How do drones affect escalation dynamics? The emerging consensus from scholarship on drones highlights increased conflict initiation when drones allow decisionmakers to avoid the risks of deploying inhabited platforms, but far less attention has been paid to understanding how drones affect conflict escalation. Limited theorization and empirical testing have left debates unresolved. I unpack the underlying mechanisms influencing escalation decisions involving drones by proposing a logic of remote-controlled restraint: drones limit escalation in ways not possible when inhabited assets are used. To test this logic and explore its instrumental and emotional microfoundations, I field "comparative wargames." I immerse national security professionals in crisis scenarios that vary whether a drone or inhabited aircraft is shot down. I validate wargame findings using a survey experiment. The wargames shed light on the microfoundations of escalation, highlight limits of existing theories, and demonstrate the utility of comparative wargaming as an IR research tool.
ActonJames. 2018. “Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War.” International Security43 (1): 56-99.
2.
AxelrodRobert. 2006. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
BartelsElizabeth. 2018. “Games as Structured Comparisons: A Discussion of Methods.” San Francisco, CA.
5.
BartelsElizabethMikolic-TorreiraIgorPopperStevenPreddJoel. 2019. Do Differing Analyses Change the Decision? Using a Game to Assess Whether Differing Analytic Approaches Improve Decisionmaking. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
CrawfordNeta. 2000. “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships.” International Security24 (4): 116-56.
17.
CreveldMartin Van. 1991. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present. New York: Touchstone.
18.
DanielJ FurmanMusgravePaul. 2017. “Synthetic Experiences: How Popular Culture Matters for Images of International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly61 (3): 503-16.
19.
Department of Defense. 1966. “Final Report of NU I and II-66, Two Interagency Politico-Military Games Played by Officials of the Executive Branch during 1/11–2/8/66,” February 28, U.S. Declassified Documents Online.
20.
EmersonRobertFretzRachelShawLinda. 2011. Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. 2nd ed.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
21.
FearonJames. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The American Political Science Review88 (3): 577-92.
22.
FearonJames. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization49 (3): 379-414.
23.
FrijdaNico. 1986. The Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
24.
GelpiChristopherFeaverPeterReiflerJason. 2009. Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25.
GelpiChristopherGriecoJoseph. 2015. “Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001.” American Journal of Political Science59 (2): 440-56.
26.
GeorgeAlexanderBennettAndrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
27.
GilliAndreaGilliMauro. 2016. “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints.” Security Studies25 (1): 50-84.
28.
GrayColin. 1993. Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
29.
GustersonHugh. 2016. Drone: Remote Control Warfare. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
30.
HermannCharles. 1967. “Validation Problems in Games and Simulations with Special Reference to Models of International Politics.” Behavioral Science12 (3): 216-31.
31.
HollandPaul. 1986. “Statistics and Causal Inference.” Journal of the American Statistical Association81 (396): 945-60.
32.
HorowitzMichael. 2020. “Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics?” Annual Review of Political Science23 (1): 385-400.
33.
HorowitzMichaelKrepsSarahFuhrmannMatthew. 2016. “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation.” International Security41 (2): 7-42.
34.
HorowitzMichaelSchwartzJoshuaFuhrmannMatthew. 2020. “Who’s Prone to Drone? A Global Time-Series Analysis of Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Proliferation.” Conflict Management and Peace Science.
35.
HuthPaul. 1997. “Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment.” Security Studies7 (1): 72-99.
36.
JensenBenjaminValerianoBrandon. 2019. “Cyber Escalation Dynamics: Results from War Game Experiments.” Toronto, Canada.
37.
JervisRobert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38.
JervisRobert. 1995. “Political Implications of Loss Aversion.” In Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict, edited by FarnhamBarbara, 23-40. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
39.
JervisRobert. 2006. “Understanding Beliefs.” Political Psychology27 (5): 641-63.
KahnHerman. 1965. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger.
42.
KertzerJoshua D. 2017. “Microfoundations in International Relations.” Conflict Management and Peace Science34 (1): 81-97.
43.
KertzerJoshua D.2021. “Re-Assessing Elite-Public Gaps in Political Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science.
44.
KrepsSarahSchneiderJacquelyn. 2019. “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving beyond Effects-Based Logics.” Journal of Cybersecurity5 (1): tyz007.
45.
LernerJenniferGonzalezRoxanaSmallDeborahFischhoffBaruch. 2003. “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment.” Psychological Science14 (2): 144-50.
46.
LernerJenniferYeLiValdesoloPiercarloKassamKarim. 2015. “Emotion and Decision Making.” Annual Review of Psychology66 (1): 799-823.
47.
LibermanPeter. 2006. “An Eye for an Eye: Public Support for War Against Evildoers.” International Organization60 (3): 687-722.
48.
LieberKeir. 2008. War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
49.
LieberKeirPressDaryl. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Security41 (4): 9-49.
50.
Lin-GreenbergErikReidPaulySchneiderJacquelyn. 2022 "Wargaming for International Relations Research." European Journal of International Relations28 (1): 83-109.
MacdonaldJuliaSchneiderJacquelyn. 2017. “Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions: The Case of Unmanned Weaponry.” Journal of Conflict Resolution61 (3): 511-36.
55.
MacdonaldJuliaSchneiderJacquelyn. 2019. “Battlefield Responses to New Technologies: Views from the Ground on Unmanned Aircraft.” Security Studies1–34: 216-249.
56.
MahnkenThomasSharpTravisKimGrace. 2020. Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power Competition. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
57.
McDermottRose. 2002. “Experimental Methodology in Political Science.” Political Analysis10 (4): 325-42.
58.
McDermottRoseLopezAnthonyPeterHatemi. 2017. “‘Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It’: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence.” Texas National Security Review1 (1): 68–88.
59.
McHughFrancis. 1966. Fundamentals of War Gaming. 3rd ed.Newport, RI: US Naval War College.
60.
MercerJonathan. 2010. “Emotional Beliefs.” International Organization64 (1): 1-31.
61.
MesquitaBruce Bueno de. 1983. The War Trap. New Haven: Yale University Press.
62.
MillerAndrew. 2020. “The Information Game: Police-Citizen Cooperation in Communities with Criminal Groups.” Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/128634
63.
MintzAlexReddStevenArnoldVedlitz. 2006. “Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution50 (5): 757-76.
64.
MirAsfandyar. 2018. “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan.” International Security43 (2): 45-83.
65.
MirAsfandyarMooreDylan. 2019. “Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence from a US Drone Program.” International Studies Quarterly.
66.
MorganForrestMuellerKarlMedeirosEvanPollpeterKevinCliffRoger. 2008. Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
67.
MuellerJohn. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
PaulyReid. 2018. “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint.” International Security43 (2): 151-92.
72.
PerlaPeter. 1990. The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press.
73.
PetersenRoger. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
74.
PosenBarry. 1991. Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
75.
ReddieAndrewGoldblumBethany. Forthcoming. “Evidence of the Unthinkable: Experimental Wargaming at the Nuclear Threshold.” Journal of Peace Research.
SchellingThomas. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
81.
SchneiderJacquelynSchechterBenjaminShafferRachael. 2022. “A Lot of Cyber Fizzle But Not a Lot of Bang: Evidence about the Use of Cyber Operations from Wargames.” Journal of Global Security Studies7 (2): ogac005.
82.
SchulmanLoren DeJonge. 2018. Weird Birds: Working Paper on Policymaker Perspectives on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Their Impact on National Security Decision-Making. Washington, DC: Center for New American Security.
83.
SmokeRichard.1977. War: Controlling Escalation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
84.
SnyderGlenn. 1959. “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment.” In Research Monograph No. 1. Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
85.
SnyderGlennDiesingPaul. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
86.
TalmadgeCaitlin. 2017. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” International Security41 (4): 50-92.
87.
TalmadgeCaitlin. 2019. “Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for Today.” Journal of Strategic Studies42 (6): 864-87.
88.
TannenwaldNina. 1999. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization53 (3): 433-68.
89.
TomzMichaelWeeksJessicaYarhi-MiloKeren. 2020. “Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies.” International Organization74 (1): 119-43.
ValerianoBrandonJensenBenjaminRyanManess. 2018. Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion. New York: Oxford University Press.
95.
Van EveraStephen. 2001. Causes of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
96.
WagnerWilliam. 1982. Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers.
97.
WalshJames IgoeSchulzkeMarcus. 2018. Drones and Support for the Use of Force. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
98.
WeisigerAlex. 2016. “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration.” International Organization70 (2): 347-75.
99.
WeisigerAlexYarhi-MiloKeren. 2015. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics.” International Organization69 (2): 473-95.
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
