Abstract
In the early stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, military leaders resisted the release of body count and “casualty ratio” data. However, in the spring of 2004, the U.S. military (and American media) began to focus on the “limited” American casualties in specific operations versus the “significant” number of insurgents killed. This article examines the extent to which body count/casualty ratio “frames” and individual casualty tolerance influence public perceptions about the war and the success or failure of U.S. military operations. Two experiments were conducted pitting alternative casualty frames against one another to measure their relative impact. The results demonstrate the influence of framing effects on public perceptions and clarify understanding of the determinants and impact of casualty tolerance.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
