Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-sharing arrangements, due to their ability to deliver superior governance outcomes which, in turn, can promote stability by undercutting the initial motivations for conflict or by reducing the feasibility of rebellion. The authors argue that these positive outcomes result from closed-list PR’s ability to increase party discipline and checks on executive power, while reducing incentives for personalistic voting. The introduction of political institutions in postconflict negotiated settlements allows us to test the independent effects of institutions on governance and stability using survival analysis and a case study.
AcemogluDaronJohnsonSimon. 2005. “Unbundling Institutions.”Journal of Political Economy113 (5): 949–95.
2.
AchenChristopher H.2002. “Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART.”Annual Review of Political Science5: 423–450.
3.
AchenChristopher H.2005. Conflict Management and Peace Science22 (4): 327–339.
4.
AlesinaAlberto F.EasterlyWilliamDevleeschauwerArnaudKurlatSergioWacziargRomain T. 2003. “Fractionalization.”Journal of Economic Growth8 (2): 155–94.
5.
AndewegR. B.2000. “Consociational Democracy.”Annual Review of Political Science3: 509–36.
6.
BartlettWilliam.2003. Croatia: Between Europe and the BalkansNew York: Routledge.
7.
BeckThorstenClarkeGeorge R. G.GroffAlbertoKeeferPhilip. New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political >Economy: The Database of Political Institutions (February 2000). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2283. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=629133.
8.
BogaardsMatthijs. 1998. “The Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review.”European Journal of Political Research33(4): 475–96.
9.
Box-SteffensmeierJanet M.ZornChristopher J. W.. 2001. “Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science.”American Journal of Political Science45 (October): 951–67.
10.
Bueno de MesquitaBruceSmithAlastairSilversonRandolph M.MorrowJames. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11.
CareyJohn. 2009. Legislative Voting and AccountabilityNew York: Cambridge University Press.
12.
CareyJohnShugartMatthew. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote.”Electoral Studies14 (4): 417–39.
ElkinsZachary. 2012. Designed by Diffusion: Constitutional Reform in Developing Democracies. Manuscript in preparation.
20.
ElkinsZacharySimmonsBeth. 2004. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy.”American Political Science Review98 (1): 171–90.
21.
ElkinsZacharySidesJohn. 2007. “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?”American Political Science Review101 (4): 693–708.
22.
EvansPeterRauchJames. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth.”American Sociological Review64 (5): 748–65.
23.
FearonJames. 2005. “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.”Journal of Conflict Resolution49 (4): 483–507.
FearonJames D.LaitinDavid. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”American Political Science Review97 (1): 75–90.
26.
FryeTimothy. 1997. “A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies.”Comparative Political Studies30 (3):523–53.
27.
GagnonV. P.2004. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
28.
GeorgeAlexander L.AndrewBennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
29.
GerringJohn. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
30.
GleditschKristian Skrede. 2002. “Expanded Trade and GDP Data.”Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (5): 712–74.
31.
GoldsteinIvo. 1999. Croatia: A History. London: Hurst & Co.
32.
HabyarimanaJamesHumphreysMacartanPosnerDanielWeinsteinJeremy. 2007. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?”American Political Science Review101 (4): 709–25.
33.
HaggardStephanKaufmanRobert. 2008. Development, Democracy, and Welfare States in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
34.
HartzellCarolineHoddieMatthew. 2003a. “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management.”American Journal of Political Science47 (2): 318–32.
35.
HartzellCarolineHoddieMatthew. 2003b. “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.”Journal of Peace Research40 (3): 303–20.
36.
HartzellCarolineHoddieMatthew. 2005. “Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the Transition from Civil War.” In Sustainable Peace: Power-Sharing and Democracies after Civil Wars, edited by RoederPhilipRothchildDonald, 83–106. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
37.
HartzellCarolineHoddieMatthewRothchildDonald. 2001. “Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables.”International Organization55 (1): 183–208.
38.
HellerPatrick. 2000. “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,”World Politics52 (July):484–519.
39.
HorowitzDonald L.1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
40.
HorowitzDonald L.1993. “Democracy in Divided Societies.”Journal of Democracy4 (4): 18–38.
KasapovicMirjana. 1996. “1995 Parliamentary Elections in Croatia.”Electoral Studies15 (2): 269–82.
43.
KasapovicMirjana. 2000. “Electoral Politics in Croatia 1990-2000.”Politicka misaoXXXVII (5): 3–20.
44.
KaufmannDanielKraayAartMastruzziMassimo. 2009. “Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008.”World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424591.
45.
KingGaryMurrayChristopher J. L.SalomonJoshua A.TandonAjay. 2003. “Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research.”American Political Science Review97 (4): 567–84.
46.
KopsteinJeffreyReillyDavid A.. 2000. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World.”World Politics53 (1): 1–37.
47.
KurtzMarcus J.SchrankAndrew. 2007a. “Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms.”Journal of Politics69 (2): 538–54.
48.
KurtzMarcus J.SchrankAndrew. 2007b. “Growth and Governance: A Defense.”Journal of Politics69 (2): 563–69.
49.
LeviMargaret. 1989. Of Rule and Revenue. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
50.
LiebermanEvanSinghPrerna. 2009. “Measuring State Institutionalization of Ethnic Categories across Time and Space.”Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research7 (1): 29–35.
LijphartArend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
53.
LijphartArend. 1990. “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–1985.”American Political Science Review84 (2): 481–96.
54.
LijphartArend. 1992. Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
55.
LustickI. S.1997. “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism.”World Politics50 (October): 88–117.
56.
MooreMick. 2004. “Revenue, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries.”International Political Science Review25 (3): 297–319.
57.
MukherjeeBumba. 2006. “Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?”International Studies Quarterly50 (2):479–504.
58.
NorrisPippa. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
59.
NorthDouglass. 1991. “Institutions.”Journal of Economic Perspectives5 (1): 97–112.
60.
Ray, JamesL.2003. “Explaining interstate conflict and war: What should be controlled for?”Conflict Management and Peace Science20 (2): 1–32.
61.
ReillyBenjamin. 2002. “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies.”Journal of Democracy13 (2): 156–70.
62.
ReillyBenjamin. 2005. “Does the Choice of Electoral System Promote Democracy? The Gap between Theory and Practice.” In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, edited by RoederPhilip G.RothchildDonald, 159–71. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
63.
ReillyBenjamin. 2009. “Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Philadelphia.
64.
RoederPhilip G. 2005. “Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing.” In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, edited by RoederPhilip G.RothchildDonald, 51–82. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
65.
RoederPhilip G.RothchildDonald. 2005a. “Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy.” In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, edited by RoederPhilip G.RothchildDonald, 51–82. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
66.
RoederPhilip G.RothchildDonald. 2005b. Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
67.
RossMichael L. 2006. “A Closer Look and Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War.”Annual Review of Political Science9: 265–300.
68.
RothsteinBo. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
69.
SalloukhBassel F.2006. “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon.”Canadian Journal of Political Science39 (3): 635–55.
70.
SchmitterPhilippe CTerryKarl. 1991. “What Democracy is ... and is not”, Journal of DemocracyII (3): 75–88.
71.
SenAmartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
72.
SimmonsBethDobbinFrankGarrettGeoffrey, eds. 2006. The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
73.
TannerMarcus. 2001. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
74.
TsebelisGeorge. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
75.
VarshneyAshutosh. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.”World Politics53 (3): 362–98.
76.
WalterBarbara. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.”International Organization51 (3): 335–36.
77.
WalterBarbara. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
