A growing literature suggests that nuclear assistance from other countries is an important determinant of whether states pursue nuclear weapons. Existing work does not consider, however, the most widely available source of assistance—the Technical Cooperation (TC) program administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA assistance is an important piece of the nonproliferation regime’s central bargain: member states enjoy nuclear assistance in exchange for agreeing not to seek nuclear weapons. Using a data set of TC projects since 1972, we examine whether international nuclear assistance is associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. We hypothesize that some TC assistance reduces the cost of pursuing nuclear weapons, making weapons programs more likely. We find that receiving TC related to the nuclear fuel cycle is a statistically and substantively significant factor in state decisions since 1972 to seek nuclear weapons, with important implications for existing theories of nuclear proliferation.
AloiseGene. 2011. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: More Progress Needed in Implementing Recommendations for IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program (GAO-11-482T). Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office.
2.
BarrettoPaulo M. C.CettoAna Maria. 2005. “IAEA Technical Cooperation & the NPT.”IAEA Bulletin, March, 28–30.
3.
BeardsleyKyleAsalVictor. 2009. “Winning with the Bomb.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 278–301.
4.
BeckNathanielKatzJonathan N.TuckerRichard. 1998. “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.”American Journal of Political Science42 (4): 1260–88.
5.
BleekPhilippLorberEric. 2014. “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation”Journal of Conflict Resolution58 (3): 429–54.
6.
BrownRobert L.2010. “Measuring Delegation.”Review of International Organizations5 (2): 141–75.
7.
BrownRobert L.2011. “Explaining Delegation.” In Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, edited by RauchhausRobertKroenigMatthewGartzkeErik, 13–31. New York: Routledge.
8.
CarterDavid B.SignorinoCurtis S.. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data.”Political Analysis18 (3): 271–92.
9.
CarterDavid B.SignorinoCurtis S.. 2012. “What Just Happened? Left-Truncation in Grouped Binary Duration Data.”Paper prepared for the Peace Science Society (International) annual conference, Savannah, Georgia.
CortellAndrew P.PetersonSusan. 2006. “Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WHO and WTO.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by HawkinsDarrenLakeDavid A.NielsonDanielTierneyMichael J., 255–280. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12.
DownsGeorge W. 2000. “Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes.”Annual Review of Political Science3(1): 25–42.
13.
DownsGeorge W.RockeDavid M.BarsoomPeter N.. 1996. “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?”International Organization50 (3): 379–406.
14.
EricksonJenniferWayChristopher. 2011. “Membership Has Its Privileges: Conventional Arms and Influence within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. ” In Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, edited byRauchhausRobertMatthewKroenigErikGartzke32–60. New York: Routledge.
15.
FindlayTrevor. 2012. “Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog.” In Policy Brief #23. Waterloo, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
16.
FirthDavid. 1993. “Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates.”Biometrika80 (1): 27–38.
17.
FischerDavid A. V.1997. History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency.
18.
FortnaVirginia Page. 2003. “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace.”International Organization57 (2): 337–72.
19.
FuhrmannMatthew. 2008. “Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade.”Journal of Peace Research45 (5): 633–52.
FuhrmannMatthew. 2009b. “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 181–208.
22.
FuhrmannMatthew. 2012. Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
23.
FuhrmannMatthewS. SechserTodd. 2014. “Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments”Journal of Conflict Resolution.
24.
GAO (Government Accountability Office). 1997. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation Program (GAO-RCED-97-192). Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office.
25.
GartzkeErikJoDong-Joon. 2009. “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 209–33.
26.
GartzkeErikKaplowJeffrey M.MehtaRupal N.. 2014. “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure”Journal of Conflict Resolution58 (3): 481–508.
27.
GartzkeErikKroenigMatthew. 2009. “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 151–60.
28.
GartzkeErikKroenigMatthew. 2014. “Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”Journal of Conflict Resolution.
29.
GhosnFatenPalmerGlennBremerStuart A.. 2004. “The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.”Conflict Management and Peace Science21 (2): 133–54.
30.
GiblerDouglas M.SarkeesMeredith Reid. 2004. “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816–2000.”Journal of Peace Research41 (2): 211–22.
31.
GleditschKristian Skrede. 2002. All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration and Democratization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
32.
Hafner-BurtonEmilie M.2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression.”International Organization59 (3): 593–629.
33.
HathawayOona A.2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”Yale Law Review111 (8): 1935–2042.
34.
HawkinsDarrenJacobyWade. 2006. “How Agents Matter.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by HawkinsDarrenLakeDavid A.NielsonDanielTierneyMichael J., 199–228. Cambridge University Press.
35.
HawkinsDarrenLakeDavid A.NielsonDanielTierneyMichael J.. 2006. “States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory.” In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by HawkinsDarrenLakeDavid A.NielsonDanielTierneyMichael J., 3–38. Cambridge University Press.
36.
HeinzeGeorgSchemperMichael. 2002. “A Solution to the Problem of Separation in Logistic Regression.”Statistics in Medicine21 (16): 2409–19.
37.
HorowitzMichaelNarangNeil. 2014. “Are Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Substitutes? Comparing the Determinants of WMD Proliferation”Journal of Conflict Resolution.
38.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 1957. Statute of the IAEA. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
39.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 1959. First Annual Report of the Board of Governors to the General Conference: Covering the Period from 23 October 1957 to 30 June 1958. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
40.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2007. The Annual Report for 2006. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
41.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 2010. Technical Cooperation Report for 2010 (GC(55)/INF/2). Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
KleinJames P.GoertzGaryDiehlPaul F.. 2006. “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns.”Journal of Peace Research43 (3): 331–48.
48.
KoremenosBarbaraLipsonCharlesSnidalDuncan. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.”International Organization55 (4): 761–99.
49.
KroenigMatthew. 2009a. “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance.”American Political Science Review103 (1): 113–34.
50.
KroenigMatthew. 2009b. “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 161–80.
51.
LooschReinhard. 1997. “The Emergence of the Group of 77 as a Major Player in the Board of Governors.” In International Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reflections, edited by BlixHans, 63–78. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency.
52.
MontgomeryAlexander H.2005. “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network.”International Security30 (2): 153–87.
53.
MontgomeryAlexander H. 2013. “Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs.” In The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security, edited by StulbergAdamFuhrmannMatthew, 177–202. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
54.
NikitinMary BethAndrewsAnthonyHoltMark. 2011. Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power (RL34234). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
55.
PowellRobert. 2003. “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense.”International Security27 (4): 86–118.
56.
QuesterGeorge H.2000. “Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.”International Studies Perspectives1 (2): 165–76.
57.
RauchhausRobert W.2009. “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach.”Journal of Conflict Resolution53 (2): 258–77.
58.
RubleeMaria Rost. 2009. Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
59.
SaganScott D. 1996/1997. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”International Security21 (3): 54–86.
60.
SimmonsBeth A.. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.”American Political Science Review94 (4): 819–35.
61.
SimmonsBeth A.2002. “Capacity, Commitment and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes.”Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (6): 829–56.
62.
SingerJ. David. 1987. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Military Capabilities of States, 1816-1985.”International Interactions14 (2): 115–32.
63.
SinghSonaliWayChristopher R.. 2004. “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation.”Journal of Conflict Resolution48 (6): 859–85.
64.
SolingenEtel. 2007. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
65.
TateTrevor McMorris. 1990. “Regime-Building in the Non-proliferation System.”Journal of Peace Research27 (4): 399–414.
66.
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”1968. United Nations Treaty Series 729: 169-175 (10485).
67.
WaltzKenneth N.SaganScott D., eds. 2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. 2nd ed. New York: Norton.
68.
WayChristopher R.SasikumarKarthika. 2004. “Leaders and Laggards: When and Why Do Countries Sign the NPT?”Montreal: Research Group in International Security (REGIS) Working Paper.
69.
World Bank. 2008. World Development Indicators, 2008. Washington DC: World Bank.
70.
ZornChristopher. 2005. “A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models.”Political Analysis13 (2): 157–70.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
