Green-Lighting Accountability: Transitional Justice and Compliance With Rulings From the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Abstract

When do democratically-elected leaders comply with rulings from international courts? While international courts have been studied independently, little research examines their interaction with state-level transitional justice (TJ) institutions. We evaluate the incentives of post-authoritarian leaders to comply with rulings of international courts related to violence under military dictatorships. We expect leaders to be more likely to comply with international court rulings addressing authoritarian human rights violations when maximalist TJ (domestic trials and vettings) has been implemented. In contrast, we expect leaders will be no more likely to comply when minimalist TJ (amnesties) has been adopted. Using data on remedies issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 1989 to 2020 for abuses committed under military dictatorships, we find that compliance is more likely following domestic trials and vettings but amnesties have no significant effect on the likelihood of compliance, as predicted. Overall, our results suggest that international courts serve as complements for domestic TJ.