Fears of rogue states, withdrawal of cold war-era security guarantees, a falling technological threshold, and availability to terrorist organizations ensure that nuclear weapons proliferation remains a central security issue and that developing an adequate theory of proliferation ranks high on the agenda. A data set on nuclear proliferation is constructed that identifies three different stages on the path to the weaponization of nuclear weapons technology. Hazard models and multinomial logit are used to test theories of nuclear proliferation. Results suggest that nuclear weapons proliferation is strongly associated with the level of economic development, the external threat environment, lack of great-power security guarantees, and a low level of integration in the world economy.
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