Sensing Common Ground? A Call for Collaboration Between the DND/CAF Quantum S&T Strategy and the Women,Peace and Security Agenda

Abstract

Recently published strategic documents relating to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and quantum science and technology by the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) reveal these domains of operation have little overlap in their scope of work. Although this divide may reflect expectations, we argue that the siloing of these strategies misses important opportunities for inter- and intra-departmental collaboration on key objectives. Focusing specifically on the WPS goal of conflict prevention and two quantum sensing technology missions articulated in the DND/CAF quantum science and technology implementation plan, we illustrate creative opportunities for further coordination and collaboration between policy silos.

Introduction

One of the major rhetorical shifts during Justin Trudeau's premiership was the government's identification with gender equality and feminist policy. In contrast to the prior administration's erasure of the term “gender equality” from policy discussions, the early years of the Trudeau administration witnessed the appointment of a gender-balanced cabinet and the release of Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) and public references to the government's international posture as Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP). ¹ While these rhetorical commitments continued throughout this government's time in office, concerns have been raised about the capacity for feminist policy aims to make a difference across the whole of government, particularly in areas where concerns on the subject of gender equality have traditionally been underrepresented or largely absent. ² When gender policy considerations are siloed off from other strategic objectives, Canada misses opportunities to expedite advancing potentially overlapping priorities in multiple strategies.

To demonstrate that the aims of gender policy can, in fact, be shared with the specific aims of other policy domains and to undermine positions that limit the scope and breadth of gendered analyses, we examine the potential overlap between the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces’ (DND/CAF) strategic approach to quantum science and technology (S&T) on the one hand, and to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda on the other. Their guiding documents are effectively separated, with no mention of quantum science and technology in the DND/CAF WPS implementation plan, and little meaningful discussion of gender policy in DND/CAF's approach to quantum science and technology. ³ We argue that this stymies collaborative efforts to limit effective policy planning and implementation. Both WPS and quantum S&T are domains that require particularly close engagement with global allies and the leveraging of existing domestic expertise in order to pursue broadly-defined security goals. Beyond these structural similarities, however, there is an opportunity to pursue a specific common goal: the development of quantum sensing as a method of conflict prevention.

The first section of this policy brief introduces the DND/CAF implementation plan on WPS, in the context of Canada's current national action plan, Foundations for Peace, and discusses the framing of technology in these documents. The second section focuses on the DND/CAF approach to quantum science and technology, with particular attention paid to the quantum sensing missions outlined in Quantum 2030. The third section proposes quantum sensing as a shared mission between the quantum S&T and WPS plans. The conclusion reflects on how this policy proposal might spur further collaboration between gender policy and other domains, and why gender policy should avoid a reductionist reading of technological futures.

WPS, DND/CAF, and foundations for peace

The Women, Peace and Security agenda was launched in 2000 through United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325, and developed through a series of further resolutions aimed at the promotion of gender equality as a means to enhance human security and reduce violent conflict. Canada's first national action plan (NAP) was released in 2010 with little fanfare in Ottawa; this cold treatment contrasts the Trudeau government's high-profile launch of the second strategy in 2017. ⁴ Canada's current national action plan, titled Foundations for Peace, sets out six focus areas for action: building and sustaining peace; security, justice, and accountability; crisis response; sexual and gender-based violence; leadership and capabilities; and inclusion. The workplan is shared by ten government departments (including DND/CAF), each of which has its own implementation plan. ⁵ The strengths of this third NAP include a greater sense of coordination with Global Affairs Canada and a far more compelling account of the importance of qualitative reporting (rather than leaning on statistics). Although government attention to the topic has increased since the first plan in 2010, critics have noted the plans’ lack of effective monitoring and evaluation, as well as questions on how Canada will use the NAP to dismantle systemic inequality. ⁶ With an increase in violence against women at home and abroad, the WPS goals remain a vital part of any comprehensive national security agenda, particularly amid a backlash against gender- and equity-based initiatives. The implementation plan developed by DND/CAF for Foundations for Peace includes coverage of all six areas of focus, and charged the minister of national defence with integrating elements of gender equality and culture changes. The plan acknowledges that “DND/CAF has had mixed results delivering on previous WPS commitments,” but suggests that structural changes, including the establishment of the chief professional conduct and culture position, will help to achieve the targets outlined in the report. ⁷

In both the DND/CAF implementation plan and Foundations for Peace itself, we find a generally negative treatment of technology. The documents highlight the new forms of gendered insecurity emerging with new technologies, with “technology-facilitated gender-based violence” appearing as a key term in Foundations for Peace, and a range of issues—including cyberattacks, malicious acts in the information environment, disclosure of private material, hacking, stalking, and others—appearing in the documents. ⁸ Curiously absent from the documents is any discussion of how emerging technologies might support the aims of the national action plan. ⁹

The DND/CAF quantum S&T posture

Across the security and defence sector, experts are preparing for radical disruption as a new generation of technologies come online. Already called the “revolution in quantum military affairs” by some, these disruptive technologies promise remarkable advantages in precision, speed, and sensitivity over existing technologies through their manipulation and control of individual quantum systems. ¹⁰ In 2021, DND/CAF released its Quantum S&T Strategy, which outlines the Canadian defence team's approach to developing quantum technology capabilities and its preparations for the disruption that they will cause to the overall security environment. The follow-up implementation plan, Quantum 2030, provides more specific detail, highlighting four specific missions:

Quantum-enhanced radar: “DRDC will build and field-test a prototype quantum-enhanced long range radio frequency transmission and detection system within the next seven years”

Quantum-enhanced LiDAR (light detection and ranging): “DRDC will build and field-test a prototype quantum-enhanced LiDAR system within the next seven years”

Quantum algorithms for defence and security: “DRDC will demonstrate a quantum algorithm solving a defence problem with advantage over classical computing within the next seven years”

Quantum networking: “DRDC will work with partners to build and demonstrate a communications network capable of transmitting quantum information over long ranges and employing theoretically unhackable quantum protocols, within the next seven years” ¹¹

These four technologies will provide DND/CAF with highly expanded sensing capacity, improved cybersecurity, and secure communications platforms. The technologies also posses potentially lucrative dual-use applications in the civilian world.

Although the Quantum S&T Strategy and Quantum 2030 implementation plan offer detailed accounts of how these emerging technologies will fit into the future operations of DND/CAF, neither engage with gender equality concerns. There are no references to gender policy in the Quantum S&T Strategy, and in in Quantum 2030, only a single sentence states that Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) should be included in policy work (thus restating an existing departmental commitment without further discussion). ¹² There is neither evidence of meaningful consideration of how gender policy can support emerging technology strategies in these two DND/CAF documents, nor commentary on how the achievement of strategic aims can support broader gender equality goals. Much like we observed in the case of the WPS documents, these documents reinforce the siloing of technology policy from gender policy.

Quantum sensing as a WPS goal

In 2015, UN Women released a global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 reaffirming conflict prevention generally as the primary aim of the WPS agenda rather than a specific focus on women's safety in conflict, and demanding greater global efforts to prevent conflict. ¹³ Although this report details the devastating ways in which technological advancements have produced new forms of gender-based violence and harassment, it also emphasizes technology's potential to collect data, develop networks, free communication, and other applications to support the WPS aims. Such gendered considerations are especially pertinent considering gender imbalances and a dearth of gendered analyses in STEM fields. We argue that for DND/CAF to support its overall WPS commitments, its science and technology policies should reflect the WPS agenda—the use of emerging technologies to prevent conflict and promote peace should be prioritized wherever possible.

It is in this specific context that we find the precise overlap between the WPS agenda and military applications of quantum science and technology. Two of the four missions set out in Quantum 2030 already focus on the development of quantum-enabled radar and LiDAR technologies that will augment current sensing capacity to detect stealth aircraft, overcome fog and smoke, conduct underwater imaging, and enhance the security of defensive capacities by remaining undetectable. ¹⁴ The radical improvement in detection capabilities would directly address the “first ingredient of denial credibility” in a NORAD deterrent strategy, which Andrea Charron and James Fergusson argue is crucial to promoting the continuation of North American continental security. ¹⁵ But advancing deterrence by denial through the deployment of quantum-enabled radar and LiDAR should not only be viewed as the fulfilment of a Quantum 2030 mission, nor even more broadly as a step forward in terms of NORAD policy. If the achievement of these Quantum 2030 missions supports the prevention of conflict through a reinforcement of deterrence by denial, then such efforts simultaneously support Canada's WPS commitments to the prevention of conflict.

Conclusion

Quantum sensing could be utilized as a form of conflict prevention because it will be used for surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and aerospace maritime approaches to Canada and North America. It involves Canada and the US's binational aerospace command, NORAD, thereby bringing in international relationships, a key pillar of both the WPS agenda and the Quantum 2030 implementation strategy. This would apply an inclusive lens to the quantum defence and security strategy, provide a direct opportunity for overlap of the quantum and WPS objectives, and serve as a starting point for greater integration of goals and collaboration to achieve shared visions. It is the shortest bridge to cross at this specific moment in time. By engaging the WPS pillar of conflict prevention, the Canadian quantum strategy will more rigorously live up to the Canadian government's stated objectives surrounding a feminist foreign policy, and will avoid limiting gendered analyses to diversity targets.

This policy brief has highlighted how two policy areas whose guiding documents address no common ground can nevertheless come together in support of a common goal. Advocates for a more rigorous gender perspective may highlight that a robust GBA + framework could further identify opportunities for the quantum S&T agenda to advocate for WPS and other gender-related aims; similarly, quantum S&T domain experts would surely highlight that the diversity of quantum technologies provides many potential solutions to use-cases presented in the WPS agenda. Our argument about quantum sensing is that this ground is already shared by the quantum S&T and WPS agendas. Establishing prima facie overlaps can lay the groundwork for future collaboration on a more robust level.

As we move towards 2030, the end-date of both Quantum 2030 and Foundations for Peace, it is our hope that more opportunities for meaningful integration of WPS goals and other policy proposals will be identified. The continued siloing of these activities will result in duplicated effort and missed opportunities for burden-sharing within and across government units. Although both examples discussed in this brief occur within the context of DND/CAF, we foresee opportunities for both intra- and inter-departmental efforts to identify and pursue common goals. This will require both silos shifting their thinking. Within gender policy, it will be imperative to jettison reductionist readings of policy areas like technology; the pessimistic reading of technology in documents like Foundations for Peace may chill exploration of potential engagement with technologies like quantum sensing (and directly goes against the more nuanced approach advocated by UN Women). At the same time, there is an important opportunity for scholars and practitioners working in other policy areas to consider how their scope of work overlaps with strategic aims in support of gender equality (among other social policy goals). If a use-case for quantum sensing aids conflict prevention via deterrence by denial, there is nothing to be lost by enrolling a new ally in the policy promotion. These new policy partnerships will require horizontal collaboration across domain-specific teams, but have the potential to produce a more coherent approach to the dominant policy issues of today.