Many studies examined the state of citizen-elite congruence at the party system, legislative and government stages of representation. Few scholars examined, however, whether citizen preferences are adequately represented in enacted policies. The article addresses this gap in the literature and examines the role of electoral systems in fostering citizens-policy congruence. Building on studies of government congruence and responsiveness, we expect levels of policy congruence to be greater under majoritarian electoral systems than under proportional representation electoral systems and as the number of parties in government decreases. In order to test these expectations, we make use of data from the International Social Survey Programme and examine the proportions of respondents whose preferences are congruent with government levels of spending in eight major policy domains. Overall, the results do not support our expectations and indicate that levels of policy congruence are similar across electoral systems and government types. In line with recent works on electoral systems and representation, our findings support the claim that majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems both have mechanisms which allow governments to represent their citizens similarly.
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