Unemployed and informal workers seem an unlikely source of large-scale collective action in Latin America. Since 1997, however, Argentina has witnessed an upsurge of protest and the emergence of unusually influential federations of unemployed and informal workers. To explain this puzzle, this article offers a policy-centered argument. It suggests that a workfare program favored common interests and identities on the part of unemployed workers and grassroots associations, allowing them to overcome barriers to collective action. State responses to demands for workfare benefits generated a pattern of protest and negotiation that strengthened those groups and dramatically expanded social policy.
Following Portes and Hoffman, I understand informal workers to be casual vendors, self-employed workers (minus professionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, and noncontractual wage workers not covered by labor laws. Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman, “Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era,” Latin American Research Review38, no. 1 (2003): 50.
2.
On working-class organization in Latin America, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2002); and Philip Oxhorn, “ The Social Foundations of Latin America's Recurrent Populism: Problems of Popular Sector Class Formation and Collective Action,” Journal of Historical Sociology11, no. 2 (June 1998): 212—46.
3.
I built this data set using online editions of two national newspapers, Clarín (1998—2003) and La Nación (1996—2003). For some years, I have also used paper and online editions of Página 12, online editions of local newspapers Río Negro and Diario El Día, and a chronology of protest built by Observatorio Social de América Latina covering the years 2000 to 2003. The latter sources served to check the reliability of the two national newspapers. For the years 1993 through 1995, I assume absence of unemployed protest based on existing literature, interviews, and data on social and labor conflict collected by the think tank Nueva Mayoría (www.nuevamayoria.com), which sets the beginning of unemployed protest in 1997. The unit of analysis is the act of protest, from the point when a particular set of demands is made through mobilization until mobilization finishes. Mobilizations include demonstrations, marches, occupation of buildings, and roadblocks. I gathered and analyzed data on several characteristics of those acts (type, sponsors, location, duration, number of participants, demands, targets, violence, victims, arrests, and policy deals). This data set, which includes 962 acts of protest, is the most comprehensive data set of unemployed/informal poor protest in Argentina that I know for that period. For the construction of data sets of mobilization, see Mark R. Beissinger , Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 460—87; and Beverly J. Silver, Forces of Labor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180—203.
4.
The umbrella groups that form part of the unemployed movement call themselves fronts, federations, or movements. Some fall into what McCarthy calls the “classic national federation,” a three-level structure, while others are two-level structures, that is, local organizations connected to a national unit. To simplify, I call them federations. See John D. McCarthy, “ Persistence and Change among Nationally Federated Social Movements,” in Social Movements and Organization Theory, ed. G. D. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. Zald (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 196.
5.
The unemployed movement is also known as the Piquetero Movement.
6.
On informal workers, see Kenneth Roberts, “Party Society Linkages and Democratic Representation in Latin America,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies27, no. 53 (2002): 24, cited in Steven Levitsky, “From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party Linkages in Argentine Peronism (1983—1999),” Latin American Research Review3, no. 3 (2002): 8.
7.
Scholarship understands the popular sectors as the lower and middle-lower classes; see Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 788.
8.
For example, Marcus Kurtz, “The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America,” World Politics56, no. 2 (January 2004): 264; Kenneth Roberts, “ Social Inequalities without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era,” Studies in Comparative International Development36, no. 4 ( 2002): 5—7; Oxhorn, “ Social Foundations,” 220; and Portes and Hoffman, “Latin American Class Structures,” 41—82.
9.
In 2003, workfare programs reached 20 percent of total households in the country. Elaborated from Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, Impacto del Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar en la Pobreza (http://www.mts.gov.ar, accessed June 2006), and household data from INDEC, accessed June 2006, http://www.indec.gov.ar.
10.
In particular, the distribution of free outpatient medicine through the program Remediar, which is run by the Ministry of Health, as well as flexibilization of pension rules and expansion of noncontributory pensions.
11.
See Oxhorn, “Social Foundations,” 218—19.
12.
Unemployed leaders have been appointed to two National Under-Secretariats, those of Community Affairs and of Land and Social Habitat. Another leader has become legislator for Frente para la Victoria, President Kirchner's PJ faction. Formal policy making includes the Advisory Council of the Unemployed Heads-of-Households Program, local councils, and the newly created Joint Coordination of Policy for the Conurbano Bonaerense.
13.
All of these factors are present in the seminal sociological study by Maristella Svampa and Sebastián Pereyra, Entre la Ruta y el Barrio (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2003). Another study highlights, instead, the 2001 financial crisis as the trigger for protest; see Edward Epstein, “The Piquetero Movement of the Greater Buenos Aires: Working Class Protest during the Current Argentine Crisis” (presented at the Meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, March 27—30, 2003).
14.
In 2003, 2004, and 2006, I carried out eighteen interviews with unemployed leaders, public officials, municipal-level union leaders, and academics. Nine additional interviews were conducted by Juan Ignacio Vallejos in 2004.
15.
Author's data set of unemployed protest.
16.
The analysis of Brazil is based on fieldwork carried out in Brazil in spring 2006 with support from the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy and the Berkeley Institute for International Studies.
17.
On collective action, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Claus Offe and Helmut Wisenthal, “ Two Logics of Collective Action,” in Disorganized Capitalism , ed. C. Offe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Ruth Collier and Samuel Handlin, “ Shifting Interest Regimes of the Working Classes in Latin America” (manuscript, University of California, Berkeley, 2005).
18.
Portes and Hoffman, “Latin American Class Structures ”; and Roberts, “ Social Inequalities,” 22.
19.
See Portes and Hoffman, “Latin American Class Structures,” Tables 4 and 10. Unemployment available at http://www.indec.gov.ar.
20.
See Roberts, “Social Inequalities,” 22.
21.
Kurtz, “Dilemmas of Democracy”; and Oxhorn, “Social Foundations.”
22.
Sebastián Etchemendy , “Repression, Exclusion and Inclusion: Government-union Relations and Patterns of Labor Reform in Liberalizing Economies ,” Comparative Politics36, no. 3 (April, 2004): 273—90; M. Victoria Murillo, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions and Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press , 2001); and M. Lorena Cook, “Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in the Southern Cone and Brazil,” Latin American Politics and Society44 (Spring 2002): 1—34.
23.
For example, unions negotiated unemployment insurance, which only covered formal-sector workers and was created in 1991.
24.
Sebastián Etchemendy , Models of Economic Liberalization: Compensating the “Losers” in Argentina, Chile, and Spain (PhD diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 2004).
25.
Kenneth Roberts , “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,” World Politics48, no.1 (1996): 105—7; and Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberalism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,” Studies in Comparative International Development31, no. 3 (1996): 3—31.
26.
Steven Levitsky , Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
27.
See Andrés Thompson , Público y Privado ( Buenos Aires: UNICEF-LOSADA, 1995 ), Introduction.
28.
Among others, see Philip Oxhorn, “Is the Century of Corporatism Over ?” in What Kind of Democracy? What Kind of Market ? ed. Philip Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (University Park, Pennsylvania : Pennsylvania State Press, 1998 ), 208—11.
29.
McAdam et al. define framing processes as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate collective action” in D. McAdam, J. D. MacCarthy, and M. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.
30.
McAdam et al. define them as “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” in D. McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives, 3. See also Tarrow, Power in Movement, chap. 8.
31.
Tarrow understands political opportunity structure as “consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent or national—signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements.” Signals include “the opening up of access to power, shifting alignments, availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites.” Sidney Tarrow, “States and Opportunities,” in D. McAdam et al., eds., Comparative Perspectives, 54. See also Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in D. McAdam et al. eds., Comparative Perspectives, 23—40.
32.
For example, Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1992); Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press , 1994); Kathleen Thelen, “How Institutions Evolve,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Reuschemeyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
33.
See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; and Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?
34.
Paul Pierson , “The Study of Policy Development,” The Journal of Policy and History17, no. 1 (2005): 45; and Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 58.
35.
Joe Soss, “ Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action ,” American Political Science Review93, no. 2 (June 1999 ): 363—80.
36.
Offe and Wiesenthal, “Two Logics of Collective Action ,” 183.
37.
Olson, Logic of Collective Action.
38.
See Bo Rothstein , “Labor Market Institutions and Working Class Strength,” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo, Katheleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge , UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
39.
See Karen Anderson, “The Politics of Retrenchment in a Social Democratic Welfare State,” Comparative Political Studies34, no. 9 (November 2001): 1063—91.
40.
Margaret Weir , “Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation ,” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo, Katheleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge , UK: Cambridge University Press , 1992).
41.
Ibid., 192.
42.
In 1989, faced with hyperinflation, growing unemployment, and poverty, the Menem administration (1989—1999) created a food-stamps program, Bono Solidario, and announced the future creation of Plan Trabajar (see Clarín, December 8, 1989, 10). Bono Solidario was short-lived and unevenly implemented, while Plan Trabajar did not prosper. Following the implementation of a number of small, short-lived job programs in the early 1990s, growing unemployment resurfaced the idea of designing a more systematic scheme. Plan Trabajar was finally introduced in 1996.
43.
Community service projects were included in 1997.
44.
Unemployment insurance for formal-sector workers covered an additional 5 percent of the unemployed in 1997. See Laura Golbert, “Los Problemas del Empleo y las Políticas Sociales,” Boletín Informativo Techint296 (1998): Table 4.
45.
Maria Elina Estevánez and Patricia Feliu, Programa Trabajar II. Evaluación Social. Informe Final (manuscript, 1998), 15 and 78.
46.
Two examples of preexisting groups are Red de Barrios, a network of sixteen community associations in marginal settlements, which became the basis of Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), one of the largest unemployed federations; and Centro María Elena, a community center created in 1989 in a marginal settlement, which ultimately became the principal unemployed group in Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC).
47.
For a description of program rules, see Estevánez and Feliu, Programa Trabajar II.
48.
About collecting funds from beneficiaries to finance community projects, see Estevánez and Feliu, Programa Trabajar II, 15. About that practice in the unemployed movement, see also http://www.clarin.com/diario/especiales/informes.html, section on financing.
49.
A description of the scoring system can be found in “ Ardura: Los Planes Trabajar Son la Comida o el Hambre de los Pobres,” La Nación, March 3, 2002.
50.
See Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la Ruta, 44.
51.
Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 8, 2004.
52.
Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 15, 2004.
53.
Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 8, 2004.
54.
For example, in an interview, an unemployed leader suggests, “we struggled for a year ... [and] we obtained the administration [of workfare benefits].” Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 2004.
55.
Epstein, “Piquetero Movement.”
56.
In 1989, Argentina experienced hyperinflation, growing poverty, unemployment, and a deep political crisis. The crisis did not produce unemployed contention or an immediate full-scale social policy response.
57.
Maristella Svampa and Sebastián Pereyra , “La Politica de las Organizaciones Piqueteras ,” in Tomar la Palabra, ed. Federico Naishtat (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2005), 346.
58.
Ibid., 355.
59.
In June 1996, unemployed workers in the oil enclave of Cutral-co set up their first roadblock, demanding from provincial authorities a solution to their plight. On that occasion, the governor promised to generate private investment, and the conflict remained local. In April 1997, unemployed workers joined a teachers' demonstration, which ended up in riots after a woman was killed. Given the magnitude of the conflict and facing legislative elections, the national government intervened, offering 1,500 national workfare benefits to protestors.
60.
For a description of the first wave of protest, see Candelaria Garay, “ Policy Initiatives as a Trigger for Contention: Origins of the Unemployed Movement in Argentina” (master's thesis, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley , April 2003). See also “Ruta Liberada a Cambio de Trabajo,” Página12, April 19, 1997.
61.
On the origins of some associations, see Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la Ruta; and Denis Merklen, Asentamientos en La Matanza ( Buenos Aires: Catálogos Editora, 1991).
62.
Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 8, 2004.
63.
Elaborated from Golbert, “Problemas del Empleo y las Políticas Sociales,” Table 4; and Estevánez and Feliu, Programa Trabajar II, 19.
64.
By mid-2000, fifteen provinces ran twenty-four workfare programs, five of which were created before 1997 and nineteen of which were created between 1997 and 2000. Secretaría de Política Económica, “Informe sobre los Programas de Empleo de Ejecución Provincial,” Documentos de Trabajo 9 (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2001).
65.
Instability involves cutbacks and delays in payments, even if resources are later restituted.
66.
See David M. Woodruff, “Boom, Gloom and Doom: Balance Sheets, Monetary Fragmentation and the Politics of Financial Crisis in Argentina and Russia,” Politics & Society33, no.1 (March 2005): 3—45.
67.
No official data are available on the monthly evolution of beneficiaries from 1998 through 2001. See “El Gobierno Promete Duplicar los Planes Trabajar en Agosto,” Clarín online, July 31, 2000 . In Neuquén, beneficiaries dropped 90 percent in March 2000 ; see “Por Ahora no Reactivarán los Planes Trabajar,” Río Negro online, March 3, 2000.
68.
Author's data set of unemployed protest.
69.
See Woodruff, “ Boom, Gloom and Doom:” 3—45; Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, “ Argentina Weathers the Storm,” Journal of Democracy14, no. 4 ( 2003): 152—66.
70.
The Unemployed Heads of Households Program was created by Decrees 165/02 and 565/02. About food programs, see http://www.siempro.gov.ar, accessed August 2002.
71.
Elaborated with data from Dirección Nacional de Programación del Gasto Social, Caracterización del Gasto Público Social 1980—1997, accessed June 2006, http://www.mecon.gov.ar; Síntesis de los Principales Programas Sociales, accessed August 2002, http://www.siempro.gov.ar; and Fabián Repetto, “Transferencias de Recursos para Programas Alimentarios en las Provincias,” Documento 54 (Buenos Aires: CEDI, 2001).
72.
The beneficiary is the “household” in which children under the age of eighteen reside. The household “chooses” a beneficiary to perform the workfare obligation. The expectation is that adults in the household have low-paying, informal-sector jobs or are unemployed. Interview with Ministry of Labor official, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 2004.
73.
Laura Golbert , “Plan Jefes y Jefas, Derecho de Inclusión o Paz Social?” Serie Políticas Sociales ( Chile: CEPAL, 2004), 31.
74.
Secretaría de Política Económica, “Informe sobre los Programas de Empleo de Ejecución Provincial 2002,” Documentos de Trabajo14 ( Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Economía y Producción, December 2003).
75.
See Daniel Miguez , “Una Batalla Política en Medio de las Urgencias de la Gente,” Clarín online, May 22, 2002.
76.
Interviews with unemployed leader, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 1, 2004, and with local-level union leader, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 31, 2006.
77.
In 2006, the national government announced that it would initiate a gradual change in workfare programs, including an increase in benefit levels for workfare beneficiaries moving into a job training program or into an income-support scheme for families with at least three children. See “Reestructuran los Planes Sociales, con Aumentos a Partir de Abril,” Clarín, February 14, 2006.
78.
For further analysis of unemployed federations, see Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la Ruta.
79.
Daniel Gallo, “ Quién es Quién en el Dividido Mapa Piquetero,” La Nación , June 28, 2004.
80.
Interviews with unemployed leaders, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March and July 2004.
81.
In 1997, the manzaneras numbered close to 30,000 women. Gisela Zaramberg, “Alpargatas y Libros: Estilos de Gestión, Género y Política Social en Argentina y Chile,” Serie Políticas Sociales90 (Chile: CEPAL, 2004), 12. See Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la Ruta, 92, 132, and 186.
82.
Interviews with unemployed leaders, Buenos Aires, Argentina, March and July 2004.
83.
Access to resources on the part of more autonomous associations tended to be difficult before the expansion of social assistance. Organizations that survived autonomously did so by forming networks and/or by having ties with larger NGOs; Svampa and Pereyra, Entre la Ruta, 44.
84.
The survey belongs to the project “Comparative Infrastructure of Representation in Latin America” (CIRELA), which examines patterns of popular political participation in Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Peru. Because the survey relied on chain-referral sampling, data must be interpreted with caution.
85.
Levitsky, Transforming Labor-based Parties.
86.
Interviews with unemployed leaders, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 2004.
87.
Support for micro-enterprises and housing cooperatives also reaches more autonomous federations. Interview with unemployed leader, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 1, 2004.
88.
FPV garnered more than 40 percent of the vote, while the official PJ received less than 20 percent. See “El Mapa del Gran Buenos Aires, Pintado de Color Kirchnerista,” Clarín online, October 24, 2005.
89.
Kurtz, “Dilemmas of Democracy.”
90.
On new forms of state activism and social policy in advanced industrialized countries, seeJonah Levy, ed., The State after Statism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
91.
Unemployment reached 19.6 percent in the first quarter of 2003 and 10.6 percent in the last quarter of 2005 (http://www.indec.gov.ar, accessed October 2006). Poverty reached 47.8 percent in the first quarter of 2003 and 33.8 percent in the last quarter of 2005 (http://www.indec.gov.ar, accessed October 2006). Data on workfare programs are provided by the Ministry of Labor.
92.
In the early 1980s, Chile's unemployment rate rose to 20 percent. In the late 1990s, it stood at approximately 10 percent. Data available at http://www.bcentral.cl, accessed October 2006.
93.
Etchemendy, Models of Economic Liberalization, 294—317.
94.
See, among others, Patricia Hipsher, “Democratic Transitions and Social Movement Outcomes,” in From Contention to Democracy, ed. M. Giugni, D. McAdam, and C. Tilly ( Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 159—60; Roberts, “Social Inequalities,” 23—24; and Etchemendy, Models of Economic Liberalization.
95.
Workfare programs were eliminated when unemployment went down in the late 1980s. Currently, the main programs reaching poor households consist of monetary transfers (family allowances, family subsidies, water subsidies, and noncontributory pensions). Nearly 19 percent of the households receive at least one of these monetary transfers. See José P. Arellano, “ Políticas Sociales para el Crecimiento con Equidad, Chile (1990—2002) ,” in Estudios Socio-económicos CIEPLAN 26 ( Santiago de Chile, April 2004), 12—14.
96.
In Brazil, the unemployment rate was approximately 9 percent in the late 1990s (http://www.iets.org.br, accessed October 2006). However, in São Paulo, it peaked at 19 percent in the late 1990s (http://www.seade.gov.br, accessed October 2006).
97.
Although groups representing landless workers in Brazil had been formed in the past, the MST, which was created in the mid-1980s, is the first movement representing landless workers throughout the country and the first to target its demands to the national government. On the MST, see João P. Stedile and Bernardo M. Fernandes , Brava Gente, A Trajetória do MST e a Luta Pela Terra no Brasil (São Paulo: Perseu Abramo , 1999); and Bruno Konder Comparato, “ A Ação Política do MST,” São Paulo em Perspectiva15, no. 4 (2001): 105—18. On rural organization in Brazil, see Peter Houtzager and Marcus Kurtz, “The Institutional Roots of Popular Mobilization: State Transformations and Rural Politics in Brazil and Chile (1964—1995),” Comparative Studies in Society and History42, no. 2 (2000): 394—425.
98.
See, for example, Ana C. Torres, “Sem Reforma Agrária, Cresce Luta no Campo,” Correio Brazilienze, August 19, 1990; and “Pastoral da Terra Estimula as Invasões,” Jornal do Brasil, July 1, 1994.
99.
Jose Maschio , “ONGs e Governo Federal Financiam MST ,” Folha de São Paulo, October 22, 1995 ; and “MST Continua Recebendo Verbas Apesar das Brigas com Governo,” O Globo, September 20, 1998.
100.
See, for example, “Governo Negocia para Evitar Saques ,” O. Globo, May 27, 1998. On MST-state interactions, see Comparato, “A Ação Política,” 108—9.
101.
About the movement's coalitional choices, see Wendy M. Sinek, “Grievances, Resources, and Coalitional Choices: The Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST) in Brazil” (paper presented at the Meetings of the Western Political Science Association, Portland, Oregon, March 11—13, 2004); and Comparato “A Ação Política,” 112—17.
102.
Fernandes found a positive relationship between land invasions and distribution of land. See Bernardo Fernandes, A Formação do MST no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1999 ), cited in Comparato “A Ação Política,” 108.
103.
Interview with national official of CUT, São Paulo, Brazil, June 26, 2006.
104.
For an analysis of protests in the 1990s, see Salvador Sandoval, “ Alternative Forms of Working-class Organization in Brazil Today” (manuscript, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2004).
105.
See, for example, “CUT Lista Desempregados para Invasão ,” Folha Online, November 14, 1995; and Amaury Riberiro Jr., “A Nova Estrategia do MST é Recrutar Desempregados,” O Globo, February 22, 1999).
106.
It should be noted that in recent years, the national and some local governments have introduced programs supporting cooperatives and micro-enterprises to generate jobs. Crucially, in 2001, the Cardoso administration (1994—2002) created income transfer programs reaching poor families (especially Bolsa Escola). The administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002—2006) unified those programs into a single scheme, Bolsa Família, and expanded it massively.
107.
SeeGay W. Seidman, Manufacturing Militancy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
