This article examines how neoliberal ideas, investor interests, and institutional design converged in the creation of Opportunity Zones (OZs), a federal tax incentive program marketed as a tool for equitable development but structured to advance capital-friendly outcomes. While many critiques of OZs focus on implementation failures or unintended consequences, this article contends that the program reflects a case of policy capture by design. Neoliberal ideas played a legitimating role, framing deregulatory features such as generous capital gains tax deferrals, investor anonymity, and the absence of reporting or community benefit requirements as necessary for market-led revitalization. These ideas served as “coalition magnets,” helping to secure bipartisan support by reimagining private capital as a vehicle for public good. Drawing on legislative histories, planning documents, and secondary analysis, the article shows how the institutional architecture of OZs steered investment toward already improving areas, sidelining more deeply disinvested communities. Once implemented, ideational commitments to equity and local empowerment quickly faded while core market logic endured, exposing the durable imprint of elite economic interests embedded in federal tax policy. OZs illustrate how neoliberal discourse can operate as an instrumental and ultimately disposable device for legitimizing investor-oriented policy. This case contributes to theories of policy design, neoliberal urban governance, and policy capture by demonstrating how ideas, interests, and institutions align to reproduce inequality under the guise of reform.
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