Emerging theories of civil-military relations take a more nuanced look at the role of the actors involved, particularly noting the critical role of the legislature in modern democracies. An important tool of control for the legislature is the power of the purse, so circumstances of delegated spending authority by the legislature to the military are worthy of study. This study investigates a series of supplemental appropriations enacted by the U.S. Congress to pay for the war on terrorism and situates the story in the current literature on civil-military relations. The case describes an episode in which the legislature was willing to delegate authority, how the executive responded, and the circumstances under which the legislature returned to traditional forms of oversight.
Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control,”Armed Forces & Society23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149-149.
2.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
3.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Solider: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
4.
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking-Democracy and Civil-Military-Relations,”ArmedForces & Society29, no. 1 (Fall 2002):31-56.
5.
Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique.”
6.
James Burk, “Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society,”Armed Forces and Society19, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 167-185.
7.
Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique,”157-157.
8.
Ibid., 167.
9.
Ibid., 168-69.
10.
James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,”Armed Forces & Society29, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 7-29.
11.
Cottey et al., “Second Generation Problematic”, 44-44.
12.
See, for example, A. Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
13.
Two contemporary examples include Christos Kollias, George Manolas, and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou, “Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth in the European Union: A Causality Analysis,”Journal of Policy Making26, no. 5 (2004): 553-569; and Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003): 551-73.
14.
See, for example, J. S. Gansler, Affording Defense (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1989);F. Thompson and L. R. Jones, Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal (SanFrancisco:Jossey-Bass, 1994);andJerryMcCaffrey andL. R. Jones, BudgetingandFinancial Management for National Defense (Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004).
15.
See, for example, Norman Augustine, Augustine's Laws (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982); Kanter, Defense Politics; J. R. Fox, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, with J. L. Field (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); Lawrence R. Jones and Glenn C. Bixler, Mission Financing to Realign National Defense (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992); and Jerry McCaffrey and L. R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management in the Federal Government (Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2001).
16.
Lawrence R. Jones and Fred Thompson, Public Management: Institutional Renewal for the Twenty-first Century (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999).
17.
Fox, Defense Management Challenge; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget,” The Public Interest100(Summer1990):131-146;and James M. Lindsay, “CongressionalOversight of the Department of Defense: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom,” Armed Forces & Society 17, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 7-33.
18.
Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing; and KennethR. Mayer, “Policy Disputes as a Sourceof Administrative Controls: Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense,”Public Administration Review53, no. 4 (1993): 293-302.
19.
Fox, Defense Management Challenge; Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight”; and Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing.
20.
Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Mayer, “Policy Disputes”; and Thompson and Jones, Reinventing the Pentagon.
21.
Fox, Defense Management Challenge; Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget”; Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, “Playing the Add-on Game in Congress: The Increasing Importance of ConstituentInterests and Budget Constraints in DeterminingDefense Policy,” in The ChangingDynamics of U.S. Defense Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 85-106; and Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 4th ed. (New York: Longman Press, 2001).
22.
Lindsay, “CongressionalOversight”;Blechman, Politics of NationalSecurity; Jones andBixler, Mission Financing; and W. D. Hartung, “The Shrinking Military Pork Barrel: The Changing Distribution of Pentagon Spending, 1986-1996,” in The Changing Dynamics of U. S. Defense Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 29-84.
23.
Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight”; Blechman, Politics of National Security; Mayer, “Policy Disputes”; Thompson and Jones, Reinventing the Pentagon; and Halperin and Lomasney, “Add-on Game.”
24.
Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget”; and Mayer, “Policy Disputes.”
25.
Fox, Defense Management Challenge; Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing; and Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics.
26.
Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget.”
27.
Fox, Defense Management Challenge; Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget”; Blechman, Politics of National Security; Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight”; Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing; Mayer, “Policy Disputes”; and Thompson and Jones, Reinventing the Pentagon.
28.
Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget”; and Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing.
29.
Jerry McCaffrey and Paul Godek, “Defense Supplementals and the Budget Process,”Public Budgeting & Finance23, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 53-72.
30.
John Cochran and Mike Christensen, “Regrouping with a Common Purpose,”Congressional Quarterly Weekly15 (September 2001): 2114-2114.
31.
Mary Dalrymple, “Obey Sounds a Solitary Warning against Carte Blanche,”Congressional Quarterly Weekly15 (September 20010: 2131-2131.
32.
During this case, the office was called the General Accounting Office. It is now called the Government Accountability Office.
33.
Dov S. Zakheim, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommitteeon Readiness and Management Support”, March 6, 2002.
34.
U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Defense Budget: Need to Strengthen Guidance and Oversight of Contingency Operations Cost” (Report to the U.S. Senate, May 2002).
35.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Homeland Security, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., May 7, 2002.
36.
U.S. Congress, American Service members’ Protection Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).
37.
George W. Bush, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,”FY2003 Supplemental: Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 25, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/supplemental_3_25_03.pdf (accessed December 30, 2003).
38.
Ibid.
39.
U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Defense Budget: Tracking of Emergency Response Funds for the War on Terrorism” (Report to the U.S. Senate, April 2003).
40.
Anonymous interview, Naval Special Warfare Command official, July 24, 2003.
41.
Ibid.
42.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, The Bush Administration and the Power of the Purse, http://www.house.gov/appropriations_democrats/suppflexibility.htm (accessed December 30, 2003).
43.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Fiscal Year 2003 Supplemental Budget Request, 108th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 2003.
44.
“Military Spending Raises Questions,”Washington Post, May 11, 2004, 17-17.
45.
Dov S. Zakheim, press briefing transcript, April 16, 2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030416-0113.html (accessed June 19, 2004).
46.
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, PL 108-11, Sec. 1313.
47.
Lindsay, “Congressional Oversight”; and Jones and Bixler, Mission Financing.
48.
McCaffery and Godek, “Defense Supplementals.”
49.
Fred Thompson, “Why the American Military Base Structure Can’t Be Reduced,”Public Administration Review48, no. 1 (1988): 577-567.
50.
Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique”, 168-169.
51.
Cottey et al., “Second Generation Problematic.”
52.
Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdicationon War and Spending (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).
