The paper has three aims. First, to show that Julian Reiss' critique of what he calls the New Mechanist Perspective in the social sciences is built on a number of misconceptions; second, to provide some arguments for the need of reflections and discussions about common and “ultimate” goals for the social sciences; and third, to suggest a focus on mechanisms as one such viable goal.
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