Racializing China–Africa Relations: A Test to the Sino-African Friendship

Abstract

While contemporary China–Africa relations are often discussed in (geo)political and economic terms, they cannot be disentangled from “racial” orderings and tensions. Still, “race” remains underexplored in these encounters. This article seeks to further the conversation on the role of “race” in China–Africa relations. We build on the concept of “racialization” to examine the various ways in which race shapes both the Chinese-in-Africa and Africans-in-China contexts. We do so without losing sight of historical constructions and socio-political drivers. Drawing and expanding on a burgeoning strand of China–Africa “race”-related research, we argue that racialization processes are fused with strategic interests, historical “racial” consciousnesses, and political and economic discontent. Our analysis questions oft-repeated programmatic claims of a “Sino-African friendship” and posits that thinking through “race” is fundamental for an adequate comprehension of the narratives and modalities configuring China–Africa relations.

Introduction

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic underscored instances of discrimination against Africans in China (Castillo and Amoah, 2020). For example, in Guangzhou, local authorities launched a campaign to combat the virus directed at foreigners which, in practice, focused only on Africans. Black Africans, in particular, were required mandatory self-quarantine regardless of their recent travel history, denied access to public spaces, and evicted from their residences by Chinese landlords, forcing them to reside on the streets (Asiedu, 2020). Such scenes of maltreatments were shared widely and sparked discussions of Chinese “racism.” It also resulted in outrage, from African diasporas to governments disappointed with the treatment dispensed by China toward African nationals (Pilling and Wong, 2020).

These events lay bare potential challenges to the strength of contemporary China–Africa relations, often characterized as mutually beneficial and founded on the spirit of South-South empathy and solidarity (Power et al., 2012; Hönke et al., 2023). Based on shared feelings of mutual victimhood and “racial othering” owing to common colonial and post-colonial experiences, this “South–South spirit” has often supported formulations of a “Sino-African friendship” (Addis and Zuping, 2018). Yet, recent events in Guangzhou and beyond, highlighting recurrent scenes of discrimination, puts the sincerity and desirability of this “friendship” into question. They also underscore the importance of understanding and examining “race,” “racism,” and racialized formations in contemporary China–Africa relations.

Even though Chinese–African ties have been the subject of intense, variegated academic debates, most analyses have been guided by a macro-level approach, zooming in on the economic and political aspects of these connections, which were marked in recent decades by deepened interactions in arenas ranging from investments, to development cooperation, to interpersonal contacts (Alden and Large, 2019; Chiyemura et al., 2023; Gu et al., 2016; Lippolis and Verhoeven, 2022). In recent years, increasing field-based research has also done much to advance knowledge on the ground-level and people-to-people facets of China–Africa encounters (Amoah et al., 2020; Driessen, 2015; Oya and Schaefer, 2021). Yet, to build on the critiques of scholars, such as Monson and Rupp (2013) and Sautman and Yan (2016), analyses seldom pay close attention to the deep and symbiotic workings of social, cultural, and “racial” frameworks accompanying such contacts. The developments in Guangzhou stand as but only one reminder of the tensions, complications, and misalignments relating to “race” and “racism” on Sino-African landscapes that reflect complex histories and discourses (Cheng, 2011; Dikötter, 2015).

On this account, we seek to engage with and contribute to a burgeoning body of scholarship on how racialization is co-constituted within China–Africa relations (Castillo, 2020; Lan, 2016; Monson, 2013; Monson and Rupp, 2013; Sautman and Yan, 2016). In line with the work of Sautman and Yan (2016), we argue that such racialization is multidirectional: racialized politics and practices are enacted by both Chinese and African actors, across both the Africans-in-China and Chinese-in-Africa contexts. This highlights a complex and multifaceted picture, requiring careful examination that does not fall into simplistic explanations. Against this backdrop, this article examines overall trends and manifestations relating to “race” and “racism” in the contemporary pursuit of a Sino-African friendship. We observe how racialization processes are markedly reinforced by historical conceptions, are manifested across both physical and digital landscapes, and are politically signified.

This article draws on a varied set of data and research. To capture micro-level “racial” dynamics between Chinese and African actors, we engage with a range of ethnographic works in and on regions with notable Chinese or African migrant communities. This is complemented by considering secondary data collected through surveys and polls on public perceptions of “race” and the “other” in China–Africa encounters. In addition, we look at studies examining discourses on (social) media platforms to grasp “racial” representations and narratives on the Internet and in digital landscapes (Daniels, 2013; Gans, 2016). At the (geo)political level, to uncover racialization processes at institutional, governmental, and multilateral realms, we draw on newspaper sources, press releases, and media interviews with key Chinese and African representatives, ranging from provincial authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China to the declarations of African leaders in specific governments and regional bodies like the African Union. Here we approach specific discourses and policies with (potential) racializing signifiers and implications, as well as counter-reactions to these. To illustrate specific practical effects of racializing political discourses and governmental policies, we zoom in on particular examples with consequences to everyday encounters in China–Africa relations, such as the effects of tougher migration laws for Africans in Guangzhou and the anti-China racial nationalism adopted by political elites during electoral campaigns in Zambia. Throughout our analysis, we consider how historical constructions and processes underpin these dynamics, paying particular attention to the works of Chinese and African scholars to account for contextual nuances.

The article proceeds as follows. We start by providing a general overview of China–Africa engagements and highlight our contributions to the existing literature. We then present the article’s conceptual framework, elaborating on how we build on the notion of “racialization” to make sense of Chinese–African (mis)representations and relationships. Thereafter, we proceed with our analysis of the Chinese-in-Africa and Africans-in-China contexts, before concluding.

Revisiting China–Africa relations

Contrary to commonly held assumptions, China–Africa encounters do not begin in 1949 with the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They have a longer history (Power et al., 2012). Records suggest that (indirect) exchanges of goods go back around 2000 years (Nowak, 2016), with past Sino-African relations reaching their climax during China’s Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) (Jinyuan, 1984). During this period, Admiral Zheng Ho famously made many voyages, through which he reached Eastern Africa. Many of these early visits were cordial, as the Admiral reportedly exchanged gifts and treated indigenous Africans with respect and courtesy (Lan, 2016). This is important to note, as discourses hailing the friendly nature of historical interactions play a crucial role in framing contemporary ties. Connections have come to a halt with the advent and expansion of European colonialism across both Asia and Africa. In China, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) adopted a “closed-door” policy, limiting the possibility of maintaining foreign ties with Africa (Alden and Alves, 2008). African entities, subordinated to European colonialism, had in turn lost their ability to independently forge and maintain external relations (Jinyuan, 1984).

Sino-African engagements have therefore remained virtually negligible until the foundation of the PRC in 1949, resurfacing only in the wake of African decolonization between the 1950s and 1970s (Jinyuan, 1984). At this point, Mao Zedong was aggressively pushing an anti-racist and anti-imperialist political agenda (Lan, 2016), determined to support oppressed groups in their struggle against imperialism and “racial” capitalism. For instance, under his leadership, China has displayed solidarity with the black liberation movements in the United States (Pateman, 2021). At the Bandung Conference in 1955, the first significant multilateral platform for Afro-Asian relations, the forging of Third World-ist identities and solidarities gained traction, becoming an important pillar of China’s foreign policy toward Africa (Power et al., 2012) and prompting African nations to engage in South-South partnerships with other developing countries, including China (Tull, 2006).

Throughout the 1960s, building on the Bandung momentum, China’s trade and aid relations with Africa saw significant increases, particularly through the provision of Chinese interest-free loans for the purchase of industrial equipment, as well as through forms of technical assistance, contacts which were recurrently conveyed through vocabularies of South-South solidarity (Alden and Alves, 2008; Prybyla, 1964). Despite the Bandung momentum and notable projects like the construction of the Tazara Railway in Eastern Africa (Monson, 2009), China–Africa exchanges remained relatively modest in scale throughout the Cold War period. Prevailing geopolitical constraints coupled with the oil shocks of the 1970s and the worsening of internal conflicts across the African continent hampered the sustained maintenance and deepening of ties.

Relations have acquired renewed impetus during the 1990s, facilitated by China’s economic reforms and opening-up (Lan, 2016), and have experienced a remarkable transformation in the post-2000s. In what is now a well-known story, China’s extraordinary economic growth and commodity appetite have set the conditions for heightened political, economic, and interpersonal links. Trade with the continent has grown from 1 billion US dollars in 1980 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2019) to 254 billion US dollars in 2021 (General Administration of Customs P. R. China, 2022). China has stepped up its economic aid to African states through infrastructure projects, loans, and development assistance, fostering infrastructure construction, raising productivity, and creating jobs (Addis and Zuping, 2018). Besides benefiting from expanding trade and financing opportunities, African governments have in turn provided China with much needed natural resources and vital diplomatic support in multilateral for a (Tull, 2006). Of relevance are also the diverse forms of interpersonal relations between the two places that have emerged due to business, education, labor migration, and technical exchanges (Amoah et al., 2020).

Contemporary China–Africa relations are often set within claims of friendship and mutually beneficial outcomes. This is particularly evident across Chinese policy discourses, which have actively emphasized the renewed role of Africa’s “all-weather friend” and the construction of “win-win” partnerships, forged as an alternative to Western dominance and colonial hierarchies (Duggan, 2015; Hönke et al., 2023). Highlighting the lasting prevalence of such framings, President Xi Jinping recently hailed the profound spirit of a “China–Africa friendship” in a speech delivered at the eighth edition of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2021: “Why do China and Africa have such a close relationship and so deep a bond of friendship? The key lies in an everlasting spirit of China–Africa friendship and cooperation forged between the two sides” (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, 2021). While African leaders have often welcomed and echoed Chinese formulations of friendship, the intensification of such ties has also met its growing share of challenges. These include murky political alliances and deals, cultural and language misunderstandings, perception of neo-imperialism, and the complex development obstacles arising from the rapid expansion of projects—oftentimes hindered by unrealistic aspirations, social anger, technical shortcomings, and poor returns (Dreher et al., 2018; Gocking, 2021; Wethal, 2017).

Incidentally, heightened economic and political relations between Africa and China have also facilitated travel and migratory flows in both directions (Anshan, 2015). The emergence and consolidation of African communities in China and Chinese communities in Africa has been yet another development that has put claims of a deep-rooted China–Africa friendship to a test, not least due to the emergence of “racial” hierarchies and orderings (Cheng, 2011; Lan, 2016). Nonetheless, in disciplines, such as International Relations, Global Political Economy, and Development Studies, the concomitant research boom that has followed the boom in China–Africa relations in the post-2000s has mainly adopted a top-down focus, privileging (geo)political and macro-economic trends (Alden, 2005; Alden et al., 2008; Taylor, 2009; Tull, 2006).

This has been partly amended by a burgeoning strand of works, particularly among Anthropology, Critical Geography, and Cultural Studies scholars, approaching how relations have transcended to the micro-level (Driessen, 2015; Fei, 2020; Lesutis, 2021), including analyses that have specifically examined the role of “race” and “racism” in China–Africa encounters (Castillo, 2014, 2020; Kimari and Ernstson, 2020; Lan, 2017; Sautman and Yan, 2016). Yet, reflections on “race” relations in the existing China–Africa literature consist mainly of historical works tracing the meanings and manifestations of “race” across Chinese history (Cheng, 2011; Dikötter, 2015; Lan, 2016; Monson, 2013) and regionally focused studies exploring Chinese–African interactions in either an Africans-in-China context (Castillo, 2014; Lan, 2016; Li et al., 2009; Lufrano, 1994) or a Chinese-in-Africa context (Dobler, 2008; Hess and Aidoo, 2015b; Matambo, 2019; Mohan and Lampert, 2014). Few studies, however, provide an overarching picture and comparison of racialization processes across both landscapes, bundling together macro-trends and micro-level realities.

Against this backdrop, we engage with and complement existing works by addressing both contexts, while scrutinizing sweeping representations of a Sino-African friendship. We do so by examining how “race” orders, mediates, and co-constitutes—or, in other words, racializes—relationships. We connect micro- and macro-levels of reality, across both digital and physical spaces, yet without losing sight of historical underpinnings and political processes.

Conceptualizing “race,” “racism,” and racialization

“Race” is a controversial and complex concept. Historically, it has been vested with strong biological contours: that humans are naturally divided into racial subspecies, distinguished by inherent biological characteristics (Winant, 2006). This essentialist definition has contributed to support “racial” hierarchies and modes of differentiation, from colonialism and slavery to institutional systems of segregation, such as that of South Africa’s apartheid. Essentialist, biological notions of “race” have, however, been scientifically contested and rejected (Kaplan and Winther, 2012; Smedley and Smedley, 2005; Williams, 1997; Winant, 2006). While there can be physical, phenotypic differences among individuals based on geographical ancestry and ethnicity, these do not result into distinct “races,” as the human species does not have sufficient genetic variation to be classified into different subspecies (Hacking, 2005).

Thus, in contemporary academic debates, “race” is prominently understood as a sociological construct, not a biological attribute (Kaplan and Winther, 2012; Mills, 2000; Williams, 1997; Winant, 2006). Even though the concept of distinct biological human “races” has no scientific basis, “race” refers to the meanings and classifications societies assign to particular populations. It can be defined as a social construction used to divide people into “racial” groups based on differences in phenotype, identity, and cultural characteristics. Because “race” is socially constructed, interpretations of what characteristics constitute “racial” groups vary over time and space, and remain ambiguous and contingent.

Relatedly, “racism” is the belief system that “racial” groups exist, have distinctive cultural characteristics determined by hereditary factors, and can be ranked hierarchically, whereby some “races” are endowed with an intrinsic superiority over others (Grosfoguel, 2016). “Racism” can take on different forms: implicit and explicit, conscious and unconscious, and can occur on multiple levels, namely, at the individual level (e.g. as explicit discrimination based on personal feelings), at the communal level (e.g. as social exclusion), or at the institutional level (e.g. as structural “racism”).

“Race” and “racism” are not only domestic or identity issues, but also important historical shapers of international relations and global politics, for example, through processes of colonialism and slavery (Acharya, 2022). From local to transnational levels, the harmful impacts of “racism” as a dividing, discriminatory force remain markedly manifested through police brutality, border discrimination, and multiple forms of under-representation, from politics to academia (Búzás, 2021). At the same time, this has prompted increasing public reckoning, as demonstrated by the worldwide protests against police “racism” in the aftermath of George Floyd’s death in the United States, the toppling of statues commemorating colonial leaders, and the passing of affirmative action policies through, for instance, the establishment of “racial” quotas in employment and education (Shilliam, 2020). While formidable and entrenched challenges remain, such efforts highlight the importance of confronting the historical legacies of systemic “racism” and the enduring inequalities it has created. This also justifies the need for continued research attention in understanding questions of “race” and “racism” in contemporary global engagements, including in non-Western contexts.

As “race” remains a controversial concept, “race” relations scholars often engage with the conceptual vocabulary of racialization (Banton, 1997; Gans, 2016; Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss, 2018; Hochman, 2018; Monson, 2013). In doing so, interpretations can step away from connotations of inherency and objectivity that plain notions of “race” inspire. It shifts understandings of “race” as something in and of itself to a focus on what “race” does. That is, to speak of a person or group as being racialized rather than being of a certain “race.” In this vein, we engage with the definition of racialization provided by Omi and Winant (1986) and furthered by Sautman and Yan (2016). Omi and Winant (1986) define racialization as being “the extension of ‘racial’ meaning to a previously ’racially’ unclassified relationship, social practice, or group” (p. 111). To this definition, Sautman and Yan (2016) add that this extension of “racial” meaning to a group also “designates groups to be subjected to unequal treatment, and socio-culturally constructs hierarchy” (p. 2150).

Gans (2016) further dissects the racialization framework by providing tools and questions to analyze racialization processes. He proposes that racialization processes generally begin with the arrival of migrants perceived as (phenotypically) different and undeserving. As racialization is a process, it can also have an end. When the racialized group is no longer seen as inferior, the group can be “deracialized.” Contrastingly, when a deracialized group faces new circumstances, they can also be “reracialized.” Gans (2016) points at important analytical questions: “How does racialization start and how could it be stopped? Who begins it and how? [. . .] Do informal and formal racializing organizations take part, and what about others, including ‘the media’?” (Gans, 2016, p. 343).

In this article, we build on this racialization framework to guide our analysis. We do so for the following reasons. First, it allows us to move away from conceptual controversies pervading notions of “race” and “racial” groups. Second, and relatedly, we hold that this is more analytically adequate considering our specific empirical interest in Africa–China relations. The literature on “racial” theory has predominantly centered on Euro-American frames of reference, often manifested along Black–White binaries and dichotomies (Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss, 2018). As this article engages with instances of South–South racialization, it is essential to note that conceptions of “race” and “racism” stemming from a Black–White binary are not always appropriate (Monson, 2013). In this regard, we also attend to Castillo’s (2020) notion of “multiple triangulations” to explore “race” and “racism” in China–Africa encounters “from multiple bearings, points, and/or triangles” (p. 323). Here, besides the whiteness–blackness–Chineseness triad, it is crucial to think of racialization in terms of other (simultaneous) triangulations, such as that between “race,” gender, and geopolitics to arrive at more insightful perspectives. While it falls beyond the scope of this article to specifically examine the gendered bearings of racialization processes in China–Africa settings (see, for instance, Castillo, 2021), we build on Castillo’s understanding to think of race relations in terms of their multiple dimensions and intersections. We highlight how racialization is performed along multiple triangulations, stressing the role of geopolitical, historical, and discursive repertoires more specifically.

Taken together, we thus propose that the racialization framework is especially suitable as it affords the theoretical tools to understand “racial” constructions of difference and hierarchy as processes—rather than natural or pre-determined incidents (Gonzalez-Sobrino and Goss, 2018) —and to explore the multidimensional, multiscalar, and entangled logics of race relations.

Africans-in-China context

Starting in the 1980s, there have been increasing flows of African migration to China, including traders, diplomats, artists, students, and professionals, among others (Anshan, 2015). On an important caveat, however, Castillo (2014) reminds that the “Africans in China” term is a broad umbrella that encompasses people with a wide variety of origins and trajectories. Moreover, on the meanings of “Africans” in discussions of “race,” Monson (2013) remarks that much of the scholarly work in the field conflates “African-ness” to “blackness.” This conflation assumes that all Africans are “black,” which is not the case given the range of ethnicities and associations with “race” throughout the continent. However, Sub-Saharan Africans with darker skin tones are generally racialized as being “black” in China (Lan, 2016). Bearing this in mind, we broadly refer to “Africans” to say “black (Sub-Saharan) Africans.” We use this framing for the sake of parsimony and to communicate our argument but recognize that this categorization overlooks significant differences. Moreover, we also recognize that Africans are not the only group subject to racialization processes within China. As documented across several works, the rise of Han-centrism in contemporary China has led to distinct forms of “Han racism” and cultural prejudice toward other ethnic identities and minorities in the country, such as the Uyghurs and Tibetans (see, e.g., Friend and Thayer, 2017). However, due to the specific scope of this article on externally oriented forms of racialization, we restrict our analysis to instances of China–Africa encounters, tackling in this section processes affecting (Black) African nationals in China.

The intensification of interpersonal contacts in what we interpret as the Africans-in-China context is often traced to the 1980s, when a large number of African students were invited and offered scholarships to study at Chinese universities (Anshan, 2015). Those contacts were originally driven by political and ideological motivations, when in the 1960s during the Maoist era, small numbers of African students were invited as part of a Chinese government program attempting to boost China’s “Third-Worldist” image (Sautman, 1994). In China–Africa “race”-related research, the “racial” clashes on Chinese university campuses during the 1980s are often emphasized as they featured highly publicized, blatant “racist” rhetoric and instances of prejudice (Cheng, 2011; Lufrano, 1994; Sautman, 1994; Sullivan, 1994). Specifically, the clashes at Nanjing University are highlighted as they epitomized the fallout of tensions between African and Chinese students on campuses, leading to the protests of thousands of Chinese students chanting anti-African slogans that demonstrated “racial” hate (Lufrano, 1994). Nanjing was not a singular event, as “campus racism” was a phenomenon that occurred in various Chinese cities, sometimes also escalating into violence (Sautman, 1994).

A range of perceived threats and underlying “racial” thought contributed to such instances of racialization. The primary source of individual altercations between the Chinese and Africans were often predicated on perceived threats of African men “polluting” Chinese society through their relations with Chinese women (Sautman, 1994). This discourse revealed how considerations of “racial” purity prevailed in parts of Chinese society. The stigmatization of African men in relationships with non-African women has also been deeply ingrained in Western colonial stereotypes associated with blackness, namely, aggression and sexualization (Fanon, 1952). In addition, racialized ideas of Africans showed Chinese students’ discontentment with their position in society (Sullivan, 1994). They were critical of the amount of aid afforded to Africa, as they felt disregarded by the Chinese state. Stereotypes resurfaced of Africa being backward, incapable, and therefore, “undeserving of China’s aid.” China was seen as the great savior that provides “helpless Africa” with aid, ignoring the multidirectional nature of the relationship. Thus, within the “campus racism” of the 1980s, Chinese racialization of Africans was a form of expressing political discontent, at the cost of newly arrived African students, based on stereotypes that justified their stigmatization—in ways not dissimilar from Western colonial and post-colonial ascriptions.

In the post-2000, Cheng (2011) claims that the above discussed “campus racism” has been transplanted to digital spaces, morphed into a “cyber racism” with similar contours. Yet, while instances of “campus racism” were usually context-specific and constricted to China–Africa elite encounters (Lan, 2016), the emergence of the Internet and social media has provided an amplifying device for Chinese racializations of Africans, with reach across broader social groups. There has been considerable research on racialization processes in cyberspace across various popular Chinese platforms, such as Weibo, ChinaSMACK, and QQ (Cheng, 2011; Liu and Deng, 2020; Pfafman et al., 2015; Shen, 2009; The China Africa Project, 2021; Castillo 2021). These studies suggest how recurrent themes expressed in the “campus racism” have endured over the years, such as the sexualization of “blackness,” the maintenance of “racial” purity, and the stereotype of the dirty and diseased African.

On a related account, Shen (2009) has investigated the opinions of Chinese “netizens” on China–Africa relations. He notes how inferiority/superiority dichotomies pervade Chinese “racial” stereotypes and discourses, painting a picture of Africans as poor, lazy, and backward to derive a sense of national superiority. By racializing others, one racializes themselves in the process (Gans, 2016). Shen (2009) predicted that even though Chinese “netizens” do not popularly support China’s relations with Africa, a national sense of pride in Chinese involvement as a “savior” will guarantee the continued future involvement of China in Africa. This self-identification of China as the “savior” of Africa is also reflected by much of Chinese media in propaganda posters (Suglo, 2021), television (Castillo, 2020), films (Talmacs, 2020), and newspapers (Chow-Quesada and Tesfaye, 2020). Here, narratives of Africans as culturally inferior are reproduced. Such conceptions of “African-ness” in the media contribute to crystalize local understandings of Africa and how Africans are perceived in everyday spaces (Chow-Quesada and Tesfaye, 2020).

In this respect, (Han) Chinese netizens construct a derogatory image of Africa, as opposed to China’s recent successes and development. This construction carries historical resonances, reflecting assumptions that can be traced to pre-modern associations of blackness in China, particularly during the slave trade, when black bodies were dehumanized and linked with savagery (Castillo, 2020, p. 312). As further noted by Castillo (2020), those pre-modern encounters were also characterized by a “Sino-barbarian dichotomy” in which Chinese civilization was represented as culturally superior to all foreigners and “others.” This has often been predicated on Chinese ideas of suzhi: a criterion of individual quality encompassing physical, intellectual, and moral attributes (Kipnis, 2006). Accordingly, a common way to describe the inferiority of foreigners in China, especially Africans, is by pointing out their low level of suzhi.

Similarly to the dynamics present in the “campus racism,” discontent among Chinese “netizens” with their social standing also plays a role in cyberspace condemnations of the China–Africa relationship. As China increasingly invests in Africa, less well-off Chinese “netizens” feel neglected, left behind, and frustrated with their state’s spending on foreigners instead of them (Pfafman et al., 2015; Shen, 2009; The China Africa Project, 2021). Pfafman et al. (2015) have stated that online racialization is used as a tool by Chinese netizens to express themselves politically and show discontent with governmental policies without directly attacking the Chinese state out of fear of repercussions. Even though racialization processes in cyberspace cannot generalize to perceptions of the entire Chinese population, it still represents a significant portion of overall Chinese racializations. Moreover, given that physical Sino-African interactions remain limited to certain areas and groups, cyberspace and the media in general act as important sources of information on Africa and Africans for the wider Chinese population (Li et al., 2009; Pfafman et al., 2015; Shen, 2009).

In recent years, the largest and most prominent African community has been located in Guangzhou. Bodomo (2020) estimated that there are around 100,000 Africans there. Most Africans in Guangzhou are traders who have chosen to go to China in search of greater economic well-being and opportunities (Castillo, 2014). Guangzhou thus presents a space where face-to-face, everyday interactions between Chinese and Africans occur more frequently. While instances of “racism” and xenophobia are reported at the individual level (Bodomo, 2020), Africans have provided a more complex picture of their interactions with Chinese actors. While some feel welcomed by the Chinese and relate the discrimination to mere ignorance and curiosity, others experience interactions as highly “racist” (Castillo, 2014). Racializing processes in Guangzhou are better described as institutional at first, which then seeps through to the individual and community levels. In this regard, Bodomo (2010) emphasizes that the context in Guangzhou largely differs from the previously mentioned clashes on campuses in the 1980s. He argues that the main difference between both contexts is that in Guangzhou clashes are taking place between (illegal) African residents and hostile, generally corrupt law enforcement authorities. To which Lan (2014) concurs as she proposes that the racialization of Africans played a large role in constructing Africans as “illegal” in the Guangdong province.

This construction of illegality is embodied by race-based profiling toward the entire Black population of Guangzhou with little respect to those affected by it (Qiu, 2021) and through migration laws that disproportionately target Africans, including those who have valid visa and residence permits. Huang (2019) investigated law enforcement on the ground in the province and argues that such biased targeting necessarily constrains Africans’ ability to meet legal exigencies. It also reinforces negative stereotypes of Africans among the police and subsequently through media coverage that exacerbates negative perceptions among the Chinese public, resulting into sustained and self-reinforcing processes of racialization. This institutional racialization of Africans has caused a great deal of frustration among African diasporas in China: not just toward the Chinese government but also tellingly toward African governments themselves. Diasporas have, for example, noticed the discrepancy through which Chinese migrants in Africa obtain residence permits with relative ease and complacency, comparatively to their struggles and inability to obtain legal permissions in China (Bischoff, 2015).

Then, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a painfully visible process of (re)racialization. Africans were disproportionately targeted in attempts to combat the virus. They were required to self-quarantine, regardless of their travel history, were evicted from their residences and forced to sleep on the streets, faced maltreatment by the police, and were met with hostility in day-to-day life (Asiedu, 2020). Qiu (2021) explains that this pandemic control merges with the previously mentioned racialized construction of “illegality” and even further justified the need to intensify migration control. The cause for reracialization, in this case, was the perception of a threat. There has been a long-documented history behind the racialization of Africans as pathological and disease spreaders polluting Chinese society (Adebayo, 2021; Dikötter, 2015; Pfafman et al., 2015; Sullivan, 1994). This racialization is also a form of scapegoating, blaming a marginalized group for a highly contagious virus and global pandemic.

The Chinese government has persistently brushed off and dismissed “racial” controversies and questions about anti-African sentiment, denying the existence of “racism” in China altogether (Qiu, 2021). There has been a tendency to treat cases of bigotry as incidental and to state that “racism” is a Western problem that does not occur in China (Castillo, 2020; Tettey, 2020). Chinese official media vehicles have, for instance, given ample coverage of the worldwide Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, denouncing the ambivalences and hypocrisies associated with Western liberal ideologies (Pateman, 2021). Interestingly, this “critical” Chinese coverage has also been extended to Hong Kong, with a flurry of news articles and stories portraying cases of discrimination, alienation, and inequalities toward African migrants in the city (see, for example, Lee and Candela, 2020; Sun, 2020). Amid the eruption of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests and increasing anti-mainland sentiment, this illustrates attempts to debunk established perceptions, including among Africans, of Hongkongers as different, more “polite,” “educated,” and “superior” than the mainland Chinese (Chow-Quesada and Tesfaye, 2020; Mathews, 2011), while deflecting and spinning narratives of Chinese “racism”.

Moreover, concerning Chinese contexts, Western governments and media have been accused of exploiting the issue of “race” to damage China’s relations with Africa (Sibiri, 2021). Nonetheless, though incredibly stringent toward other issues, government Internet censorship has not been applied to racializing and discriminatory language in cyberspace (Zhu, 2020). Cyberspace in China has therefore been and remains an open ground for the exchange and promotion of racialized ideas of difference and hierarchy, particularly toward Africans—notwithstanding minor recent advances in censorship on these issues (The China Africa Project, 2021). Such challenges are reinforced by the fact that the Chinese government has long repressed human rights struggles and activisms, including “anti-racist” agendas, and has done little to curtail racializing discourses and behaviors deeply rooted in Chinese ethnocentrism.

Chinese-in-Africa context

Chinese migration to Africa dates back to the continent’s colonial period, with South Africa attracting most of the initial waves. This started with small numbers of convicts and company slaves of the Dutch East India Company in the 17th century. It was then followed by influxes of laborers, known as “coolies,” attracted by the discovery of gold and diamond mines, from as early as the 1870s continuing through the mid-20th century (Harris, 2018; Ho, 2012). Of these early waves, migrants eventually returned to China or gradually became part of South Africa’s growing “mixed-race” population—derogatively referred to as “colored” during the apartheid period (Ho, 2012; Park, 2012).

The case of Chinese migration to South Africa is particularly revealing due to its inherent “racial” triangulations between “whiteness,” “blackness,” and “Chineseness,” though racialization dynamics in this triad have varied over time. During the colonial period, and throughout most of the apartheid regime, the Chinese were classified as “non-white,” albeit not entirely racialized as “black” either (Ho, 2012). It was not until later, from the 1950s and 1960s, that Chinese South Africans started to become gradually accepted within White society. In post-apartheid South Africa, those who were born in or came to the country in earlier migration waves (usually prior to 2000) tend to be fairly well integrated, with most speaking English fluently and working as educated professionals or entrepreneurs. Such Chinese South Africans are often racialized together with White South Africans as “articulate and accomplished,” whereas those typically arriving in the post-2000 are not (Park, 2012).

Apart from South Africa, Chinese migration to Africa has only considerably increased in recent decades following China’s economic reforms in the 1970s and the liberalization of emigration legislation in 1985, acquiring heightened levels with the intensification of China–Africa ties in the post-2000 (Park, 2009). Kuang (2008) identified three groups within these more recent Chinese migration waves. The first consists of labor migration, facilitated by the advent of Chinese (state-owned) enterprises. The second is characterized by an entrepreneurial dimension, including mainly traders. The third is a transitory migration of Chinese actors hoping to go to European countries. Most Chinese in Africa today are temporary migrants, intending to return to China at some point (Driessen, 2015; Park, 2022).

Especially, in the West, media depictions of the Chinese presence in Africa usually invoke negative stereotypes (Mawdsley, 2008; Matanji, 2022), promoting “yellow peril” narratives and a supposed state-led “Chinese invasion” (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011; Mohan and Lampert, 2013). Sullivan and Cheng (2018) have opposed such depictions, claiming that there is an overarching tendency to erroneously frame individual Chinese actors as state agents. Chinese migrants have personal motivations, expectations, and concerns (Driessen, 2015) that are not always in line with state interests (Sullivan and Cheng, 2018). Liu (2018) corroborates this, noting that agency is often taken away from Chinese actors by conflating them with the Chinese state. Therefore, one should carefully contextualize and distinguish “the Chinese” from China in analyses of the diaspora in Africa, as associations can take on varied forms.

Moreover, Moyo (2016) emphasizes that it is essential to consider the variegated histories and political economies of different African states and regions, to avoid essentialist readings of “Africa as a country.” In this sense, we reiterate that arriving at generic, sweeping statements regarding African racializations of the Chinese and vice versa would be a daunting—if not impossible—task and therefore not the aim of this paper. Instead, our focus lies on discussing and contextualizing specific modes through which racialization processes occur, highlighting their complexities and socio-political conjunctures.

When it comes to “race” and “racism” in the Chinese-in-Africa context, Western media outlets have routinely depicted the “Chinese” as the sole racializers and “Africans” as mere victims of powerful, neo-imperial Chinese actors (Moyo, 2016; Sautman and Yan, 2016; Matanji, 2022). Though frequently overstated, such dynamics should not be dismissed either (Moyo, 2016). A number of works covering different African contexts has empirically documented evidence of “racist” tendencies among Chinese migrants (Lee, 2009; Moyo, 2016; Sautman and Yan, 2016). Many of these studies have looked at workplace relations, indicating how Chinese employers and expatriate workers have deployed racist rhetoric, referring to labor cultures and practices of African employees in a derogatory way, resorting to stereotypes of African laziness (Sautman and Yan, 2016; Wethal, 2017; Cezne and Wethal, 2022). At the same time, Giese (2013) has counter-argued that even though Chinese entrepreneurs might have pejorative attitudes and lower expectations toward African labor, particularly when contrasted with their positive views of Chinese working cultures, they rarely engage in active “racial” discrimination. Thus, according to Giese, though Africans may be racialized in the minds of Chinese entrepreneurs, this racialization is not necessarily carried out in their practices and businesses.

Different factors might explain such Chinese inability or unwillingness to racialize actively. One factor is that Chinese actors in Africa lack “political power, determinative influence, or cultural hegemony” to racialize Africans, as noted by Sautman and Yan (2016: 2151) in a study based on 450 interviews of Chinese and African employers and employees in 12 African countries. They found little evidence suggesting that the Chinese racialize Africans. Alternative motives appear to contribute to deter “racist” behaviors, such as China’s geopolitical need for African support. Once more, while Chinese actors’ motivations cannot be conformed to those of the Chinese state, Chinese citizens—particularly those involved with state-sponsored projects on the continent—might be directly or indirectly urged to act convivially and cordially to prevent unnecessary tensions in diplomatic and commercial relationships (Cheng, 2011). Thus, a sense of responsibility or pressure to “represent” China respectfully in Africa can also play a role, not least due to interests to preserve economic ties, engage in new partnerships or businesses, and allow for an eventual return in the future.

Fueled in recent years by developments, such as Donald Trump’s rise to power in the United States (2017-2021), the intensification of geopolitical rivalries, as well as associated concerns of economic coercion and corporate espionage, Western media outlets have frequently built on racializing stereotypes of China (e.g. as a “Yellow Peril”) to portray the Chinese presence in Africa (and beyond) as ruthless or neo-imperial, or in terms of a “trap” or “invasion” (Paterson and Nothias, 2016; Matanji, 2022). For one, such frames indicate that the Chinese are far from being the only racializers: their presence in Africa is also racialized by geopolitical and economic rivals. Moreover, narratives about Africans being mere victims of racialization are also misplaced. In this regard, Mohan and Lampert (2013) note that formulations of Africans as mere victims of the Chinese only contribute to remove their agency and power. As such, African agency—the ability to negotiate relationships with the Chinese and contest their presence driven by self-interest and strategic thinking—is found both at the individual and institutional levels (Chipaike and Bischoff, 2018; Mohan and Lampert, 2012).

Accordingly, in China–Africa research, it has been largely demonstrated how racialization dynamics are not unidirectional but works in both (or multiple) directions, with multiple case studies identifying trends of increasing hostility toward and racialization of Chinese migrants (Dobler, 2008; Liu, 2018; Matambo, 2019; Park, 2009). Zambia stands as a well-known case in point, following the advent of Chinese firms in the country’s mining sector and the resultant arrival of Chinese entrepreneurs and workers (Hess and Aidoo, 2015a). Around the early 2000s, anti-Chinese sentiment started to inflame across the Zambian population who were either discontent with the work conditions and wages that Chinese employers set or felt threatened by the increase of Chinese migrants and their negative consequences to Zambian jobs and entrepreneurs (Matambo, 2019). This was harnessed by then opposition politician Michael Sata, who ran his presidential campaign largely built on anti-Chinese sentiment. He called the Chinese “infesters” rather than “investors” and was, as formulated by Hess and Aidoo (2013), playing “the China card” to win the support of discontented Zambians. After losing multiple elections, Sata finally won in 2011. Tellingly, upon winning, he substantially modified his anti-Chinese rhetoric and actively courted China as an economic party (Hess and Aidoo, 2015a). Sata recognized the economic importance of maintaining a relationship with China once in such a position of power.

In this vein, Matambo (2019) suggests that tensions and misalignments between Chinese and African actors are frequently exploited and exaggerated for political purposes. Denouncing China, he argues, can be convenient for opposition parties as an indictment on ruling parties. Illustrated by the case of Zambia and also seen throughout wider racialization processes in Africa, anti-Chinese sentiments mainly come from economic groups that are in direct competition with Chinese entrepreneurs and labor, for instance by suffering job losses or experiencing precarious working conditions (Esteban, 2010; Hess and Aidoo, 2015b; Sautman and Yan, 2016; Cezne and Wethal, 2022). The (perceived) threat felt by such groups can be fueled by negative media portrayals of China, generally deeming the activities of the Chinese in Africa as “predatory” or “neo-colonial” (Paterson and Nothias, 2016). Moreover, as highlighted by Sishuwa and Money (2023), incumbent African ruling elites may also adopt strategies of racial nationalism against racial minorities and foreigners, for example, Whites and the Chinese, during periods of weaknesses to deflect criticism and affirm political power—though these racializations are often circumstantial and tied to specific conjunctures of political life.

Still, these racialization processes must always be put into perspective. In many African states, the Chinese are largely welcomed by the political class and population. The Afrobarometer has conducted 48,084 interviews in 34 African countries to investigate what ordinary Africans think of China’s engagement on the continent. In the period 2019–2021, they found that China’s political and economic engagement was seen as positive by the majority; only 14% considered it as negative (Afrobarometer, 2021). Interestingly, even though China’s role and influence in Africa has grown over time, the research revealed that in 24 countries, perceptions of Chinese interference dropped significantly. Though there is a clear appreciation for the Chinese investments and assistance and an overall admiration for Chinese culture and business success, resentment remains among those who are suffering from the competition caused by the influx of Chinese workers and businesses or from poor working conditions (Wang and Elliot, 2014). This paints a complex picture of the African public opinion and shows that attitudes toward the Chinese are largely based on local circumstances, such as political climate, economic outlook, and societal dynamics of the region (Park, 2022)

Implications of racialization for the Sino-African friendship

In both contexts, the examined racialization processes highlight how programmatic vocabularies of a “Sino-African friendship” pervading geopolitical alliances and economic ties are confronted with a range of tensions, complications, and misalignments that have resulted from deepened interactions and interpersonal relations. While historical bonds and Southern solidarities are said to be at the roots of such friendship, contemporary China–Africa racializations reveal challenges that places new demands on actors, institutions, and practices. In the Africans-in-China context, the pro-Africa stance held by Beijing is fraught with ambivalences: anti-African (often anti-Black) sentiment is present in parts of Chinese (digital) society and met with little resistance by official authorities. It highlights how “friendship” dispositions hailed at diplomatic declarations remain in many respects symbolic, reassuring African states of China’s “good intentions,” instead of reflecting the proclaimed horizontality of relations. Similarly, in the Chinese-in-Africa context, anti-Chinese sentiment emerges in various contexts. On one hand, with China being the continent’s largest trading partner and investor, it is unsurprising that most African political elites have primarily held a steady pro-China stance, welcoming China’s “friendship” formulation (Alden and Alves, 2008). On the other hand, however, Chinese actors have also been racialized as threatening, exploitative forces plundering the continent in a “new scramble for Africa.” This reveals, for one, long-standing frustrations and woes among Africans against perceived (neo-)colonial ambitions of foreign powers. At the same time, African politicians’ racialization of the Chinese has been instrumentalized to enhance their own political standing as well as for bargaining purposes—and might not necessarily translate into long-term tensions and ruptures at the bilateral level, as seen in the case of Zambia.

A prominent argument in the justification of racialized hierarchies and orders in China–Africa relations posits that, as contact increases, “racial” tensions arise as a byproduct of ignorance (Cheng, 2019; Olander, 2020). As suggested, even though China–Africa contacts have a longue durée, these were mainly limited in scale, and interpersonal interactions remain nowadays confined to certain spaces—such as those linked to Chinese investments in Africa or particular urban centers with notable African diasporas like Guangzhou. In this light, experience-based perceptions of the “other” remain relatively limited and contained. Thus, the “racial” knowledge in both contexts mainly stems from a mix of historical perceptions and stereotypes related to “race” in media outlets and the Internet that show a negative and ignorant view of the “other” (Lan, 2016). While this makes a compelling argument and ignorance undoubtedly plays a role in racialization processes, it is also oversimplistic to conclude that ignorance is the sole (or even the main) cause. If that was the case, increased interpersonal interactions would be the silver bullet needed to deracialize China–Africa contacts—a somewhat optimistic assumption, as Castillo (2020) notes.

Particularly in China, where “racial” superiority is infused in national history (Cheng, 2011; Dikötter, 2015), an increase in interpersonal interactions will likely not deracialize Africans. Correspondingly, in the Chinese-in-Africa context, it was precisely the intensification of interpersonal engagements that led to increased racialization. Sheridan (2016) points out that ignorance can be differentiated into two forms. Namely, ignorance based on mere inexperience and a form of ignorance that is the product of experiences interpreted within problematic frameworks. While instances of the former are plausible, the latter cannot be dismissed and shapes “racial” dynamics and experiences across both contexts. Thus, if expanding interpersonal contacts remain viewed through problematic frames of reference, this does little to improve “racial” consciousness.

The recent COVID-spurred events in Guangzhou, alluded to in the beginning of this article, places the “Sino-African friendship” at a critical juncture. Given the outrage expressed by African populations and leaders, they have set in motion particular reappraisals of China–Africa relations premised on “racial” grievances (Adebayo, 2021; Pilling and Wong, 2020). For instance, the deputy Chairperson of the African Union, Kwesi Quartey, made clear that even though Africa values its friendship with China, they do not do so at any price (African Union, 2020). This outrage is remarkable as there has been a long-standing reluctance among African governments and officials to stand up for their citizens abroad. Reasons often include fears of jeopardizing economic and political deals with important partners, such as China and lack of consular presence, channels, and resources to deal with the concerns of citizens (Bischoff, 2015). For that reason, acknowledgment and outrage over racial grievances at multilateral fora, such as the African Union is a significant development and demonstrates greater sensitivity toward racial questions in the Chinese–African relationship. Moreover, according to Sibiri’s (2021) surveys across the Ghanaian population (who make up the largest group of African students and migrants in China), respondents deemed anti-Black/African sentiments in China as the most detrimental issue to the future of Ghana–China relations. These public and diplomatic pressures lay bare the necessity and political importance for Chinese state actors to engage seriously and constructively with questions of “race,” not least to maintain, expand, and ideationally legitimate Sino-African cooperation in the future.

Such pressures and reactions have already forced Chinese authorities to cautiously admit to the existence of discriminatory practices that have long been ignored. For example, this admittance led regional authorities in the Guangdong province to announce measures against the discriminatory practices that took place during the start of COVID-19 (Elmer, 2020). One measure ensured that landlords were not allowed to adjust terms of rental agreements or withhold renters’ deposits, to avert unjustified evictions. Another addressed the trouble that foreigners had with the health app system to avoid the denial of access to public spaces on discriminatory basis. However, such measures tend to treat “racism” and discrimination as incidental and localized issues, rather than systemic and national traits. Even more recently, when Wang Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs attended a high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly, when talking about “racism,” he did not mention China’s role in it. Rather, he spoke in generic terms: that all countries should adopt a “zero-tolerance policy” for “racism” and should improve and build legal frameworks to “resolve systemic racism and law enforcement violence, prohibit the incitement of racial hostility, and end impunity” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2021), without mentioning China’s own struggles with “racism” and its impunity.

To ensure the longevity and sustainability of China–Africa relations, more proactive measures are needed (Castillo and Amoah, 2020; Tettey, 2020). In the case of China, the development of legal deterrents for punishing “racist” behaviors and discourses could provide a step forward. “Race” education can also play an important role, as “racial” superiority is infused in Chinese national history—often tied with Han-centrism (Cheng, 2011; Dikötter, 2015). In this vein, education that moves beyond ethnocentrism and inaccurate depictions of African (and other minorities’) histories and cultures is necessary to create “racial” awareness (Adu Amoah, 2021; Fennell, 2013). Admittedly, however, this is not without challenges as “race” and “racism” remain little discussed issues in China, posing entrenched obstacles for the establishment of legal and educational frameworks. All of which is further complicated due to China’s increasingly authoritarian and totalitarian outlook under Xi Xinping, with curtailed spaces for civic dialogue, criticism, and the voicing of grievances (Feldman, 2021). Nonetheless, even though the discussion of “race” remains contained, there are also encouraging initiatives at the provincial level, such as the pilot project of a community center in Guangzhou run by the Department of Social Security, aimed at assisting foreigners, of which mostly Africans, with their functional and social integration (Bischoff, 2015). This project, however small in scale, does showcase a deliberate effort and starting point to avoid racial clashes and encourage integration in the future.

In the case of Africa, authorities could promote the spread of information that is not rooted in stereotypes, informing their populations more accurately as to what the social practices and intentions of the Chinese are to demystify imaginaries and perceptions of threat and peril. In this regard, ongoing calls for greater transparency and disclosure of economic agreements, such as resource deals and infrastructure loans can play an important role (Carrai, 2021). Language barriers and cultural misunderstandings also complicate “racial” learning between Chinese and Africans (Lan, 2019). The learning process could therefore benefit from language proficiency and cultural training on both sides to ease communication on the grassroots level.

At the intergovernmental level, the events during COVID-19 provide opportunities for reconsidering policy frameworks on platforms, such as the FOCAC and the African Union to protect the rights of Africans in China and vice versa (Bodomo, 2020). This could benefit from comprehensive and sustained discussions and negotiations between Chinese and African officials (Castillo and Amoah, 2020).

Conclusion

This article explored the role of “race” and “racism” in China–Africa relations. By engaging with the notion of racialization, looking at the meanings and workings of “race,” racializing dynamics were examined in both the Chinese-in-Africa and the Africans-in-China contexts. In the Africans-in-China context, we found that the racialization of Africans is mainly enforced by historical conceptions of “racial” hierarchies, social media netizens, hostile law enforcement authorities, and the Chinese state’s negligence to acknowledge and address “racial” tensions. Underlying incentives of Chinese actors to racialize Africans were to covertly express political criticism, highlight cultural superiority, and scapegoat by blaming Africans for wider threats. In the Chinese-in-Africa context, though Chinese actors on the ground have at times shown “racist” tendencies and a racialized view of African labor, they do not always engage in active racialization. Potential explanations of this refrainment could be their lack of authoritative power and influence, the felt pressure to represent China respectfully, and the interest in preserving commercial ties and future projects. Instead, by recognizing African agency, it can be seen that African actors, especially political elites, possess the power and ability to racialize Chinese actors when in accordance with their strategic interests. African actors on the ground also show to have racializing tendencies but mainly those in direct competition with Chinese entrepreneurs or working under precarious conditions for Chinese employers. Still, outside of those affected actors, African public opinion of the Chinese is fairly positive.

Against this backdrop, this article discussed some of the main underlying motivations for racialization, offering a complex, nuanced picture of “race” and “racism” in China–Africa relations. Racialization processes in both contexts can arise due to mutual ignorance. Yet, at the same time, ignorance is far from the sole cause of racialization, as contacts between the two sides have long moved beyond sporadic interactions and include a comprehensive array of exchanges. Importantly, racialized politics and narratives are fused with strategic interests, historical “racial” knowledge, and political expression. In doing so, we challenged common programmatic rhetorical claims to a Sino-African relationship and proposed paths to mitigate racialized ideas of hierarchy and difference—for instance, through educational awareness, legislation, or greater transparency of economic relations.

This article also offers several avenues for future research. More empirically backed, case-specific studies by Sinologists and Africanists could uncover additional insight by further unpacking contextual, cultural, and historical nuances for understanding the role of “race” and “racism” in China–Africa encounters. While the article offered generic propositions to confront racial tensions, it did not delve into the specific contours, nuances, and challenges of crafting and implementing appropriate “race” legislation and education frameworks across Chinese and African settings. As such, we invite scholars, particularly from legal, public administration, and pedagogical backgrounds, to engage with such questions and think of policy formulations in this regard. Another interesting perspective lies on the comparison of the Chinese–African encounter with other South-South racializations, as well as how these differ from North-South interactions. Moreover, further research is needed to understand how Chinese–African contacts—and the role of “race” therewith—develop in light of ever-changing global, regional, and local circumstances. For instance, how do the enduring consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (leading, for example, to widespread protests and clashes over China’s severe policies) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (aggravating food shortages and reshuffling commodity markets) impinge on racialization processes? “Race” will undoubtedly remain an important shaper of China–Africa relations, but whether racialized divisions and inequalities will be aggravated, attenuated, or take on alternative dimensions remains to be seen.