Civilian Readiness and National Security Threats in Canada: A Lesson from the Military

Abstract

The twenty-first century has given rise to a variety of complex political challenges, each with the potential to threaten the national security of Canada. Thus, it is imperative that the government be ready to mount a swift and decisive response at any moment. This paper argues that to do this effectively, Canada must translate and apply the concept of “military readiness” to civilian security planning. Military readiness is a longstanding framework for strategic planning within defence institutions, designed to ensure mission success through the strategic generation of force readiness. As such, it has much to offer for civilian agencies grappling with a broad array of national security threats. Adopting a readiness posture would not only increase the nation's ability to manage security threats, it would also help reassure Canadians that their government is able to protect them in their time of need.

Democratic governments have a specific responsibility for the wellbeing of their people. This responsibility stems from centuries of liberal thought, which grounds the legitimacy and authority of a government in its provision of certain public goods to its citizens. Security is one of these goods. However, the provision of security in the twenty-first century is challenging in its complexity. Political challenges posing real insecurity to Canadians are increasing both in number and complexity, requiring governments to move far beyond traditional notions and tools.

In 2022, a task force on national security was formed at the University of Ottawa to analyze the changing strategic environment as well as Canada's ability to address the diverse array of threats it faces. The expert members of the task force concluded that Canada is “simply not ready today to deal with this range of threats.” ¹ This grim statement should be concerning not only to the Canadian government, but to the Canadian people. Amongst the questions it raises is the one that drives this paper: how should Canada prepare to deal with this range of threats?

Discussions of the military and military spending are the traditional way in which states approach questions of national security; however, many of the threats that Canadians face are not military in nature. Transnational challenges exacerbated by globalization, combined with the effects of climate change and the increasing frequency of natural disasters, create vulnerabilities for Canadians that defy traditional security paradigms. This makes the military institution, for all its benefits, an inappropriate primary responder in the quest for holistic national security. However, as an institution long concerned with the assessment of threats and defence against vulnerabilities, the military has much to teach the Canadian government.

One of these lessons can be found in the concept of “military readiness,” which refers to the process of ensuring that military forces are correctly educated, equipped, and trained for the broad spectrum of missions they are expected to undertake. The goal is mission success, evidenced by a secure nation. This is also the goal of civilian government agencies as they prepare for, and respond to, diverse security threats on the home front. This paper argues that by translating the concept of military readiness into civilian terms, the Canadian government can gain an additional tool for achieving mission success. By incorporating the proactive framework of military readiness into their security planning, various government agencies can increase their readiness to face the challenges of insecurity and, as a result, provide Canadians with greater security in their day-to-day lives.

Changing security environment, unchanging government responsibility

The task force on national security proposed a working definition of national security in Canada, characterizing it as dealing with “threats to the people, democratic values and institutions, economy, society, and sovereignty of Canada on a scale that demands a national response.” ² This definition exhibits a similar breadth to those found in the security strategies of many of Canada's allies. In reading these strategies, one finds a laundry list of dangers and threats that security practitioners are expected to account for in their security planning. ³ This proliferation of threats results from significant changes to the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War that have necessitated a new way of thinking about national security threats and the national response to them. ⁴

Australian professor Michael Evans argues that these changes have been shaped primarily by processes of globalization, which have created what he calls the “globalised security environment.” ⁵ Drawing on Evans’ work, I highlight four important changes in thinking about national security. ⁶ The first is a shift away from a focus on territory to a focus on the people living in that territory: it is the people (individuals and communities) who are vulnerable and need to be secured, not simply the boundaries of the state. This shift is the result of both a return to liberal thinking that reprioritizes the security of the individual (as discussed below) and the softening of state borders brought about by the effects of globalization, which has undermined the state's ability to stop security threats at its borders.

Second, global interconnectedness and the growing influence of non-state actors have increased the unpredictability of security threats. These threats can arise with little to no warning, and can be devastating. ⁷ Evidence of the corresponding shift in thinking can be found in the widespread prominence of risk analysis in strategic planning, as strategists must be aware that vulnerabilities can arise from any sector of society, at any time.

Third, the blurring of lines between jurisdictions (local, national, and international), security institutions (civilian and military security agencies), and sectors (from agriculture to health to defence) has created highly complex and fluid linkages between security challenges. Responding to this complexity requires agile cross-sector collaboration. This concept has become mainstream in strategic planning, observed in the inclusion of language such as “whole-of-government” or “comprehensive approach” in planning documents. ⁸ Agile cross-sector collaboration can lead to greater success in intelligence-sharing and cross-departmental consultation, greater innovation when tackling complex problems, and greater access to a range of security tools tailored to the demands of specific security threats. Recently, this language has evolved to include the idea of “whole-of-society” approaches to security collaboration, which emphasize the need for public engagement in the strategic process.

Finally, as has become clear in recent years, traditional security concerns have not disappeared, and as such, a multi-layered approach to strategic planning is needed. Multi-layered planning accounts not only for a broad spectrum of threats, but also for the ways in which these threats intersect. For example, while broad-spectrum planning requires preparation for natural disasters to take place alongside preparation for war, multi-layered planning requires accounting for the ways in which a natural disaster might influence, or hinder, the nation's ability to respond to external aggression. While all four of these changes are essential to understanding contemporary security planning, this final one underscores the response complexities highlighted in this paper. Civilian and military responses to national security threats must be integrated: the government must ensure that military actors are not siloed within a single sector of national security (defence), but instead are integrated as crucial partners in holistic security planning.

Although ways of thinking about national security have needed to change with the times, the responsibility of democratic governments, including the Canadian government, to secure their people has not changed. Emma Rothschild argues that security has been at the heart of European political thought since the seventeenth century, when it was seen as a condition of individuals. ⁹ Defined as the absence of anxiety and the freedom from care, security included freedom from the prospect of a sudden or violent attack on one's person or property. As Rothschild writes, “Individual security, in the liberal thought of the Enlightenment, is thus both an individual and a collective good. It is a condition, and an objective, of individuals. But it is one that can only be achieved in some sort of collective enterprise.” ¹⁰ Thus, a primary liberal rationale for government was established.

This focus on the individual secured through collective enterprise was subsumed during the Napoleonic era by ideas of territoriality, military supremacy, and the “security of thrones.” ¹¹ However, at the end of the twentieth century, the security conversation circled back to the importance of individual security and the obligation of the state to ensure it. ¹² At the level of global politics, the rationale for considering the individual as the referent of security was established in 1994, with the introduction of the concept of “human security.” ¹³ Building on this, the ideas of “humanitarian intervention” and “responsibility to protect” connected the security of the individual to the responsibility of the state—and, if the state was unable or unwilling to act, to the obligations of the international community. ¹⁴ Taken together, this discourse and the explanatory policy that established these concepts as mainstream global ideas have reinforced the need to understand insecurity from the perspective of the individual and to hold governments accountable for acting on their behalf. Indeed, norms of global politics, such as sovereignty and the state's monopoly on violence, have ensured that no other actor is truly capable of fulfilling this role.

Today, the security threats faced by Canada are formidable, and include disease, the effects of climate change, transnational crime, foreign interference, cyberattacks, and home-grown extremism. Each of these threats is predictably unpredictable: strategists are aware of their potential to cause catastrophic damage to our societies, but they cannot predict exactly when they will occur. New tools are therefore needed to assist governments in preparing for these potential disasters. The concept of military readiness offers such a tool, enabling the Canadian government to fulfill its duty of securing Canadians despite the uncertainties involved.

Military readiness

Military readiness is acknowledged as an essential component of security and defence planning for the simple yet significant reason that a high level of readiness leads to a greater chance that forces will be successful when called to respond. ¹⁵ Success is crucial, as lives depend on the outcome, yet the meaning of “military readiness” has historically been fluid: context-specific, sometimes subjective, and often characterized by an “I’ll know it when I see it” approach. ¹⁶

The Canadian Army defines military readiness as “the capability (people and resources) of a force to carry out missions assigned to it by its government.” ¹⁷ The goal of readiness is to “ensure that a force is prepared, equipped, and able to complete tasks at any time and in any place.” ¹⁸ An analysis of Canadian military documents shows that the word “readiness” is prevalent in defence discourse. One example is the 2024 military doctrine, Fighting Spirit, in which readiness is one of eight professional expectations for those engaged in the “profession of arms” in Canada. In this document, readiness is the outcome of all that the military does to prepare for its missions: the ability to be effective is reliant on the relative level of readiness. ¹⁹ Our North, Strong and Free (ONSAF), the most recently released Canadian defence policy, points to several key components of readiness, including the recruitment and training of personnel, the procurement and maintenance of equipment, and the updating of infrastructure. ²⁰ The phrase “ready, resilient, and relevant” appears several times throughout the document, underscoring the foundational requirements for Canada's military to successfully face the unstable global environment. The report of the chief of defence staff to the House Standing Committee on National Defence in September 2024 supports this concept of readiness, with investments in training, equipment, and infrastructure listed as the necessary elements for increasing the readiness of the Canadian military and meeting the targets set out in ONSAF. ²¹ It is clear that military readiness is important for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); however, these documents do not provide a robust framework for its implementation, and thus it is necessary to look elsewhere in order to operationalize the concept.

Military experts in America have invested considerable effort in developing a more robust framework for the concept and practice of military readiness. The official Department of Defence (DoD) definition of military readiness is “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.” ²² While there is strong consensus on this definition, there are multiple uses of this term across the DoD and its partners. These uses generally collate into two types: comprehensive readiness (referring to the full force of the military and/or the full threat spectrum) and compartmentalized readiness (unit-specific or mission-specific readiness). Both types of readiness are important, as the readiness of individual units is crucial to ensuring the readiness of the entire military force. ²³

Developing a relevant readiness posture is a strategic process, and three questions must be asked to determine the required military readiness posture. ²⁴ First: “Readiness for what?” This question highlights the need to identify potential adversaries and their capabilities, the conditions under which conflict may occur, and the ways in which the military may be asked to respond. ²⁵ Second: “Readiness for when?” Here, military strategists must consider how much time the forces will have to respond to any threat, including unexpected threats that may emerge during peacetime. Third: “Readiness of what?” Which parts of the force must be ready? Which parts must be ready now, and which parts can wait? Taken together, these three questions create a baseline for understanding what the readiness expectations are.

Once a good understanding of the readiness expectations is achieved, military organizations must move to the operational process of building readiness—that is, they must generate ready forces. In this vein, Todd Harrison adds a fourth question to the original three: “How should we achieve readiness?” ²⁶ This is a tactical question that, according to Harrison, is more about resource management than strategy: how defence budgets are spent is just as important as how much money there is in the first place. Much of the writing on readiness generation focuses on human readiness, rather than on the equipment and infrastructural readiness requirements indicated in the conceptual understanding of readiness. G. James Herrera argues that this focus on “warfighters” makes sense, since equipment—such as fighter jets—consists of tools used by individuals to ensure mission success. A focus on people can ensure a dynamic and flexible approach to the use of military equipment. This does not mean that readiness in the other elements is unimportant, however, and Herrera goes on to argue that a holistic assessment of unit readiness will include the other elements as well. ²⁷

Herrera has developed a production line model through which resources can be applied to ensure ongoing generation of ready forces. ²⁸ This model has three stages: building initial readiness (initial training and testing to prepare for stage two), increasing readiness (advanced training and testing to become deployment-ready), and sustaining readiness (ongoing training and testing to ensure readiness for future assignments). Throughout each stage of the production line, agreed-upon metrics are crucial to ensuring that expected levels of readiness are achieved and maintained. ²⁹ In doing so, mission success, while not guaranteed, becomes vastly more likely.

Though military readiness is not a twenty-first century concept, the complexity of the current security environment has increased the need for military forces to be well-prepared for the sake of mission success. ³⁰ Short-notice deployments, rapid crisis response, and mid-operational change all put pressure on the military to respond with agility and expertise. Thus, a strategically considered and well-resourced readiness posture continues to be an essential requirement for any military institution. ³¹ These lessons of readiness—the need for regular strategic assessment of the security environment and ongoing investment in readiness generation—are not only valuable for military institutions, but also provide important guidance for civilian authorities as they work to secure Canadian citizens today.

Translating military readiness for civilian purposes

Using the frameworks outlined above, it is possible to translate the concept of military readiness for defence missions into a useful approach for developing civilian readiness for a wide range of contemporary national security challenges.

Whether discussing military or civilian readiness, the first requirement is a comprehensive assessment of the security environment that answers the first question, “Readiness for what?” In defence terms, the answer generally focuses on traditional security concerns originating from states or non-state organized groups that deploy hard power assets to infringe on Canadian national interests as defined by the government. ³² Traditional threats are not the only concerns that the CAF must contend with, however. The CAF must also be ready to act in “aid to the civil power,” a longstanding requirement that has expanded in scope since the end of the Cold War. ³³ ONSAF articulates this growth, with two of the eight core missions of the CAF now focused on aid to the civil power. These missions are described as follows:

- “Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad,” and

- “Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies.” ³⁴

If the CAF must be ready to act in support of the civil power, there is an implicit responsibility for the civil power to be ready to lead the response. Unfortunately, there is no companion national security policy that confirms the nature of this responsibility.

Canada's last comprehensive national security strategy was released in 2004, and no one would deny that the strategic landscape today is fundamentally different. ³⁵ Since then, several strategic papers have been released that focus primarily on the threat of terrorism to Canada and its people, with more recent documents addressing cybersecurity. ³⁶ While such documents may signal a sector-by-sector approach to strategic analysis, they do not provide the comprehensive and integrative analysis required by the complexity of the current strategic environment. Sector-based strategies are helpful when derived from an overarching strategy, not when they constitute the sum-total of strategic planning. The lack of a current security strategy and the public discourse that developing such a strategy elicits is a major failing of successive Canadian governments. When the government of the day neglects its role in security planning, it is the people who pay the price.

Insecurity can arise in unexpected ways. Rather than fixating on individual security concerns (e.g., a natural disaster) when asking “Readiness for what?”, it is more valuable to consider how different sources of insecurity shape the way we conceptualize threats to national security. First, not all issues of insecurity begin as threats: over time, a political challenge or public policy issue may increase in severity to the point where it becomes threatening. This issue of “scale” is exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic: a relative handful of ill people was a public health concern, but the rapid spread of the virus and rising death rates, combined with the political choice to close borders and institute lockdowns, became a complex security threat affecting Canadians across the nation. ³⁷

Second, not all experiences of insecurity originate from human action. For example, the damage caused by natural forces is not a product of rational choice or strategic intent: natural disasters cannot be deterred through strategy or diplomacy. The natural world has always been a source of insecurity for human populations, yet natural hazards are increasing in both frequency and scale due to climate change. As such, traditional planning frameworks must be reconsidered and updated to prevent the increase in hazards from becoming an increase in disasters. ³⁸

Third, even when the source of insecurity is human, it can be human choices in the aggregate that unintentionally cause the problem, rather than discrete choices by an individual or an organization with definable leadership. For example, social instability can be caused by a large wave of immigration or an extreme heat wave attributable to human-induced climate change. ³⁹ While the intent in these cases is not to threaten, the cumulative result can still be the experience of insecurity.

Fourth, insecurity may be caused by an individual or organization's choice to break the law in pursuit of other interests. Thus, insecurity can be caused by the sheer magnitude of individual or organizational defection from the norms of the political order. A good example of this is the transnational drug trade and the rise of the opioid crisis in Canada. ⁴⁰ Public safety and public health systems have become overwhelmed as authorities attempt to deal with the magnitude of crisis, meaning that the insecurity of drug usage extends past users to society at large.

In addition to these sources of insecurity, two additional factors may influence our understanding of threats to national security. First, the word “security” may not actually be used in describing the challenge at hand. There is a tension in describing natural disasters or irregular migration as security concerns, as doing so may elicit a securitized response that initiates an ineffective response mechanism or threatens other important values. ⁴¹ Given this reality, a holistic security analysis may include issues that governments prefer to characterize as political challenges rather than security threats. Finding common language can therefore be difficult, but it is necessary to ensure that all actors agree on the urgency with which the challenge must be addressed.

Second, insecurity is as much about perception as it is about reality: when people feel insecure, they will act to secure themselves, particularly if it appears that the government is not providing a competent security response. Feeling insecure can lead to societal problems, including a distrust of government and its institutions (including law enforcement), susceptibility to misinformation, and vigilantism. These concerns are directly connected to the state's obligation to ensure the provision of security as a public good. The lack of broad, substantive, and transparent strategic analysis by the Canadian government has, arguably, contributed to societal fractures that are evident around issues of climate change, migration, and the opioid crisis. Therefore, government action on this issue should not only be driven by Canadians’ objective security; it should also seriously consider their perception of insecurity and subsequent disaffection with traditional institutions.

The second readiness question, “Readiness for when?”, can be answered in two ways. First, in a broad sense, the answer is now (if not yesterday). The complexity of the strategic environment is such that Canada is already dealing with insecurity from issues like extreme weather changes and transnational crime, and the country is playing catch-up in its understanding of how these threats can exploit Canadian vulnerabilities. Recognition of this shortfall should provide a sense of urgency for security planners. ⁴²

Second, “readiness for when” can also be answered as always. The unpredictability of these threats, as noted earlier, necessitates constant vigilance. An essential component of strategic planning is the establishment of early-warning indicators, which is the role of intelligence agencies in a whole-of-government response. Unfortunately, as Chad M. Briggs, Miriam Matejova, and Robert Weiss argue, intelligence gathering on “soft” security threats (from sectors such as health and the environment) focuses primarily on responding to the threats as they occur rather than systematically analyzing the data to anticipate their probability. ⁴³ Early-warning mechanisms are crucial to mitigating the impact of threats that cannot be deterred: dedicating intelligence-gathering resources to these issues assists the readiness process by increasing the time governments have to respond to threats, thereby improving the chances of reducing negative impacts.

Building on the strategic planning outlined above, the third question, “Readiness of what?”, requires further work to determine exactly what kinds of preparations are needed to produce the expected level of readiness. While the details of this question are naturally context-specific and therefore beyond the scope of this paper, a few observations are worth noting. First, it is important to note that this question cannot be answered successfully without a clear answer to question one (“readiness for what”), reflecting the linearity of the process. Second, of tremendous benefit to this process is that readiness preparations for many threats are similar. Natural disaster readiness, for example, looks similar whether the disaster is a wildfire, flood, or earthquake. In addition, specific preparations for natural disasters, such as ensuring substantive training for first responders, are also necessary in the event of a bio-security breach or terrorist event. Being able to combine training for multiple threats, and to multitask equipment and infrastructure, helps keep costs down by creating a clear focus for investments. Third, being able to provide a substantive answer to “readiness of what” ensures that proactive investments can be made. Such investments may include enhancing infrastructural resiliency, establishing early-warning mechanisms, and communicating important public safety information to Canadians.

Once the strategic work is complete, the operationalization of readiness plans can begin. In addressing Harrison's question, “How should we achieve readiness?”, the government can draw on Herrera's production line model to ensure an ongoing cycle of readiness generation and regeneration. The first stage is building initial readiness, which consists of determining the lead actor or agency for each issue area and tasking it with determining the kinds of investments needed to ensure a strong readiness posture. While the government must take the strategic lead in areas of national security, the job of responding to these threats has become increasingly democratized since the turn of the century. Whole-of-government collaboration has become a mainstream idea in contemporary security planning; however newer to the discussion is the idea of a “whole-of-society” approach, or the inclusion of the public in the process. ⁴⁴ A whole-of-society approach can be defined as one “involving civil society as well as the public and private sectors in the joint pursuit of common solutions to complex problems.” ⁴⁵ For each potential threat identified, stakeholders from across society need to work together to determine the personnel, equipment, and infrastructure requirements for ensuring a successful readiness posture.

In 2021, the Canadian government launched its national strategy for advancing the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, in which it presented its whole-of-society vision. ⁴⁶ This includes collaboration with multiple levels of government, Canada's indigenous peoples, civil society, the private sector, scholars, and the global community. Since then, the “whole-of-society” approach has been described in a variety of Canadian policy documents, including the recently released cybersecurity strategy. ⁴⁷ Initial readiness, therefore, should be developed collaboratively, as doing so creates a foundation on which additional readiness preparations can take place.

The second stage, increasing readiness, requires that all participants in the expected threat response be trained to play their parts effectively, including members of the public, as part of the whole-of-society response. A crucial part of training is the use of scenarios and simulations to expose participants to the kinds of pressures they will face should the event occur in real life. Kun Wang, Eleni Petraki, and Hussein Abbass describe scenario planning as the development of “linguistic stories” that create possible futures. ⁴⁸ Scenario planning is used in conjunction with the simulation process: once possible futures are devised, the gaming of those futures can commence through simulation to test the readiness, responsiveness, and resilience of the security reaction.

Several benefits can be derived from this process. Most importantly, as R. McCreight argues, the use of scenarios develops better leaders. “The overall aim,” he writes, “is to sharpen the skills and analytical acumen of leaders and their staffs so that realistic determinations and decisions can be made that have genuine life or death outcomes.” ⁴⁹ Simulating the response of actors to a wide range of possible scenarios helps participants to determine the kinds of situations they may encounter as they respond to a security threat, and to prepare themselves physically, emotionally, and mentally for the task ahead. While many government agencies already employ some form of scenario planning, the incorporation of actors beyond government would add a necessary layer of complexity to this process.

The final stage focuses on sustaining the readiness of the whole-of-society response. This requires consistent communication about changes to the strategic environment, as well as the establishment of an ongoing training schedule to ensure scenarios are updated and practical skills are refreshed accordingly. In addition, the “sustaining readiness” stage must also incorporate an automatic lessons-learned process in the simulation debrief to uncover and fix response mistakes and gaps in planning. This is also the time to make any updated improvements to infrastructure (e.g., new or updated technologies) and to retire and replace old equipment (e.g., expired personal protective equipment).

Something akin to readiness planning in Canada is already underway in response to climate change concerns. Since the early 2000s, security experts and scholars have been working to draw attention to climate change as a major driver of both direct and indirect security threats to Canada. ⁵⁰ Recognition of these dangers, along with the severity of recent natural disasters, has led governments across Canada to confront their implications. One of the clearest examples of this is in British Columbia (BC). The BC provincial government established the Ministry of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness in 2022 in response to the devasting wildfires and flooding of the previous year. When this new ministry was unveiled, Premier David Eby was clear that its responsibility was to “[make] sure we’re ready to go,” with the goals of risk mitigation and a greater capacity for resilience being driving factors of its creation. ⁵¹ In addition to hosting practical emergency preparedness resources for the public, the ministry has also worked to develop a resource catalogue of research and strategic analysis on climate-related concerns and other natural hazards. One of these documents is the government's Climate Preparedness and Adaptation Strategy Action Plan 2022–2025. ⁵² This report stands out as an excellent example of readiness preparation, although in this context “readiness” is expressed instead as resilience, capacity-building, prevention, and risk reduction. The overall goal of the strategy is to “strengthe[n] our capacity to anticipate, reduce and manage climate risks,” which reflects a readiness posture, even if the concept remains unnamed. ⁵³

An evaluation of military readiness in civilian security environments

There are several arguments for the value of translating the idea of military readiness into civilian form. One is that a posture of readiness ensures that the government takes seriously the threats Canada faces (or could face) today. For the CAF, being unprepared for war is an existential threat to the country. Likewise, if the government is unprepared to deal with the magnitude and complexity of security threats to the country, this is a dereliction of duty that creates the potential for serious harm to our values, institutions, and people. Numerous experts note that Canada, unfortunately, suffers from a lingering “fireproof house” mentality, which, over time, has fostered a security tradition of “insularism.” ⁵⁴ While there is widespread acknowledgement of the notion that the processes of globalization have shrunk the world and brought distant dangers to our shores, the urgency with which the problematic outcomes of these trends are addressed in Canadian politics remains low. The result is a national security culture that is complacent, reactive, and unsophisticated. ⁵⁵ There are enough examples of the devasting impacts of non-traditional security threats on the lives and livelihoods of Canadians to prove that this complacency is a significant problem. Adopting a posture of readiness can focus government attention on this issue and begin the process of shaping a national security culture that is alert and proactive.

A second argument for its value is that choosing a posture of readiness can ignite a public conversation on the importance of security preparedness, particularly in less publicized areas of security concern. As Canada is a relatively safe society, ⁵⁶ Canadians could be forgiven for deprioritizing security in the face of economic turmoil, political fragmentation, and institutional distrust at home; however, these troublesome issues are deeply connected. A public conversation shows the government being proactive in securing the wellbeing of the people. This is essential for rebuilding public trust in political institutions and political leadership (as a general class of actors). The rebuilding of trust is critical in the post-COVID world, as citizens grapple with diverse lingering concerns over the government's response to the crisis: this climate of distrust will undoubtably influence the actions of Canadians the next time the government asks them to accept extraordinary measures for their own security. ⁵⁷ The government is taking some steps to improve public trust through the development of a “Trust and Transparency Strategy,” in which enhanced public participation in federal policy and decision-making comprises the third strategic objective. This is a good first step in a complicated process of rebuilding trust in Canadian political institutions and leadership, but there is much more to be done. ⁵⁸

A public conversation also allows the government to effectively lead the whole- of-society response. Given the growth in both the quantity and complexity of national security threats today, the government simply does not have the people or the resources to effectively respond on its own. Instead, its role must shift to one of strategic leadership: establishing strategic policy at the national level and investing in frontline actors to carry out the response. The practice of localization is crucial to this process. Localization recognizes that local actors are best situated to determine what kind of policy response is required to meet the security needs of their community. ⁵⁹ Such a practice requires provincial governments to work with municipalities and community organizations to tailor the national strategy to issues of local concern. One example of localization is the work done to create a long-term flood mitigation plan for the Sumas Prairie in Abbotsford, BC. Through multi-level political, technical, and community collaboration, government has offered recovery assistance to those affected by the 2021 floods, and begun planning to prevent future flooding from devastating the region. ⁶⁰

There are also challenges associated with the argument that the Canadian government should draw security lessons from the military. The first concerns the general difficulty of applying military doctrine to the civilian world. Ever since early discussions about broadening the security agenda, both scholars and practitioners have expressed concern that invoking military practices in response to non-traditional security issues can lead to militarized responses that are, at best, ineffective, and more often harmful, particularly for the wellbeing of individuals. ⁶¹ The idea of “translation” can help with this problem: instead of importing military ideas and structures wholesale and placing them in a new context, they must be translated into the civilian context, a process that may require, for example, the creation of a separate vocabulary to better encompass the goals and tools of civilian security strategy.

The second concern is perhaps more unique to Canada. A thread of anti-militarism weaves through Canadian history, starting with the French-Canadian resistance to the wars of the British Empire, passing through the post–Cold War “decade of darkness,” and arriving at the tepid response to NATO spending commitments in the face of re-emerging aggressive powers (a tepidness that seems to be ending under the current Liberal government of Mark Carney). ⁶² This anti-militarism has helped to cultivate Canada's peaceful international persona, which is fundamental to Canadian identity and is not entirely problematic. However, it may be a cultural obstacle preventing the government from looking to the military for guidance in navigating an uncertain and unpredictable strategic environment. It must be recognized, however, that the CAF has a long and proud history of ensuring Canada's security through warfighting, peacekeeping missions, alliance collaboration, and aid to the civil power: they are the experts in this field, and should be treated as such.

A third concern is that adopting a posture of readiness does not prevent threats from emerging in the first place. Arguably, this is because prevention against traditional military threats happens at the political, not miliary, level, and thus military doctrine spends little time on this aspect of the problem. Translating readiness into the civilian context, however, marries the political with the security response: therefore, prevention is a crucial piece of this puzzle. A discussion of prevention is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is important to acknowledge that prevention can never be fully effective given the nature of today's threats. Thus, that which cannot be prevented must be answered, and answered with a solid plan so that all actors are aware of their responsibilities and ready to respond accordingly.

The final challenge raised by this argument is whether Canada can afford to focus on civilian readiness when it cannot seem to find consensus on ensuring military readiness. Military spending itself can often seem like a luxury, particularly in the context of a domestic affordability crisis, making the military an easy target for budget cuts. ⁶³ Given Canada's political culture, however, it may be easier to convince policymakers of the need for civilian security readiness than for military defence readiness. Now might be an appropriate time for security experts across the spectrum to advocate for holistic and comprehensive investment in Canada's security structures.

Conclusion

We live in uncertain times. Security concerns are proliferating and overwhelming the capacity of governments to prevent and respond to these complex threats. In this time of challenge and instability, the Canadian government needs look to the expertise of the CAF to assist in developing a posture of national security readiness. By translating the idea of military readiness into the civilian national security framework, the Canadian government will signal the seriousness with which they take threats to Canada and its people. Such action will prompt a national conversation on security readiness that will incorporate a multiplicity of views and a wider range of resources by engaging the public. ⁶⁴ In addition, working with the public to develop a posture of readiness can assist in the process of rebuilding trust in Canada's political institutions, ensuring that the nation is unified in a time of crisis. While there are some challenges inherent in this process, they are well worth grappling with given the importance of the outcome. Ultimately, the goal of a readiness posture is to ensure mission success. It is time for the Canadian government to take this responsibility seriously and ensure that Canada is ready for the security threats of the twenty-first century.