This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities.
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