Think tanks have emerged as significant political groups in corporatist political economies in Europe. However, little is known about how think tanks situate themselves among existing actors in the political system and how existing actors react to them. We explore possible coordination between think tanks and interest groups by drawing on rational choice institutionalism to argue that organizations might either engage in allied advocacy to increase political influence, or that interest groups might seek to preserve autonomy and privileged positions by declining to engage in coordinated messaging with think tanks. Across a quantitative text analytical study, a case study, and elite interviews, we find that systematic patterns of allied advocacy across organizational type are relatively absent, although the interviews suggest the theoretical relevance of the hypothesis. Our results imply that think tanks are not mere extensions of existing structures and that they may struggle to find lasting alliances.
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