This article builds on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public’s willingness to expend additional “blood and treasure” in an ongoing war. The rhetoric of “sunk costs” (often described as “sacrifices”) that must be redeemed through further conflict is a well-known, yet irrational, trope. Utilizing an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey on attitudes about Iraq, we find that “investment frames” increase support for the war among individuals who believe the U.S. “did the right thing in Iraq,” but decrease support for the war among those who feel the U.S. “should have stayed out.” We also find, however, that framing effects are inconsistent when the frames are attributed to sources. These latter results demonstrate the importance of including unattributed frames to evaluate source effects in framing research.
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