Canada in the Long Shadow of America First

Abstract

The America First agenda in the United States poses a major threat to Canada America First is marked by an enthusiasm for protectionism; a retreat from global engagement that echoes the isolationism of the 1930s; a rejection of global governance; an indifference towards a global leadership role for the United States; an embrace of illiberal and authoritarian leaders and a concomitant disdain for America's traditional friends and allies in the West. The America First policy agenda enjoys the support of tens of millions of Americans. If the Democratic Party loses control of the White House and one or both houses of Congress, the consequences for the interests of Canadians will be profoundly negative.

The enduring popularity of the America First agenda in the US is a major threat to Canada. America First is marked by an enthusiasm for protectionism; an isolationism resurrected from the 1930s; a rejection of the very idea of global governance; an indifference towards a global leadership role for the US; an embrace of illiberal and authoritarian leaders; and a concomitant disdain for America's traditional friends and allies in the West. America First's prime exponent is, of course, Donald J. Trump, but his foreign policy agenda—as a whole or in parts—enjoys the support of tens of millions of Americans. If the Democratic Party loses control of the White House and one or both houses of Congress, there will be profoundly negative consequences for Canadian interests.

Most importantly, the return of an administration committed to an America First agenda and beholden to the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement would dramatically reshape politics between the two North American countries. For much of the twentieth century, relations between officials of the two governments were shaped by a common attachment to a particular diplomatic culture that saw conflicts of interest between the two countries as “problems to be solved” rather than “confrontations to be won at all costs,” as K.J. Holsti put it more than fifty years ago. ¹ However, such a nuanced use of American power is well beyond the inclinations—if not the abilities—of an America First president, who has a deeply transactional view of international relations and a profoundly negative view of his country's friends and allies.

The willingness to use American power in an unrestrained way will be most evident in the area of continental trade. It used to be that the Democratic Party was the party of protectionism and the Republican Party was the party of free trade. Today, the GOP under Trump has turned into a deeply protectionist party, and its leader has an unabashedly mercantilist approach to trade. Indeed, Trump's idiosyncratic views can be captured in a single tweet:

….I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in to raid the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so. It will always be the best way to max out our economic power. We are right now taking in $billions in Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA RICH AGAIN.” ²

Not only does this make little sense, as tariffs are paid by US importers and not foreign exporters, but it negates the deeply interdependent economic relationship between Canada and the US. Trump appears to be convinced that America's “friends” like Canada are no friends at all, but grubby free-riders eager to “rape” the US (as he indelicately likes to put it). In his first term, after all, he accused Canada of being a threat to America's national security and slapped a range of tariffs on Canadian imports. He is already considering massive tariffs for his second term—measures that would seriously harm Canadians. And with the US-Canada-Mexico Agreement (as it is known in the US) open for a “joint review” in 2026, an America First administration will not hesitate to move to “max out” its economic power.

Canadians will also feel the America First heat in other policy domains. Should Trump return to the White House in 2025, he will bring back with him the shambolic and bizarre diplomacy that marked his first term. He would likely withdraw from multilateral efforts to manage global problems. A Trump 2.0 administration would once again abandon American leadership in global governance in a range of issues, from global trade regimes to climate change.

An America First administration also would likely make good on Trump's oft-repeated promise to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, by the simple expedient of abandoning Ukraine and embracing Vladimir Putin—who, not coincidentally, enjoys high levels of support among MAGA voters. Trump is also likely to act on his long-standing desire to withdraw from NATO. And we should always keep in mind that the US does not have to formally renounce the 1949 treaty in order to “withdraw.” As president, Trump could simply leave the treaty in place, but not assign any American military personnel to the alliance or spend any US funds on NATO. Or he could make clear that the US would not come to the aid of other NATO members, as he insinuated in February 2024, when he said that he would “encourage” the Russians “to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies. ³

We can also expect that a re-elected Trump administration would make the relationship with the People's Republic of China central to its foreign policy. Not only would Trump double down on the tariffs on Chinese imports imposed during his first mandate and which were maintained by the Biden administration, but he would be likely to ratchet up the level of American conflict with China. This would entail significant risk, since the PRC under paramount leader Xi Jinping is in an assertive and truculent mood, as Beijing's rhetoric over Taiwan and its aggressive stance in the South China Sea demonstrate. For Canada, there is significant risk of being drawn into such escalating tensions.

The evolving unpredictability in great-power relations will have an immediate impact on Canada. Canada's defence policy is designed for a world in which the US exerts a leadership role and is concerned about its global network of friends and allies. Canadian defence policy is not at all designed for an America First administration that is indifferent to global leadership, fundamentally unconcerned about the safety and well-being of friends and allies, and concerned only with what other countries can do for the US. Canadians will have to worry that such an administration is likely not only to pay considerable attention to how much Canadians are spending on defence, but, more importantly, to what Canada is spending its defence dollars on. If Trump returns to the White House in 2025, we can expect that Washington will demand that Canada significantly ramp up its defence spending. It is also likely to insist that Canada reorganize its defence posture to support the US in projecting power into the Indo-Pacific.

The threats to Canadian interests from America First are real. Even if the Democrats retain control of the executive and legislative branches, however, these threats will not dissipate. The Democrats are as deeply protectionist as Trumpist Republicans—as Joe Biden demonstrated in May 2024 when his administration adopted Trump's proposal to impose a one hundred percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles. The good news for Canadians is that at least the threat to Canada's economic interests from sustained protectionism would be mitigated—for a while at least—by the rejection by the Democrats of the other elements of the America First agenda.