How might Bosnia-Herzegovina attempt to institute democratic civil control over its military? This article applies Cottey, Edmonds, and Forster’s thesis of first- and second-generation civil-military relations to the protectorate of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It argues that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this agenda does not occur in a loosely overlapping fashion with the initiation of the first-generation agenda providing the basis upon which the second-generation agenda can be implemented. Rather, the reverse occurs: the second-generation, capacity-building agenda allows for the construction of state-level institutions in the defense and security sphere—not least a functioning ministry of defense—the hallmark of the first-generation macroinstitutional structural reform agenda. This approach may well prove to be appropriate for other protectorates, and it is of rising strategic significance in an age of preemptive action against failed and rogue states, regime change, and democratization
International Community Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) Reforms, April 7, 2003. For a study of civil-military cooperation in BiH, see Adam B. Siegel, “Civil-Military Marriage Counselling: Can this Union Be Saved?”Special Warfare15, no. 4 (December 2002): 28-34.
2.
Lord Ashdown, “Broken Communities, Shattered Lives: Winning the Savage War of Peace,”UNASA News Agency, June 20, 2003.
3.
There are many historical examples of failed or defeated states that have subsequently generated strong democratic institutions in part because of the administration, guidance, and oversight administered by external military forces. “Operation Blacklist,” in which General McArthur democratized Japan, and “Operation Eclipse,” the complete political rebuilding of postwar Germany by Allied Forces, are the most famous examples. See Aminta Arrington, “Cautious Reconciliation: The Change in Societal-Military Relations in Germany and Japan Since the End of the Cold War,”Armed Forces & Society28, no.4 (July 2002): 531-554.
4.
See also William Bain, “The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Inequality,”International Relations17, no. 1 (2003): 59-77.
5.
“Operation Uphold Democracy” (1992-1995) represented a successful attempt to instill and maintain democratic rule in Haiti until the U.S. Army disengaged from the island in April 1996.
6.
Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insight, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario,”Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003, 8-8.
7.
The initial peacekeeping campaign was called “Operation Joint Endeavor.” It was later changed to “Operation Joint Guard” and, since June 1998, is called “Operation Joint Forge.”
8.
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,”Armed Forces & Society29, no.1 (Fall 2002): 31-56.
9.
For a proponent of the thesis that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness, see Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,”Journal of Democracy13, no. 1, (2002): 5-21; also available from http://www.journalofdemocracy.com/.
10.
and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes,”International Studies Quarterly46 (2002): 529-549.
11.
Christopher D. Jones and Natalie Mychajlyszyn, “Overview: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe in Former Communist Societies,”Armed Forces & Society28, no. 4 (July 2002): 531-554.
12.
Robert M. Kunovich and Randy Hodson, “Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and Inequality: A Structural Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia,”Sociological Quarterly43, no.2 (Spring 2002): 185-208.
13.
As one analyst stated, “Since widespread ethnic displacement was a central objective of the conflict in BiH, the right of refugees to return to their pre-conflict residence is essential to effective peace-building. Return to pre-conflict homes is a recognized right under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH, however, many repatriates find themselves returned to situations of internal displacement”; Gaim Kibreab, “Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees,”The International Migration Review37, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 24-73.
14.
David Chandler, “Anti-corruption Strategies and Democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina,”Democratization9, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 101-121.
15.
Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Interview, Michael Humphrey, Head of the European Commission Delegation to BiH,”Newsletter of the European Union, April 2003,5-5.
16.
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 11-11.
17.
Michael Pugh, “Post-war Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace,”Global Governance8, no. 4 (October-December 2002): 467-482. Per capita income does not exceed $2,000 a year in BiH, as compared with $8,300 in Croatia and $2,800 for Albania. See Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Interview,” 6.
18.
Based on conversations during the BiH Defense Reform Law Conference in Jahorina, BiH, May 5-9, 2003.
19.
Christoph Solioz and Svebor Dizdarevic, eds., “Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Dependence to Sustainability, (Sarajevo 2002): Book Review,”Croatian International Relations ReviewIII, nos. 28 and 29 (2002): 199-200.
20.
Wolfgang Petritsch, “In Bosnia, an ‘Entry Strategy,’”Washington Post, July 2, 2002, A5-A5.
21.
Peter Lippman, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: A State under Threat,”The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs22, no. 5 (June 2003): 44-44, 63-64.
22.
Wolfgang Petritsch, “Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,”NATO”s Nations and Partners for PeaceI (2000): 96-97.
23.
Defense Reform Law Conference, May 5-9, 2003.
24.
Information based on a briefing presented by the Office for Defense Cooperation and an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe representative, Seminar on State Defense Law, Jahorina, BiH, May 5, 2003.
25.
John Drewienkiewicz, “Budgets as Arms Control—The Bosnian Experience,”RUSI Journal148, no. 2 (April 2003): 30-35.
26.
Eric E. L.Guenther Jr., David B. Thayer, and Tyler C. Hathaway, “The Visible Hand: Armor Looks at the Changing Face of Peacekeeping in the Balkans,”Armor112, no. 3 (May/June 2003): 7-13.
27.
Mr. Stjepan Pocrnja, secretary general of the Standing Committee on Military Matters of BiH, “BiH Presentation: Peace Implementation Council,” January 30, 2003.
28.
Draft BiH Defense Law presented at the Jahorina conference in May 2003.
29.
International Community Plan for BiH Reforms, April 7, 2003.
30.
This view reflects the experience and professional military judgment of Lieutenant Colonel Tracy, reinforced while serving as military assistant to the chief of staff of the Stabilization Force in Sarajevo.
31.
Onasa News Agency (Sarajevo), “Standing Military Committee Adopts Plan for Joining PfP,” June 25, 2003.
32.
Drewienkiewicz, “Budgets as Arms Control,”35-35.
33.
Press Releases, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, April 2 and 10, 2003.
34.
Partnership for Peace “checklist” requirements for state-level C2 military rank—outlined at the Office for Defense Cooperation briefing in Jahorina, BiH, on May 5, 2003.
35.
Agence France Presse (Sarajevo), “Ashdown Launches Bosnian Army Reform Following Arms-to-Iraq, Spying Scandals,” May 8, 2003.
36.
SRNA News Agency (Bijeljina, BiH), “Bosnia High Representative Forms Experts’ Commission on Intelligence Service,” May 29, 2003.
37.
Associated Press, “Bosnia Gets Its First Defense Minister Ever,” March 15, 2004.
38.
Onasa News Agency, “Defense Minister Meets Parliamentary Defense and Security Committees,” April 13, 2004.
39.
UN Press Release, SC/8242, November 11, 2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8242.doc.htm.
