( Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).
15.
Stephen Biddle, "Iraq after the Surge," statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 110th Congress (2nd Session), January 23, 2008.
16.
David Kilcullen in George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy," The New Yorker, December 18, 2006.
17.
Roberto Gonzalez, American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain ( Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009).
18.
"After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers,"The Economist, October 27, 2007, 33-36.
19.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), "Questions and Answers about AFRICOM,"http://www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp (accessed October 5, 2009).