Stronger Alone? Canadian Homeland Defence Amid Great Power Competition

Abstract

Canada faces an unprecedented convergence of threats from Russia, China, and the US, including coercive annexation attempts, Arctic competition, and the aggressive pursuit of critical natural resources. The Canadian Armed Forces is incapable of independently defending its territory against this confluence of threats. This article evaluates three plausible deterrence pathways available to Ottawa: reconfigured alliances, Total Defence, and nuclear weapons acquisition. This article contends that there is only one option that is both feasible and effective: a citizen-centred whole-of-society model that leverages Canada's geography and societal resilience to impose prohibitive costs on any prospective aggressor. A Total Defence strategy is the most realistic pathway to safeguard Canadian sovereignty in an era of renewed great power conquest.

The future of Canadian sovereignty is now deeply uncertain. Not only do China and Russia continue to pursue ambitions in the Canadian Arctic, but severe threats now also come from Canada's southern border. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated his desire to coercively annex both Canada and Greenland, threats that have caused diplomatic crises within the NATO alliance. ¹ A new era of great power coercion has begun, and the risk of major global war is high.

China has signalled its intent to annex Taiwan, as Russia pursues ever more land seizure in Ukraine while pursuing hybrid operations against NATO allies. The US perpetrated illegal military attacks on Venezuela and Iran in early 2026 and has made additional threats of illegal operations against Cuba, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico. These hostile actions signal a collapse of the rule of law and fracture of the global order. As Russia, China, and the US alike embrace military conquest, Canada faces an unprecedented and existential threat to its sovereignty. ²

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is unprepared to address the magnitude of these threats and cannot defend the homeland from a large-scale military attack. This weakness was decades in the making, born of complacency, dependency, and an idealistic belief in its friendship with the US and the strength of the liberal international order. Ottawa now faces the consequences of years of inadequate defence spending and unhealthy reliance on US power preponderance. The most significant threat facing Canada today is the fact that the CAF is unable to mount a solo defence of its own territory.

A direct US military attack on Canada currently remains a low probability but extremely high impact scenario, one which warrants a strategic pivot. Yet the worst-case scenario of direct invasion is not the only risk; Canada must also contend with threats of grey-zone tactics, illegal territorial violations, new forms of coercion, and even the probability of major global war. To survive in this complex new security environment, it is imperative that Canada take rapid and drastic steps to deter threats. This will be a challenge for Canadians who have little experience taking full responsibility for the costs of their national defence. Yet to address the risks on the horizon, citizens will be asked to do far more than meet enhanced NATO defence spending obligations. In fact, the country must prepare to defend itself without the help of allies.

This will be a sharp pivot in the Canadian mentality. The idea that Canada does not “fight alone” is as ingrained in the Canadian defence establishment as the “rules-based international order” is in Canadian foreign affairs. ³ Yet these old ideas are misaligned with the realities of the emerging multipolar era. Solely relying on old alliances for protection is no longer a responsible national defence strategy. ⁴

As a democracy, Canadian citizens will have to agree on a new approach through a national debate, based on an accurate assessment of defence capabilities. Whether citizens like it or not, however, there are only a handful of realistic options available to Ottawa that could deter violence. The range of available choices is limited to the following three pathways: (1) reconfigured alliances, (2) whole-of-society defence, and (3) nuclear weapons acquisition.

None of these three options are as stable and comfortable as the bygone era of friendly alliances, safe borders, and NATO supremacy. But to survive in this hostile new world, Canadian leaders and citizens alike must look starkly at the facts and rationally evaluate these options, with a clear calculation and honest assessment of the costs, risks, and efficacy of each approach.

As a step in that effort, this paper uncovers an inverse relationship between the ease and the effectiveness of these three available options. The easiest defence strategies Canada could adopt are also the least likely to successfully deter foreign aggression, whereas the harder strategic pivots are more likely to uphold national security. This insight is important because less disruptive defence strategies may appeal to voters who are wary of major changes, but those strategies will be useless if they fail to deter threats.

Through this analysis, the paper identifies a clear winner among the three options: whole-of-society defence. The most viable and effective deterrence strategy that Canada can adopt is to proactively develop a comprehensive model to respond to major disasters and wars, which mobilizes all citizens to participate in a collective, sustained effort. The Canadian government has already expressed interest in developing a whole-of-society approach for Canada, but its success will require a dramatic change in attitude by both citizens and the state.

Most notably, there is currently no existing model of whole-of-society defence that relies solely on volunteer contributions, and the idea of mandatory military service might shock and unsettle Canada's voting public. An honest and open national conversation on how to build a successful whole-of-society defence model is therefore necessary. To remain unviolated, Canadian citizens from all walks of life must engage in frank discussion about mandatory service and citizen responsibility, lest they ignore the warnings and leave the country exposed to danger.

A nation exposed: Why threats to Canada are real and serious

Canada now faces real and serious security threats on three fronts: Russia, China, and the US. Some citizens have tried to dismiss recent American threats to Canada's sovereignty and territorial integrity as exemplary of Trump's rhetorical style, distracting bluster, or a negotiation tactic. That assessment is incorrect. The scholarly literature clearly identifies concrete, strategic reasons why the US and other hostile superpowers are incentivized to pursue an expansionist agenda that would threaten Canadian security. ⁵

The key factor behind this expansionist push is the change in the global balance of power. ⁶ Although the US remains the world's strongest military, it is experiencing relative power decline vis-à-vis peer competitors. After decades of uncontested US dominance, two key watershed moments served to catalyze concerns about the future of American hegemony. First, in 2021 China launched a hypersonic missile test that surpassed American capabilities, shocked military officials at the Pentagon, and triggered a new arms race. ⁷ Second, in February 2022, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, aimed at pushing back perceived NATO encroachment, and then launched a diplomatic blitz campaign across the African continent to shore up support. ⁸ Within a few short months, the international system entered a volatile new tripartite Cold War. The scholarship shows that when a declining hegemon perceives that a rising competitor could overtake its dominant position, it is more likely to engage in proactive military aggression to defend its privileged status. ⁹ This research clearly predicted that the US would behave aggressively in response to China's rise, and to a lesser extent, Russia's resurgence. ¹⁰

The reason this great power confrontation affects countries like Canada or Ukraine is because nuclear weapons make it too dangerous for these superpowers to fight each other directly. Instead, China, Russia, and the US have turned to their respective geographic neighbourhoods, seeking regional domination to project their strength on the world stage. Rather than risking nuclear escalations or fighting proxy wars in faraway places, each has concentrated efforts on controlling territories and resources proximate to their own homelands. China has pursued this regional dominance through its illegal “Ten Dash” line in the South China Sea, whereas Russia has annexed territory in Ukraine and destabilized other Eastern European countries. ¹¹ Trump has also embraced this “continentalist geopolitics” approach, focusing on regional domination of the Americas. ¹² The November 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States explicitly states power preponderance in the Western Hemisphere – and control over critical mineral supply chains – as top US security goals. ¹³

Critical minerals are another key reason that Canada and Greenland have been specifically targeted, as both are rich in the exact types of natural resources that the US needs to keep up with other great powers. Russia, China, and the US are in direct competition for control of rare earth materials that are essential for maintaining parity with each other. ¹⁴ Critical minerals are essential ingredients in most modern technology, including electronic devices, semiconductor chips, digital technologies and artificial intelligence, solar panels, batteries, and military equipment. Without these resources, the US cannot maintain technological superiority.

This has become a strategic priority for the US because China has established a near-monopoly over the world's critical mineral and rare earth supply chains, controlling an estimated 85% of processing capacity. ¹⁵ This puts the US in a compromised position. In fact, as trade tensions between the US and China worsened, in October 2025 China announced sweeping new export restrictions on rare earth materials, a move widely perceived as a bargaining tool to secure tariff concessions in negotiations with Trump. That incident further exposed how dependent the US is on Chinese-controlled supply chains.

It is therefore unsurprising that Trump has urgently pursued new deals with Japan and Australia aimed at diversifying American access to critical minerals and their processing. In other cases, American pursuit of rare earths has been demonstrably more coercive and exploitative. ¹⁶ For example, in his tense meeting with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in 2024, Trump was intently focused on securing American control over Ukraine's vast mineral resources. ¹⁷ Ultimately, the deal between Ukraine and the US committed to a sharing of profits from Ukraine's future sale of minerals and energy reserves, which serves as “a strong signal that the Trump administration is embedding minerals into its foreign policy.” ¹⁸

Trump's annexation threats against Canada and Greenland are an even more coercive expression of this policy approach. ¹⁹ Both Canada and Greenland have vast untapped endowments of critical minerals that Washington views as essential for its national defence and technological supremacy. Canada has one of the world's largest known reserves of rare earth elements, estimated at 15.2 million tonnes of rare earth oxide. Greenland also has large, untapped reserves of rare earths that are critical to the development of most advanced military technology. And unlike Japan and Australia, Canada and Greenland are geographically located in the immediate regional neighbourhood of the US.

The fact that the Trump administration attempted to coercively and illegally annex Greenland in January 2026 was an unprecedentedly aggressive move in pursuit of these coveted resources. Even though Carney and European heads of state rallied to deter Trump in the short term, the relational damage has been catastrophic. Even as Trump's attention has moved towards Iran, the threat and the escalation against Greenland continue to loom over the NATO alliance. ²⁰

For Canada and Denmark (which is responsible for the defence of Greenland), it would be professionally negligent for political and military leaders to delay action in response to an evolving threat landscape involving three hostile superpowers. It is worth noting that Sweden has never once been overtly threatened with annexation by Russian President Vladimir Putin but has a comprehensive defence plan for that scenario. In stark contrast, Canada faces threats from three rival superpowers, and the CAF is profoundly unprepared and unequipped to respond to them.

The responsible time to address these security threats is as soon as they are detectable. By the time a hostile army is amassing at the border, it is too late.

Defending Canada without rules and allies

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada's approach to international security has centred on (1) promoting the primacy of the rules-based international order as enshrined in the UN Charter, and (2) upholding alliance relationships with the US and with NATO. Unfortunately, in the emerging multipolar order, both of those old pillars are crumbling.

First, as Carney stated in his landmark speech at Davos in January 2026, Canada can no longer count on the rules-based international order for the protection of its sovereignty and security. The UN Charter Article 2(4) unequivocally prohibits wars of territorial expansion and violations of state sovereignty; however, these laws only work when powerful countries are willing to abide by them. ²¹ In the emerging multipolar order, the US, Russia, and China have all engaged in illegal military aggression; moreover, all three are interested in controlling resources in the Canadian Arctic. This means Canada must be prepared to defend against illegal incursions from three superpowers.

Second, Canada can no longer solely trust that its alliance relationships will safeguard its sovereignty, especially if threats of territorial annexation come from the US. For many decades, Canada has relied heavily on two main defensive agreements, both of which are dependent on US power: the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NORAD is an exclusive Canada-US military cooperative arrangement, which aims at the timely detection of aerospace and maritime activity across North America. NORAD was developed in 1958 to serve as an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile attacks from Russia during the Cold War. Given its close cooperation in NORAD, Canada has always trusted that it is protected by the US nuclear umbrella. The credibility of those security guarantees has, however, been undermined by President Trump's comments that the US is not obligated to defend Canada.

Canada also cannot afford wishful thinking that the NATO alliance can or will be able to protect it from attacks to its sovereignty. NATO was formed in 1949, and its fundamental purpose was to protect member states from the Soviet Union. In Article 5 of the NATO Charter, signatories agree to consider an attack on any one member to be an attack on them all. This collective self-defence mechanism was designed to deter Moscow from aggressive actions against member states. ²² Yet this alliance is primarily designed to defend against Russian aggression in Europe, and it is extremely unlikely that any European members of NATO would be willing or able to mount a strong defence of Canada in the event of a crisis.

Given that the US has actively threatened Canadian sovereignty, the two traditional pillars of Ottawa's thinking – the rules-based international order and the maintenance of decades-old defence partnerships – are no longer sufficient tools for national defence. Trump's trade war, hard foreign policy stance, and threats of annexation have damaged ties with Ottawa so thoroughly that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney outright declared that the old relationship with the US is “over”.

Yet, in a future scenario where Canada can no longer rely on NATO or NORAD, how could Canada deter military aggression and threats to its sovereignty by rival superpowers? The sheer asymmetry in military power puts Canada in an insurmountable deficit. Even if Canada spent every penny of its national budget on military procurement, it could not achieve parity with either the US, Russia, or China. Regardless of whether Canada buys American F-35s, Swedish Gripens, or South Korean KF-21s, it cannot match a superpower. While it is necessary that Canada purchases new equipment, there is no way that Canada could achieve its defence objectives through the acquisition of new aircraft or submarines. The math is impossible to overcome. In any one-on-one conventional war with a superpower, Canada loses.

What then could Canada possibly do to deter or withstand an attack from a major power?

The answer to that question must begin with three key presuppositions. First, any direct conflict with a hostile superpower would be an asymmetric war, in which Canada assumes the weaker position. ²³ Second, it is structurally impossible for Canada to achieve military parity with the US, Russia, or China at any point in the foreseeable future. And third, there are a limited number of effective ways that weaker parties in asymmetric conflicts can defend themselves. These foundational assumptions ensure a realistic assessment of what it would take to successfully deter an attack on Canadian territory.

Three deterrence strategies

Deterrence works when the imposed cost of an action is higher than its expected benefit. ²⁴ That means a hostile superpower is less likely to attack Canada if the risks of invasion are higher than the value of seizing our natural resources. Given that Canada is extremely resource-rich and poorly defended, that presents a challenge. Russia, China, and the US are all aggressively competing with each other over control of strategic territories and critical minerals, and Trump has explicitly indicated that he is willing to coerce his own allies and even violate his alliances to seize their assets. ²⁵ Yet, the research on deterrence posits that decision-makers should refrain from such aggression if they perceive the costs of their actions to outweigh their returns. ²⁶ Canada's responsibility is therefore to create a defence strategy that guarantees high costs to any invader.

Canada has three options to achieve that deterrence objective: (1) reconfigured alliances, (2) whole-of-society defence, and (3) nuclear weapons acquisition. These three options are not equal in terms of difficulty, risk, or effectiveness. The first option, which is to reconfigure and strengthen Canada's existing defensive alliances, is already consistent with Canada's current defence strategy. It would therefore be the easiest for Canadians to accept, and the least disruptive path for Ottawa to pursue. Unfortunately, it is also the most likely to fail.

The second option, to build a whole-of-society defence system, would ask Canadians to accept full responsibility for their defence in ways that they have not considered for over a hundred years. While whole-of-society defence is an effective strategy, it is also likely to receive pushback from voters who are not willing to accept the added responsibilities that this approach would impose on ordinary citizens.

Finally, the nuclear option would constitute a very strong deterrent against invasion but would be exceedingly difficult to achieve. Not only would this require a withdrawal from international treaties that would destabilize the entire system, but the process of developing a nuclear bomb would also be provocative, costly, and time-consuming. ²⁷ There is a clear paradox in choosing this path. Having a nuclear weapon in hand can deter would-be aggressors, but the process of acquiring a nuclear weapon might pre-emptively attract aggression.

Although these strategies are neither mutually exclusive nor incompatible, they do each carry their own distinct cost-benefit calculations. As Canada adapts to rapidly changing global threats, it is therefore imperative to weigh the risks, costs, and effectiveness of each of these three options.

Option 1: Reconfiguring alliances

The first option Canada can pursue is to bolster its alliances with other countries to ensure collective self-defence against any hostile attack by any superpower. NATO is already a collective self-defence organization, and the Carney government is already seeking to bolster its European ties within the existing alliance. ²⁸ The first step in that process is to increase defence spending to meet NATO's new benchmark of allocating 5% of GDP to defence by 2035. The NATO alliance is not, however, designed to address intra-alliance threats from other member states. For NATO to have true value to Ottawa, all its members would need to guarantee the collective defence of Canadian sovereignty from any aggressors, including the US. Using NATO to defend members against American – not Russian – aggression constitutes an existential identity crisis for the alliance. This crisis occurred in January 2026, when several western European members of NATO rallied to protect Greenland, causing Trump to back down on threats to use military force to achieve annexation. The fact that NATO members had to use military signals to deter American aggression profoundly destabilized confidence in the integrity of the alliance.

NATO members first attempted to address the Greenland crisis diplomatically using strongly worded statements. ²⁹ Yet the Trump administration refused to back down, and White House deputy chief-of-staff Stephen Miller stated, “Nobody's going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland.” ³⁰ The escalation resulted in an unprecedented standoff, as several European allies deployed military resources to Greenland, signaling to Trump that any attempt at annexation would require fighting Western allies. After a tussle of tariff threats, Trump backed down. This was a crucial win for Canada and European allies but also revealed severe cracks in alliance integrity.

This fracture is very serious, as NATO Secretary Mark Rutte warned in late 2025 that Russia is already engaged in covert destabilization campaigns against member states and could launch an attack on a NATO ally within five years. ³¹ A weakened NATO not only jeopardizes Europe, but also potentially leaves Canada exposed. In a fight on two fronts, expecting overextended European allies to cross the Atlantic to protect Canada would be a tall order. The far more likely scenario is that Canada would be fighting alone.

The destabilization of the NATO alliance places both Canada and Europe in a high-risk situation. Deterrence through collective security only works if the alliance has the collective strength to impose serious costs on a prospective aggressor. From a raw military standpoint, the existing scholarship shows that without US backing, NATO allies are unable to meet their own defence needs. ³² Although European countries are aggressively working to increase their military capabilities, they have yet to achieve that capacity. ³³ Without the US, Europe is unprepared to deter Russia. And if Europe is at war with Russia, it would be unable to come to Canada's defence against the US.

Amid this extreme volatility, it would be irresponsible for Ottawa to pretend that NORAD and NATO are designed to meet the spectrum of new security threats on Canada's horizon. Although Canada is accustomed to achieving its defence objectives through alliances, this strategy is the riskiest option with the highest chance of failure. Canada should continue to maintain these alliances but must also conduct a realistic and honest calculation of how those alliances are likely to behave in future scenarios. Even more, Canadian leaders need to think carefully about what they can meaningfully contribute to the alliance, which would encourage other members to make firmer commitments to the Canadian homeland. It is a failing strategy to show up hat-in-hand and expect other allies to carry the costs of Canadian territorial defence. The stronger Canada's raw military capabilities are, the more likely other allies will be confident to rally together for collective defence. The next two options address those concerns.

Option 2: Total defence

The second option is to adopt a “whole-of-society” approach to defence designed to create a strong domestic resistance to any invasion. A whole-of-society approach brings together both military and civil defence forces, as well as public and private stakeholders across society, to defend the state and its citizens. ³⁴ The objective of this approach is to build a society that is so inherently difficult to attack or occupy that a would-be aggressor decides the costs are simply not worth the effort.

Turning the whole-of-society idea into action, many countries have built “Total Defence” strategies that mobilize all citizens – across military, economic, and other civilian domains–to contribute to the collective protection of the state. ³⁵ Total Defence strategies start with the assumption that all citizens must play a role in national security and emergency response, and are responsible for contributing to the protection of their country and their homes.

Many of Canada's democratic allies have already adopted their own whole-of-society strategies, including Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Singapore, and Taiwan. Many approaches draw from Taiwanese doctrine, called the “Porcupine Strategy”, which aims to signal to China that if Beijing attempts to “eat” Taiwan, it will be a very painful meal. Retired General Gustav Hägglund from Finland aptly explains this analogy, stating, “The metaphor symbolizes deterrence through resilience. Russia – the bear – may be powerful, but attacking Finland – the porcupine – should be made so painful and so costly that it would never be worth the attempt.” ³⁶

There are several reasons why a comparable strategy would meet Canada's domestic security needs. First, adopting a “porcupine” approach would address Canada's defence spending deficit while building capabilities that directly protect the homeland. Second, it would serve as an effective deterrent against threats to Canadian sovereignty from hostile superpowers, without depending on commitments from any other allies. Third, it could help build and strengthen Canada's national identity and improve civic responsibility. Fourth, the approach could offer valuable paid opportunities to young people, which would train them in practical skills that align with their preferred professional fields. Fifth, it would build resilience into the fabric of Canadian society, including defending against grey-zone threats and responding to other emergencies and natural disasters.

Although there is no singular model of Total Defence across all countries, the goal of the approach is to be able to quickly mobilize multiple sectors of society – including but not limited to military and police forces, civil defence units, civil society organizations, public servants, and private companies – to protect society from attacks and disasters. More than just a military framework, Total Defence aims at enhanced societal and national resilience in the face of major disasters, with civilians and businesses playing key roles in keeping core state functions running under extreme stress. These tasks include maintaining food security and fuel distribution, caring for vulnerable populations, protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring cybersecurity and resilience against disinformation campaigns, and supporting emergency and medical services. Total Defence seeks to cultivate emergency preparedness and readiness from all societal institutions, as well as establish a clear set of responsibilities that all citizens know they must meet. The approach integrates both military and civil defence into a holistic approach to resilience and response.

A crucial advantage of the Total Defence approach is that it not only addresses worst-case scenarios of asymmetric war, but also builds capacity to deal with a wide range of lower-level threats, including grey-zone tactics such as weaponized disinformation. Russia, China, and the United States have all been caught using hostile disinformation campaigns and political manipulation to destabilize other states, including Canada. ³⁷ In fact, although the US has not yet directly attacked Canadian territory, it has already destabilized Canadian sovereignty by covertly backing the separatist movement in Alberta. ³⁸

A whole-of-society approach could help tackle grey-zone threats from the Americans, Russians, Chinese, and others. Sweden's Total Defence model includes a plan to defend against disinformation and election interference campaigns by training citizens through its new “Psychological Defence Agency”. Finland's comprehensive security strategy counters disinformation through media literacy taught in schools and across society, with excellent results. ³⁹ These types of Total Defence interventions require no military footprint but improve resilience against grey-zone and hybrid threats. As the Finns note, of the fifty-six strategic tasks in their comprehensive security strategy, fifty-four are non-military objectives, and only two tasks require the armed forces. ⁴⁰

That said, it is impossible to develop any whole-of-society defence model that does not include the cultivation of a strong domestic fighting force. Indeed, the reason smaller and mid-sized countries embrace these comprehensive security strategies is because they want to deter asymmetric military threats from larger powers. Total Defence offers that deterrence. It is well known that ordinary citizens can, in fact, defeat superpowers using nothing more than small arms and light weapons. ⁴¹ The US and Russia have both been trounced in the past by well-armed resistance movements and have experienced the risks of becoming ensnared in costly forever wars. A Total Defence model capitalizes on that advantage by creating a defence-ready population that is able and willing to inflict serious damage. It signals to prospective aggressors that invasion will be costly, long, and brutal, and ultimately end in failure.

Building this “porcupine” model requires a large, well-armed, and well-trained domestic population that is ready to defend the country from a foreign invasion. To that end, every single country in the world that has currently adopted Total Defence requires mandatory military service. ⁴² While there are different models of conscription across these countries, including universal military service, lottery-driven service, and selective compulsory service, there is no existing version that relies wholly on voluntary enlistment. ⁴³ Given that Canadians have historically had a strong aversion to conscription, any plan to build a Total Defence model for Canada will require a frank conversation about the issue of mandatory service requirements. ⁴⁴ The presence of a large, well-trained fighting force is the necessary ingredient for Total Defence to work. Fifty thousand new soldiers are not nearly enough to achieve that deterrent capability; to succeed, Canada would need to train and retain an auxiliary reserve force of half a million fighters, exclusively dedicated to homeland defence and no other military tasks.

A force that size should convince any prospective aggressor – even a superpower – that it will face high risks, low rewards, skyrocketing costs, and decades-long timelines if it dares to invade. The fact is that superpowers can and do lose wars to strong domestic resistance fighters. And they know it. Most members of the French Resistance, the Viet Cong, and the Afghan Mujahideen were regular civilians who learned how to fight against hostile superpowers through hard-won experience and on-the-job training. In highly asymmetric conflicts, the one key factor that can reverse the fortunes of a more powerful aggressor is the presence of a large domestic fighting force that is committed to resistance and willing to use irregular warfare against invaders. ⁴⁵ Simply put, when fighting a superpower invader, guerrilla warfare works much better than conventional methods. ⁴⁶ This approach is also highly durable. Even if the state collapses or the government surrenders, resistance fighters can deny invaders victory indefinitely.

Irregular warfare turns power asymmetry on its head, as occupation forces must spend exorbitant amounts of resources to hold territory, whereas defenders spend a fraction of that cost to deny them victory. Resistance fighters can treat waging war as a secret, part-time job, using ambushes, raids, and surprise attacks to slowly bleed an invading army. Local communities support these fighters by giving them safe havens, cover, and material support. These citizens can also engage in forms of “everyday resistance,” using millions of passive-aggressive episodes of sabotage to frustrate and drain the enemy. ⁴⁷

Were Canada to adopt a Total Defence approach, it would send this deterrent message to any and all prospective aggressors. There are many reasons why Canada could leverage a new Total Defence model to make itself an unattractive target for invasion. To start, Canada's geography is quite amenable to resistance-style fighting, and the presence of a well-trained defence force would make it easy for Canadians to trap invaders in a frustrating military quagmire. With vast forests and rugged mountains, Canada's terrain is an insurgents’ paradise that cannot be conquered and controlled. ⁴⁸ A large and trained domestic force could leverage this terrain to sustain a resistance indefinitely, with the support of local communities.

While Canada currently has a pacific and genial reputation, the reality is that any resistance-based war on the North American continent would be exponentially more violent than other modern insurgencies. Even if only 1 percent of all resisting Canadians engaged in armed insurrection, that would constitute a 400,000-person insurgency, nearly ten times the size of the Taliban at the start of the Afghan war. ⁴⁹ If a fraction of that number engaged in violent attacks, with easy access to critical infrastructure targets, it would set fire to the entire continent. It costs tens of billions of dollars to build an energy pipeline, and a few thousand to blow one up.

Even if a superpower aggressor responded with missiles and drone strikes, that approach to counterinsurgency is known to fail. ⁵⁰ Research clearly shows that the harder occupying forces strike, the larger and more fragmented the insurgency becomes, making it impossible to achieve either a military victory or a negotiated agreement. ⁵¹ The Americans and Russians have both experienced the crippling frustration of insurgencies and should be familiar with the high costs and low returns of so-called forever wars. The prospect of having to fight a well-trained and highly motivated domestic population on a decades-long timeline should be a clear deterrent to invasion. Even for a power-drunk dictator, Total Defence is a sobering reality check.

Adopting a porcupine strategy would therefore signal that any attempt to occupy Canada would be a futile effort, leading to a brutal insurgency from which there would be no escape. That signal is so serious that it should deter any ambitions to annex Canadian territory. However, for this deterrence to work, the prospective aggressor must be convinced that the threat is real. As dominant players in the international system, superpowers often suffer from severe overconfidence bias, expecting an easy victory over weaker targets. ⁵² This overconfidence bias can result in miscalculations and terrible and destructive outcomes. The solution is to slap the hostile superpower with a reality check, so that decision-makers clearly see the risks of invasion and back off before making perilous mistakes. Building a population-centred Total Defence model can send this strong signal, without any provocative actions towards external actors. Total Defence is an inherently inward-focused homeland defence strategy, which cannot easily be misread as offensive aggression.

That said, it is important to recognize that Total Defence offers an imperfect deterrent against aggression. After two decades of failed and costly military occupations, superpowers should be wary of creating forever wars, especially in their own backyards. Unfortunately, China's December 2025 military drills against Taiwan, Russia's military push to seize more territory in Ukraine, and the February 2026 US and Israeli illegal war on Iran reveal a failure to have learned this lesson. Yet this evidence only further affirms the argument that Canada needs to build a whole-of-society approach to its national defence, and fast.

Hostile foreign leaders may still disregard the warnings, succumb to overconfidence, or repeat past mistakes that have led to disastrous invasions. Even in that unhappy scenario, however, any countries that have a functioning Total Defence model will be better off than those that failed to build a whole-of-society plan for resilience and survival.

Option 3: Nuclear weapons acquisition

Alliances and whole-of-society defence may provide Canada with some protections, but the ultimate deterrent tool is the nuclear weapon. Canada is already a nuclear-threshold state and could choose to develop its own nuclear weapons program. ⁵³ It has both the knowledge and the raw materials to build its own weapons, and Canada is in a better position to cross the nuclear threshold than most European countries.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. As Iranians and Iraqis well know, countries with nuclear weapons do not get invaded, whereas countries without have no such deterrent ability. Even a small nuclear arsenal is an effective deterrent, as long as second-strike capabilities can be demonstrated. ⁵⁴ The North Koreans have an estimated 50 launch-capable nuclear weapons, whereas the US has over 5,000. ⁵⁵ But, as long as Pyongyang can convincingly threaten that it can hit even one American city, that is a serious enough threat to push the US to de-escalate tensions. Iran, which had no such deterrent capability, has failed to prevent illegal Israeli and American attacks.

Nuclear weapons are therefore successful deterrents, but only a small and aggressive group of countries have these weapons. For any others to acquire them would constitute a violation of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the last remaining nuclear arms control treaties in the world. If Canada or any other democratic allies were to withdraw from the NPT, the treaty would collapse, opening the door to all other countries to seek out their own nuclear arsenals. The result would be a world with far more nuclear weapons, and therefore more risk of catastrophic accidents. ⁵⁶ The integrity of the 1968 NPT is therefore a crucial consideration in this decision, especially because several other nuclear control treaties have failed in the past decade alone.

Yet, because the US has introduced uncertainty about protection under its nuclear security umbrella, the NPT is now under pressure. The Trump administration's disdain for democratic allies has prompted a global rethink on proliferation, especially among allies that would be dangerously undefended without a nuclear deterrent. European allies are now looking to France and the United Kingdom to create a new nuclear umbrella. ⁵⁷ South Korea is debating whether to build nuclear weapons of its own. ⁵⁸

The problem of democratic backsliding adds to these concerns, as leading scholars argue that the US is moving dangerously closer to a competitive authoritarian system, such that even if elections continue, the country will no longer have a fundamentally democratic character. ⁵⁹ If the US does indeed slide into competitive authoritarianism, that would mean the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons would be in the hands of undemocratic countries. The US has 5277 nuclear weapons, Russia has 5449, and China has an estimated 600 and is rapidly expanding its arsenal. ⁶⁰ In contrast, Britain has 225 and France has 290. ⁶¹ If democratic decline in the US does not quickly reverse itself, then the world's democracies will have a total of 515 nuclear weapons, whereas authoritarian states will have over eleven thousand. Even though France has declared it will increase its nuclear arsenal, this democratic nuclear deficit is a serious future security concern.

Adding to the risk of democratic backsliding is the fact that Trump has previously stated that he may not uphold nuclear security guarantees to allies, including Canada. Some Canadians hope that British and French nuclear weapons could protect Canada, but the UK and France have a much smaller arsenal and would be carrying the responsibility of nuclear deterrence for the entire European continent. It is not feasible to maintain a defensive posture against Russia while credibly committing to cover Canada from multiple threats as well. It is also inconceivable that either the UK or France would signal a nuclear deterrent threat to the US; the only direction that the UK and France can aim their nuclear weapons is towards Russia.

An alternative is for Canada to develop its own independent nuclear arsenal. Instead of asking the UK and France to further stretch their limited arsenals, Canada could take responsibility for its own nuclear defence. It already has the raw materials and technical know-how to develop and test a nuclear weapon. Although Canada does not currently have enriched uranium, it does have significant uranium deposits and could work towards enrichment capabilities. It could also use its plutonium reserves to build weapons quicker. With respect to deployment, Canada would also need to develop launch capabilities. While this would be an expensive and time-consuming endeavour, Canada has the materials and know-how to achieve this goal.

Once across the nuclear threshold, Canada would have a bulletproof defence of its homeland from all prospective aggressors. It could then work with the UK and France as an equal and reliable partner, contributing to a democratic nuclear umbrella to protect vulnerable allies across Europe. Rather than going hat-in-hand to its overburdened British and French allies, Canada could invest in its own nuclear weapons program, which could then be added to the nuclear umbrella protecting other democratic allies.

This would require formal withdrawal from the 1968 NPT, but that action could be coordinated with European and other democratic allies to diffuse potential pushback. As the rules-based international order collapses, it is possible that these international agreements may collapse anyway. If that shift occurred on the world stage, Canada could work with its allies to justify crossing the nuclear threshold as part of a collective defence of liberal democracies.

Of the three options, nuclear weapons acquisition is the most dangerous defence strategy. ⁶² The issue is a matter of timing. On the one hand, once a country has a working nuclear weapon in hand, it can deter aggression and safeguard its sovereignty. Having a nuclear weapon is a significant deterrent. On the other hand, seeking a nuclear weapon is very risky. As soon as a country tries to acquire a nuclear weapon, it is perceived as having aggressive intentions, which will trigger a security dilemma and conflict escalation. ⁶³ This can even lead to proactive attacks to prevent nuclear weapons acquisition. Every second before a successful nuclear test is high risk.

It is also impossible to develop a nuclear weapons program without detection, and there is no way that Canada could pursue this path in secret. Rather, the only safe way to proceed would be if the US agreed to allow Canada to develop its own independent nuclear program. Under normal circumstances, this would be highly unlikely. ⁶⁴ However, these are not normal circumstances, and the American government has strongly demanded that NATO countries stop relying on the US military and nuclear security umbrella. Trump has clearly stated that he is unhappy that the US is paying for the security of other countries, and that he wants those countries to spend their own money on their own defence. Nuclear weapons acquisition complies with his demand.

Given that Trump's administration does not adhere to traditional ideas in foreign and defence policy or international law, it is theoretically possible that an unusual window of opportunity may open for some non-nuclear countries to cross the threshold in the foreseeable future. It is possible, although not at all guaranteed, that this administration will not care to enforce old rules around nuclear non-proliferation. It is therefore worth investigating whether a unique moment to cross the nuclear threshold could emerge, without causing a provocation. If the Americans are uninterested in indefinitely extending their nuclear umbrella to other countries, and they also do not care about enforcing adherence to the NPT, then countries like South Korea, Poland, and Canada could potentially walk through that open door.

Of course, it is also entirely possible that the idea of a Canadian nuclear program may provoke an extreme reaction, so much so that the option becomes untenable. If the Americans panic and threaten pre-emptive action, the risks of pursuing a nuclear option would outweigh its benefits. Ottawa would have to abandon the idea and work on de-escalation and restoration of trust. Broaching the subject is perhaps best left to informal channels in the preliminary stages of discussion. Nevertheless, in such unusual times, it is possible that the US will have an atypical reaction to the idea.

The pursuit of nuclear weapons is a dangerous path, but once a country becomes a nuclear power, it enjoys a considerable degree of deterrence and stability. The risks of pursuing this option are significant. However, amid many volatile changes in American foreign policy, if US posture on the 1968 NPT changes, then the possibility of proliferation is worth investigating.

Building a truly strong north

Canadian government and military officials understand that threats to Canadian sovereignty are real and serious. They know drastic action must be taken, yet there are only so many ways that Canada can respond to superpower threats. While Ottawa has worked hard to bolster ties with its other democratic allies, none of these partnerships are sufficient to indefinitely deter aggression from any superpowers. And while Canada is a nuclear threshold state, there is currently no collective withdrawal from the NPT that would make proliferation possible, and Prime Minister Carney has reiterated that Canada has no plans for nuclear proliferation. Moreover, both alliances and nuclear weapons cannot mitigate many of the new coercive threats Canada faces, such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, political interference, and arguably even limited military incursions.

That leaves only one viable option for Canada: Total Defence.

The Canadian government and military appear to be discussing this behind closed doors. An internal Department of Defence document from May 2025 revealed that the Canadian government has begun aspirational discussions on how to develop a whole-of-society defence model, including increasing the regular reserves to 100,000 and developing an all-new supplementary reserve force of 300,000 volunteers. ⁶⁵ Canada is also deepening diplomatic and security partnerships with other democratic countries that have adopted a whole-of-society model, most notably Sweden. ⁶⁶ Canada's plans remain in incipient stages and have yet to tackle difficult questions of military recruitment and retention. The government is currently ruling out conscription and instead hoping to achieve its goals through wholly voluntary recruitment.

Yet, Ottawa has yet to broach the topic of whole-of-society defence with its citizens, let alone mandatory military or civil service. ⁶⁷ While this might be a hard pivot for many Canadians, that national conversation is essential. There is ample evidence that the Russian, Chinese, and American governments have real expansionist ambitions, and are willing to use overt and illegal military force for aggrandizement and resource acquisition. This hostile behaviour has eroded the fundamental principles of international law, which have maintained global peace since the end of the Second World War. The age of great power conquest has returned. ⁶⁸ There is no avoiding this miserable fact.

Most Canadians already understand that their security landscape has fundamentally changed but may still struggle to understand and process information about defence spending and procurement, alliance commitments, nuclear weapons treaties, and the credibility of threats. ⁶⁹ Yet it is now impossible for Canadians to remain passive about their national security or on the sidelines of these policy conversations. There is no magic deterrence fairy that can offer Canadians a free and painless alternative. The only way that Canada can successfully protect its sovereignty and security is through a whole-of-society approach, and that means the whole of the citizenry must agree on what those roles and responsibilities should be.

How Canada chooses to implement a Total Defence model is entirely up for debate. But that debate cannot and must not be conducted behind closed doors in the gilded halls of power in Ottawa. A top-down approach will serve to rupture social trust, rather than build the cohesion necessary to make a whole-of-society plan work. It is therefore essential for Canadian citizens to be active participants in the national conversation about Total Defence from the outset, including debates about mandatory versus voluntary service in future supplementary military reserve forces and civil defence corps. The more citizens understand the risk landscape and their roles and responsibilities in it, the more effective a whole-of-society response will be.

This national debate about Total Defence must begin with wide participation across every section of Canadian society and every stratum of power, with a central place for Indigenous nations across the country. Any future model will depend on a unified citizenry that trusts its government and is willing to act collectively in times of crisis. For Canada to develop a successful whole-of-society model, it must therefore start with a whole-of-society conversation that includes everyone who will be called on to serve.