No Further Options: Canada's Peacekeeping Efforts in Yugoslavia,1991–1993

Abstract

Drawing from archival records and secondary sources, this article examines the decisions that led Canada to undertake peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia, and how subsequent decisions influenced the course of those operations. It argues that despite the prevailing diplomatic and military conditions that Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government knew about, and notwithstanding the volatile situation in Yugoslavia, Canada decided to commit peacekeepers to a mission that even then was quickly degenerating into a major regional war. The search for an international success led the federal government to disregard the complicating factors that ultimately created the conditions for the failure of Canada's mission. Mulroney's decision was an attempt to put a Progressive Conservative Party imprint on the liberal internationalism that defined twentieth-century Canadian foreign policy.

In deploying Canadian peacekeepers to the Yugoslav Wars in February 1992, the Progressive Conservative (PC) government of Brian Mulroney showed that it was willing to include an interventionist element in its foreign policy. Addressing the deployment, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Barbara McDougall stated, “Our commitment today underscores our determination to find a peaceful and lasting solution to this conflict.” ¹ This ambitious goal, however, was beyond the capacity of the diplomatic and military resources that Canada employed.

The Mulroney government's decision was not supported by corresponding Canadian diplomatic initiatives that attempted to stabilize conditions in the region so as to support peacekeeping efforts. An examination of Canadian and US diplomatic records from 1991 to 1993 reveals that Canadian diplomacy was muted during the conflict, and that throughout the war in Yugoslavia, the Canadian Department of External Affairs could not establish which governments of the Yugoslav republics actually wanted UN peacekeepers present. Moreover, the US's minimal interest in the conflict under the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations was reflected by US State Department officials who sought to limit any possible US role. ² Europe and the UN also sought to avoid engagement in the war. Finally, the intensity of the Canadian public reaction to the conflict, which had initially sparked the Mulroney government's efforts, rapidly diminished by 1993.

Despite the prevailing diplomatic and military conditions and notwithstanding the volatile situation in Yugoslavia, Canada decided to commit peacekeepers to a mission that was degenerating into a major regional war. The mission in the ex-Yugoslavia marked the largest deployment of Canadian peacekeepers since the UN operation in the Congo in 1960, surpassing the 1,800 Canadian peacekeepers that were deployed to intervene in that post-colonial civil war. ³ This article argues that the Mulroney government's imperative search for an international success led them to disregard the complexities that eventually led to the failure of Canada's Yugoslavia mission.

Canadian historiography has tentatively mentioned external factors in Mulroney's Yugoslav policy calculations, but focuses largely on the motivations of national political figures. ⁴ Canadian domestic politics of the early 1990s has been frequently noted as the key focus of the Mulroney government, marking the beginning of a period of unpopularity for Mulroney prior to his resignation in 1993. ⁵ Considering Mulroney's failed attempts at Canadian constitutional reform, economic problems, and a divided PC caucus, the prime minister was seeking to reaffirm his national and partisan leadership. ⁶ With domestic politics proving to be a challenge, the Mulroney government saw the domestic popularity of Canadian peacekeeping as the potential key to a foreign policy success. Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, for example, emphasize that “It is therefore logical that the Mulroney government would want to take advantage of this new wave of popular enthusiasm for peacekeeping, all the more so because, at the end of its second term, the Conservative government's popularity was falling.” ⁷

Scholars of Canadian foreign policy disagree over which actors and what circumstances inside and outside of government influenced Mulroney's approach to international affairs, as their respective interpretative lenses place different emphases on conflicting factors. For example, Fen Osler Hampson suggests that the “inertia” that Mulroney found within External Affairs on taking action in the Balkans motivated his and the SSEA's decision-making, whereas Sean M. Maloney views the potential political and diplomatic benefits of a Canadian peacekeeping operation in eastern Europe as an important influence, not only for the Mulroney government, but also for the departments of External Affairs and National Defence. ⁸ This article illuminates these arguments by demonstrating that during the Yugoslav Wars, Mulroney was comfortable with using Canadian peacekeeping as a tool to challenge and even transform Canada's established norms on peacekeeping and intervention.

A larger debate in the historiography is where the Yugoslav case fits within the wider scope of Canada's post–Cold War foreign policy. Duane Bratt considers that for the Canadian government, participating in UN peacekeeping in the Balkans represented a “fundamental break from its past practices and policy preferences.” ⁹ Additionally, Nicholas Gammer concludes that Canada's intervention in the Yugoslav Wars represented a “shift” in Canadian foreign policy, with “the role of political leadership” as the main explanation for the change. ¹⁰ For scholars who determine Mulroney's foreign policy to be transformative, Canadian peacekeeping operations in the ex-Yugoslavia is cited as a primary example.

The collapse of Yugoslavia and the global response

The Yugoslav Wars, and thus Canada's intervention, arose from events that led to the violence and ultimately the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In 1980, Joseph Broz Tito, the long-time leader of Yugoslavia, died, and without his authoritarian leadership, the ethnic divisions throughout the Balkans, which were always endemic, degenerated. ¹¹ From the 1940s to his death, Tito had managed to hold together Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Tito maintained the delicate Yugoslav political structure during his time in power, but economic failures in the 1970s revealed deeper problems in the country. Thus, by the time of his death, the ethnic divisions in the Yugoslav republics were well fuelled by economic hardship and discontent with Tito's policies.

Among the instigators of the Yugoslav Wars was the Serbian nationalist politician Slobodan Milosevic, who in May 1989 became president of Serbia. The following month, Milosevic delivered his infamous “Field of Blackbirds” speech in the then-Serbian province of Kosovo, effectively declaring war against Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia's Muslim population. ¹² Consequently, in 1990 the Serbian government began to impose laws that limited the freedoms of Kosovar Albanians, who were the ethnic majority in Kosovo. ¹³

As a result of Milosevic's actions, throughout 1990 and 1991, Serbia's neighbours Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia grew increasingly distrustful of Serbia. In each respective republic and in Kosovo, movements for independence from Serbia grew and political leaders took advantage of ethnic nationalism that had been repressed during the Tito era. ¹⁴ In December 1990, Slovenia held an independence referendum that won a convincing majority; the same month, in Croatia, the government determined that Serb Croats were a “national minority.” ¹⁵ By the end of 1990, a reversion to pre-Tito Yugoslavia was essentially complete. The country was once again a collection of small states comprised of their component ethnic elements.

War between Serbia and Croatia broke out in the summer of 1991. The Serbians neglected requests from the West to de-escalate and instead took the measures they deemed necessary to secure their new borders. On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia formally declared their independence from Yugoslavia. In August, war between Croatia and Serbia began; it would end only with UN intervention in February 1992. ¹⁶ To address the conflict, NATO held a summit in November 1991 and issued “The Rome Declaration,” directing all the now-independent republics to follow the guidelines of the Commission of Security and Cooperation (CSCE). ¹⁷ Under the CSCE's guidelines, the republics agreed to not change their region's borders through military force. ¹⁸ Additionally, the Rome Declaration tried to join together the European Community (EC), CSCE, and NATO in order to prevent violent nationalism, and was understood by the Europeans as a step toward peace.

The sentiment of the Rome Summit—that a European-led initiative would resolve the crisis in the Yugoslav republics—masked the reality that European nations lacked the capacity to improve the region's security and, moreover, that the US was comfortable with the EC and CSCE leading peace efforts. During the Rome Summit, American President George H.W. Bush told US allies in Europe that “If your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, then the time to tell us is today.” ¹⁹ Although the Rome Summit was presented as a course for NATO's future, the summit revealed tensions within the organization, as the divide between the Bush administration and among the Europeans themselves over who was capable and responsible for the security of Europe widened. ²⁰ The lack of a united American-European response was further publicized in December 1991, when Germany became the first western European country to unconditionally recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. ²¹

In November 1991, the UN took its first significant steps in the war when Cyrus Vance, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, negotiated a ceasefire agreement among Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and General Veljko Kadijevic, the Yugoslav defence minister. ²² Signed on 23 November 1991, the agreement—known as the Geneva Accord—allowed for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to Croatia. The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 721 authorized the mission on 27 November after a formal request for peacekeepers from the Yugoslav government. ²³ However, the Geneva Accord collapsed on 15 December, as UNSCR 724 concluded that the conditions for deploying UN peacekeepers had not materialized. ²⁴ Consequently, the war continued into late 1991, indicating that any potential peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia would have to be conducted in the midst of an active war zone.

Mulroney's initial response to Yugoslavia

In the late fall of 1991, Brian Mulroney's cabinet considered the nature of Canada's participation in a potential UN operation in the former Yugoslavia, given the widespread violence in Croatia. ²⁵ More than one thousand civilians had been killed in Croatia since late June 1991, and the Geneva Accord had failed to stop the conflict. Prior to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting on 17 September 1991, Canada's UN delegation received a briefing note on discussions planned for the upcoming meeting. The brief stated that “external pressure is essential to force the parties to agree to work toward a peaceful settlement” in ex-Yugoslavia, ²⁶ and advised that, should the UN send peacekeepers to the region, “Canada would be ready to provide a contribution.” ²⁷ Undeterred by the lack of a well-defined operation for said Canadian peacekeepers, the Mulroney government continued to seek extensive Canadian involvement in the former Yugoslavia. In a 20 September 1991 letter to UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Mulroney called for a UN Security Council (UNSC) emergency meeting on Yugoslavia and offered to deploy Canadian peacekeepers, but this offer failed to gain traction among the permanent UNSC members. ²⁸ Russia supported Milosevic's ethnic nationalism and, following the Tiananmen Square incident, China did not want any UN decisions that impinged on state sovereignty. Consequently, because of their willingness to work with the UN and their offer of peacekeepers, at the outset of the Yugoslav Wars the Mulroney government found itself in a unique position as one of the few countries motivated to find an end to the conflict. Nevertheless, during the conflict's initial stages, Canada still could not clearly articulate the extent to which it wanted to be involved in a UN operation. Never to be fully resolved, this dilemma had a lingering effect on Canadian diplomacy.

Canada was among the participants in the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome, attended by Mulroney and McDougall. During the summit, Mulroney condemned the naval bombardment of the medieval Croatian city of Dubrovnik by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Yugoslav navy—both under Serbian control—and advocated a stronger stance against the Serbian government. ²⁹ In his memoirs, Mulroney recalled, “I called on these Balkan countries to sit down and negotiate a settlement to their conflict. Little could I, or anyone, have imagined the horror and atrocities that would soon follow in Bosnia and Serbia.” ³⁰ Notwithstanding Mulroney's efforts, it appeared that External Affairs was not confident that NATO could resolve the conflict and, more broadly, that the US and the Western alliance were avoiding intervention in the Balkans. McDougall's briefing note for the NATO summit contended that “The Americans hold the key to ending this affair, if anyone can. So far they have been very reticent about getting more directly involved.” ³¹ The US military had just concluded the Gulf War in late February 1991 and Bush was facing re-election in November 1992, with domestic economic issues dominating US politics. Given the lack of American leadership to help solve the Yugoslav crisis, External Affairs concluded that Canada should only have a minimal role in the Balkans.

Varying from most assessments, James Bissett, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia in Belgrade, sympathized with the Serbian leadership. In a 7 November 1991 report to External Affairs detailing Milosevic's response to the EC's efforts to begin peace negotiations, Bissett displayed a noticeable pro-Serbian bias. He was skeptical of the EC's approach, and likely viewed Milosevic, despite the Serbian leader's extremism, as the figure best equipped to quickly resolve the conflict between the republics and avoid UN or NATO intervention. He wrote that “Anti-Serbian bias had been evident from outset making it difficult for Milosevic to accept terms of [EC] docu which presumed dissolution of Yugo…Serbs interpreted it as third German/Austrian ultimatum to Serbia this century.” ³² The Bush administration's position, according to Bissett, was to let the EC attempt to resolve the Yugoslav crisis without direct American involvement. Bissett stated in his report that the “Conflict is extremely complicated and difficult knot to unravel, entangled as it is by twisted th[r]ongs of ancient hatreds, bloodstained memories and current power struggle by six republics as well as natl. aspirations of God knows how many ethnic groups.” ³³

On 15 November 1991, External Affairs sent a memo to Canadian missions overseas that detailed the government's thinking regarding Canada's peacekeeping role in Yugoslavia. In the memo, External Affairs acknowledged Mulroney's offer of peacekeepers and argued that while Canada should continue to support the “lead role” of the EC and the CSCE, “Peacekeeping will require international underpinnings best provided by UN or possibly CSCE. CSCE has [an] important role to play as regional organization and sponsor of EC effort and we are examining ways further to reinforce this role.” ³⁴ According to External Affairs, Canada's frequent calls for peacekeepers in Yugoslavia had gained European attention. In the event of a peacekeeping operation, Canadian roles could potentially include “Protecting minorities [in mixed populations] in Croatia and elsewhere; ensuring integrity of borders; supervising ceasefire.” ³⁵ The memorandum was the earliest indication within the Canadian government of the type of mission the government envisaged for Yugoslavia. External Affairs concluded the memo by emphasizing that the protection of minority populations would need to be clarified: “Would the peacekeepers be expected to undertake the administration, policing and security of minority areas or would the host republic maintain this function but with peacekeeper supervision (we prefer latter)? How will situation of mixed populations be handled?” ³⁶ This uncertainty around how UN peacekeepers would function in the newly independent republics continued throughout the Yugoslav Wars and was a source of tension between the Yugoslav republics and the UN members, including Canada, that ultimately sent peacekeepers.

From the outbreak of the conflict in June 1991, the Canadian government recognized the need for UN action, as CSCE and the EC interventions had been ineffective. During the fall of 1991, the Canadian government continued to emphasize the need for UN intervention in Yugoslavia. On 19 December 1991, during a North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting, McDougall stated, “The UN is now the only institution which can bring to bear the maximum pressure. But it is blocked—by radical elements in Yugoslavia and by timidity in the international community.” ³⁷

Canada's statement of support for UN intervention, however, was non-committal, as the government was cautious about contributing to a UN peacekeeping operation, considering that European security institutions had failed to establish a ceasefire. Furthermore, Canada did not have any particular national interest in Yugoslavia or the Balkans region. However, Mulroney was willing to back the UN response to Serbian aggression, primarily to support humanitarian intervention, and secondarily, to put a Progressive Conservative Party imprint on the liberal (both small and large “L”) internationalism that defined twentieth-century Canadian foreign policy. Explaining the government's position, in his memoirs Mulroney reasoned that in addition to a strong UN enhancing Canada's international standing, “Our troop contribution also showed that while our manpower contributions to NATO forces in Europe were winding down, Canada's commitment to the European continent would never falter.” ³⁸ Mulroney wanted an international role for Canada in the post–Cold War world, and his gamble on an enhanced international status for Canada mirrored his ventures at constitutional reform.

Within Canada, the press found that the international response to the conflict in Yugoslavia was tepid and that Canada should continue to press for UN intervention. As a 20 November 1991 editorial in the Toronto Star declared, “As Yugoslavia self-destructs, the world cannot wash its hands of a civil war that has wrought about 3,000 deaths and virtually razed entire cities.” ³⁹ The Star highlighted Canada's call for UN peacekeepers and criticized the UNSC's adherence to state sovereignty. Yet views were mixed; in another editorial on 7 December, the Star stated, “Formal recognition of Croatian independence at this time—before its ethnic and border disputes are peacefully resolved—would be premature, as would any recognition of Serbian military conquests.” ⁴⁰ The government, however, did not heed this advice and continued to eagerly offer up Canadian peacekeepers for Yugoslavia, in large part because Mulroney overlooked the advice offered by External Affairs on the difficulties that peacekeepers would face in the Balkans.

Following the NAC meeting in December 1991, McDougall attended that month's full NATO meeting, where Canada's objective was to persuade NATO to prioritize the Yugoslav crisis. The briefing provided to McDougall prior to the conference stated that a “point to register” was that “Peacekeeping and safeguarding minority rights by the international community may be required. Canada has already expressed its readiness to participate in an international peacekeeping operation.” ⁴¹

Mulroney's support of military intervention in a failed state was a significant change to Canadian foreign policy that had heretofore largely avoided intervention. ⁴² Since coming to office in 1984, he had displayed little appetite for international peacekeeping or changing Canadian policy on the subject. The Mulroney government's position on intervention in Yugoslavia was further unusual because, unlike in the Gulf War, the US would not be leading the military effort. In this case, elements of the Yugoslav diaspora within the PC Party were pressuring Mulroney to act. Mulroney also may have had some personal sensitivity regarding Yugoslavia because his wife, Mila Pevnika, was Serbian. ⁴³ The combination of personal factors and PC party politics, along with his drive to change Canadian liberal internationalism, influenced Mulroney to neglect the concerns of External Affairs and take a less cautious approach. The political calculations of McDougall and Mulroney spurred Canada to intervene in the conflict.

Yet throughout the first two years of the Yugoslav Wars, the Canadian government did not have well-defined interests in Yugoslavia, nor did it clearly articulate how it wanted the conflict to be resolved. McDougall's approach to Yugoslavia was closely in line with that of the prime minister: like Mulroney, she viewed the humanitarian situation in the region as intolerable and grew increasingly frustrated with her American and European counterparts for failing to bring about diplomatic negotiations between the warring republics. ⁴⁴ McDougall elaborated her stance during a 10 December 1991 speech in Toronto commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Statue of Westminster, stating that the events in Yugoslavia were a reminder that “tragedy can occur when basic democratic principles and respect for human rights are flouted or when the basic needs of ordinary people are ignored.” ⁴⁵ Canada's intervention in Yugoslavia was more involved than had been the case in previous post–Cold War conflicts, most notably the 1991 Gulf War. This degree of involvement indicated that the prime minister and the SSEA desired an enhanced international role for Canada.

The Department of National Defence (DND) also sought a post–Cold War role for Canada and certainly also for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This goal undergirded the department's interest in Yugoslavia and may have been particularly acute for Robert Fowler, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and author of the 1987 Defence White Paper. The 1987 White Paper was very much a Cold War document, proposing major rearmament, such as nuclear-powered submarines, to help the CAF face the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. ⁴⁶ However, with the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989, the paper's proposals were obsolete by 1991, and Fowler thus was looking for a way to restore his own and DND's credibility. The Yugoslav crisis presented Fowler with the opportunity to use Mulroney's keen enthusiasm for a peacekeeping mission in the Balkans to remake his reputation.

By 1991, budget cuts were prevalent throughout the Canadian military, with the September 1991 Statement on Defence Policy announcing a reduction in personnel strength to about 76,000 and the establishment of the Minister's Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure to study potential base closures. ⁴⁷ Despite the department's fiscal restraints, DND, like External Affairs, viewed a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia as a way to generate political capital. The reality of the situation in the Balkans would require DND to reassess this desire. Before the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR I), a Canadian reconnaissance team sent to Croatia reported that the situation would not be similar to conventional peacekeeping operations and that Canadian troops should be prepared for combat, with all the necessary equipment. ⁴⁸ Some within the DND bureaucracy with peacekeeping knowledge disagreed with the reconnaissance team's assessment, but ultimately the federal government approved the requested equipment. ⁴⁹ By late 1992, once both the bureaucracy and the government realized that traditional peacekeeping was dead in the ex-Yugoslavia, it was too late to adjust Canada's actions to respond to the intense level of violence.

Canadian recognition and response

Mulroney's policy in the Yugoslav Wars took another questionable turn in January 1992, when the Canadian government formally recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, a measure that the EC had refused to take and one that the US State Department did not support. ⁵⁰ The wisdom of the Canadian decision to recognize Croatian and Slovenian independence was questionable as Mulroney had, of course, offered peacekeepers. Furthermore, just one month earlier, McDougall had publicly linked Canada's credibility as a peacekeeping nation to remaining objective. Thus did Canada's position toward Yugoslavia become increasingly unclear, as it seemed that Mulroney was committing peacekeepers to an operation that was not well defined. These actions signalled that he was willing to test out a new approach toward liberal internationalism, one that neither the UN nor the EC had fully sanctioned.

Recognition of the independent republics posed a significant problem for the West because if an independent Croatia was internationally recognized before a peace settlement was created in Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina could dissolve into civil war. In a cable to the US Secretary of State, the American embassy in Belgrade warned that “Those within the EC hell-bent on immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia—and hang the consequences—seem to have finally gained the upper hand in the wake of Western publics’ outrage over the JNA's…callous bombardment of Dubrovnik.” ⁵¹ The cable further advised:

The November 8 NATO statement tied recognition of individual Yugoslav republics to an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. We recommend that the Department instruct embassies in EC capitals (particularly those which are NATO members) to urge we stick to that formula and avoid pouring more fuel on Yugoslavia's already horrific civil war. ⁵²

Despite its warning, the US still was not proposing a NATO mission or military action in Yugoslavia.

Canada's decision to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was in line with the stance of some EC members, but broke with the US's, and further muddied Canada's position, as Mulroney and McDougall had initially supported withholding recognition of the republics. Mulroney's decision to declare Canadian recognition of Croatia and Slovenia set the course for Canada's contradictory Yugoslav policy.

Mulroney's more assertive attitude toward the Yugoslav Wars concerned External Affairs because the department's requirements for a peacekeeping operation had not been met. In a recent 15 November 1991 memo to missions overseas, External Affairs had outlined why a ceasefire agreement was needed before peacekeepers could be deployed to Yugoslavia, stating, “A ceasefire is a precondition for almost any other aspect of the peace process” ⁵³ and, further, that “Peacekeeping must have the consent and support of parties.” ⁵⁴ The memo did not suggest how Canadian policy should adjust if the UN failed to gain the consent of the warring republics. The concluding point was “that peacekeeping mandate must be clear before deployment.” ⁵⁵ In listing these preconditions, senior officials were protecting External Affairs in the case of unexpected violent developments for Canadian peacekeepers. The collapse of the Geneva Accord in December 1991 was further evidence that lasting ceasefire agreements between the republics would prove elusive.

Canadian politics and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

By January 1992, the Quebec independence movement had begun to influence the Ottawa establishment, who viewed the threat of nationalism destroying a federation as something that Canada shared with Yugoslavia. ⁵⁶ Canada's recognition of the independent republics came amidst its own renewed independence challenge from Quebec, spurred by the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord. The issue also influenced McDougall's public statements on Yugoslavia. During her speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the Statue of Westminster, McDougall connected foreign policy with national unity, declaring that “As we move further into this country's process of constitutional renewal, it is important to remember that the successes and achievements of Canada in the wider world would not have been possible if we had not been a united country.” ⁵⁷ As the Toronto Star would report, “With a referendum looming in Quebec…Ottawa's response to the various international independence movements has always been with an eye to how it will play in Quebec.” ⁵⁸

The situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated further in early 1992, with militant separatist movements spreading throughout the Balkans. In January 1992, the Muslim-majority Bosnian government appealed to the UN for peacekeepers, after the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, declared their independence on 21 December 1991. ⁵⁹ As a result, on 21 February 1992, UNSCR 743 was approved and 13,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed throughout Yugoslavia, including 1,200 Canadians to Croatia under the mandate of the additional April resolution UNSCR 749, which authorized UNPROFOR I. ⁶⁰ Canada's Croatia deployment was the third-largest national commitment; an incredible contribution for NATO's only other non-European member. ⁶¹ However, UNSCR 749 would prove to be flawed, as it established UNPROFOR's headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 27 March, the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries began their operations against the Bosnian government and gained control of 60 percent of the country (despite being 31 percent of the population) by early May 1992. ⁶² Through coordination with the JNA, the paramilitaries intended to force Croats out of Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims out of Bosnia. The ethnic-based targeting in Bosnia and Croatia signalled the level of violence that Canadian peacekeepers would face. For the Canadian government, the element of ethnic violence made their involvement even more complicated.

Expanding the mission

By late April 1992, Sarajevo was well under siege by the Bosnian-Serb Army led by General Ratko Mladic, demonstrating that UNPROFOR's effectiveness was limited. Because of the scale of the siege, the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General John de Chastelain and Fowler recommended to the Minister of National Defence Marcel Masse that Canada expand its participation in UNPROFOR beyond Croatia and into Bosnia. ⁶³ UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren recommended that UN troops secure the Sarajevo airport and identified the Canadian infantry battalion (CANBAT 1) deployed in Croatia as suitable to “play a central role” in the operation. The de Chastelain-Fowler memorandum stated that “We believe that our battalion is well equipped and suited to this role, and that such a re-deployment would be in keeping with the overall UN mission in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.” ⁶⁴ Fowler and de Chastelain concluded, “We therefore recommend that you approve the re-deployment of the Canadian battalion in UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to secure the airport at Sarajevo on a temporary basis and related security tasks.” ⁶⁵ This recommendation seemingly overlooked the military opinion of Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, the first commander of UNPROFOR, who in early March had raised the dangers of the Sarajevo airport to UN Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs Marrick Goulding. Despite MacKenzie's warnings, Fowler and de Chastelain were successful in their efforts to have Masse approve the re-deployment of the battalion to Bosnia, causing a major change in Canada's peacekeeping operation in the Balkans and an increased risk to Canadian personnel. Moreover, de Chastelain and Fowler's bureaucratic maneuverings went against Canada's best interests in Yugoslavia.

Canada's undefined role in the region was exacerbated by underestimations within External Affairs of the complexity of the violence in ex-Yugoslavia. Of note, the Canadian embassy in Belgrade did not seem to view the Serbian government and the Bosnian-Serb military as extreme nationalists. The embassy wrote a memorandum to External Affairs headquarters in late June 1992 outlining possible initiatives to further the peacemaking process. Among the initiatives recommended was a CSCE fact-finding mission to investigate the relationship between the JNA and the Bosnian-Serb Army and to “Encourage leader of BH Serb Forces, Gen. Mladic to cooperate with CSCE mission.” ⁶⁶ Another major initiative suggested in the memo was to “Propose that EC mtg on BH (or perhaps under UN auspices) include leaders of three BH warring factions, BNH MinDef, Gen. Mladic, Milosevic and Tudjman as possible precursor to UN conf on BH-agenda initially to include ceasefire.” ⁶⁷ In presenting Mladic, Milosevic, and Tudjman as non-extremists who would be open to negotiations, the Belgrade embassy did not present an accurate report of the conditions present in the former Yugoslavia and created a narrative that diplomacy was still functioning. But by that time, the intensity of the UNPROFOR operation and the expanded role that Canadian peacekeepers were facing indicated that any peace process was wishful thinking. ⁶⁸ Canadian personnel were in a war zone where they were underequipped and outnumbered. For the Belgrade embassy to consider that the Bosnian-Serb Army under Mladic would adhere to a ceasefire agreement was imprudent and ignored the reality on the ground. Throughout the first five months of the UNPROFOR mission, External Affairs debated whether to continue to present the Yugoslav Wars as a situation that could be resolved.

One month later, the embassy dramatically changed its reporting and instead issued its most dire warning to date. In a 27 July 1992 memorandum to External Affairs headquarters, the Belgrade embassy stated, “The spilling of Bosnia's lifeblood across the face of Europe and beyond in Europe's largest refugee movement since WWII can only continue unabated until peace is made in Bosnia.” ⁶⁹ By identifying a peace agreement in Bosnia as an absolute necessity to end the conflict in the Balkans, the embassy was signalling that an escalation in the war was likely. The memo further added that “poisoning” the gulf between the Muslim government and Serb and Croat leaders in Bosnia were “Those among the Bosnian Serb and Croat communities, and in their ethnic homelands of Serbia and Croatia, who pursue a kind of enosis dream of Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia.” ⁷⁰ Significantly, the memo determined that “It is Bosnian Muslim leader and Republic President Izetbegovic who is most adamant about not resuming political negs.” ⁷¹ Considering Bissett's reports from 1991, the pro-Serbian stance of the Belgrade embassy seemingly became more entrenched during the first year of the war. Although the embassy was critical of Izetbegovic and the Bosnian-Muslim leadership, it emphasized that the Canadian government had to act quickly to assist the international community in preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia.

By August 1992, the prospect of mass killings throughout Yugoslavia undoubtedly increased as the violence in Bosnia had not been curbed. On 25 August 1992, the London Conference, led jointly by the UN and EC, began, with the intent of solving the crisis facing Bosnian-Muslim refugees and establishing a constitutional framework for Bosnia-Herzegovina. ⁷² Three weeks prior to the conference, Mulroney had sent letters to the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. Mulroney had informed the respective presidents that the London Conference would possibly be the final opportunity to negotiate a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would permit refugees to return to their home regions. In a 6 August 1992 memo to the Privy Council Office (PCO), Lorenz Friedlaender, the Director of the Central and Eastern Europe Relations Division at External Affairs, recorded that “Taken together, these letters are intended as a diplomatic initiative to reinforce Canada's efforts in peacekeeping, in humanitarian assistance and refugee relief and in multilateral negotiations for a longer-term settlement in the former Yugoslavia.” ⁷³ Friedlaender's August 1992 note to the PCO was the clearest statement made by a government official on what Canada's policy in the ex-Yugoslavia consisted of since the February deployment of Canadian peacekeepers. This transparency on Canada's Yugoslavia mission was not shared with the Canadian public.

In his letters to the presidents, Mulroney attempted to exert a measure of personal influence over Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, and envisioned “good-faith” negotiations between the three presidents during the London Conference. Mulroney wrote to Milosevic, “I am appealing to you personally to do your utmost to help end this tragedy and to use your influence with the Bosnian Serbs to this end.” ⁷⁴ Conversely, in his letter to Izetbegovic, Mulroney sympathized, noting “I understand your deep reluctance to negotiate with representatives of the forces which are tearing Bosnia-Herzegovina apart.” ⁷⁵ Yet, Mulroney's letter to Izetbegovic contained a note of warning: “I do not believe that international military intervention by force, under United Nations or other auspices, is a feasible course of action to resolve the crisis in Bosnia.” ⁷⁶ Mulroney's opposition to further military interventions in Bosnia formed the basis of what would become the prime minister's approach to the Yugoslav conflict for the remainder of his time in office.

The Mulroney government attempted to take an active role at the London Conference. During the conference, McDougall announced that “The Canadian Government is ready to make further efforts in support of this essential humanitarian work, and has decided to make available to the United Nations 1,200 more Canadian troops for this purpose.” ⁷⁷ This proposal to nearly double the size of Canada's commitment was not based on any policy recommendation from External Affairs or National Defence. Seized by the gravity of the situation, Mulroney and McDougall identified it as a priority for Canada to use peacekeeping as a means toward peace negotiations. Ideally, the UN would have the authority to force a peace settlement. On 24 September 1992, McDougall addressed the UNGA and criticized the UNSC for its inaction in the Balkans, while also calling attention to Canada's commitment to the notion of “peace enforcement” through the use of force. ⁷⁸ McDougall also emphasized to the UN the major Canadian contribution to peacekeeping. The UN's actual behaviour toward peacekeeping in Yugoslavia undermined that organization's stated goals in Yugoslavia. The Mulroney government's determination to use the UN as the international body to end the conflict was beginning to dissolve because of the latter's inaction.

Mulroney may have understood the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, but his government's actions neglected the factors contributing to the situation and left Canadian policy on Yugoslavia without a firm foundation. When it was apparent that no ceasefire agreement would hold, the government continued to offer up Canadian peacekeepers, despite the growing danger. Canadian peacekeepers had the wider objective of stopping further atrocities in Bosnia, but the UN had made no specific commitments to preventing ethnic cleansing, leaving the Canadians in Bosnia in an insecure position. Though on the surface it carried on a long tradition of peacekeeping in Canadian foreign policy, in practice, the intervention in Yugoslavia was a far different commitment than anyone in the Canadian government had planned for. While Mulroney had launched the peacekeeping mission as an attempt to put his own imprint on Canadian liberal internationalism, the response of his government to the developments of the mission revealed a short-term approach with no appreciation of how Canada's involvement would end.

McDougall and External Affairs officials accomplished little at the London Conference and the UN. In Sarajevo, however, CANBAT 1, as part of UNPROFROR, was faced with continued heavy fighting. As de Chastelain and Fowler had predicted, Canada was placed in an early leadership role, with General MacKenzie leading the largest contingent in Sarajevo. UNPROFOR's main objective was to secure and reopen the Sarajevo airport, which was accomplished on 3 July 1992. ⁷⁹ Reopening the Sarajevo airport was a significant milestone for UNPROFOR because it formed a key connection to the international community to assist in the delivery of relief supplies. Nevertheless, the movement of CANBAT 1 to Bosnia was not based on the reality on the ground in Yugoslavia, as the Canadian peacekeepers were under-equipped and faced almost constant hostile fire. It was apparent that there was no agreement among the Bosnians over permitting UN peacekeepers to operate. Yet, in Ottawa, it was determined that Canada could not be seen as acting too late to stop a humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, as the July 1992 report from the Belgrade embassy had indicated. Fowler, Masse, and Mulroney, three of the key decision makers concerning Canadian action in Yugoslavia, all perceived that Canadian participation in Bosnia enhanced Canada's international profile and brought with it associated benefits. While the public justification for Canada's military contribution to the UN mission in Yugoslavia was shaped around principles of peacekeeping, the diplomatic and political circumstances necessitated that Canada accept a leadership role that overextended its military capabilities and lacked wider international support.

Lacking leadership

The Canadian government perceived some benefits to its role in Yugoslavia but, privately, it was searching for ways to scale back Canada's diplomatic involvement. McDougall's critiques of the UN reflected this undeclared preference, while maintaining a Canadian approach that would not abandon peacekeeping efforts. Because of the UNSC's lack of engagement, Canada's quasi-leadership role took on a greater importance. By mid-1992 the Bush administration had become focused on election-year politics and foreign policy became less of a priority. James Bartleman, the Canadian permanent representative to NATO, suggested that Canada's involvement in Yugoslavia had bolstered its international standing, claiming:

Just six months ago in wake of decision to close the military bases in Germany, Cdas standing with our allies was probably at the lowest point since 1969 decision by govt of the day to cut Cdn force levels in Europe. Today Cdas standing is perhaps at highest it has ever been. ⁸⁰

Bartleman's report neglected the reality that Canada's NATO European presence was no longer required and that the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe after a forty-three year presence was hardly noticed in Europe. ⁸¹ Mulroney's public commitment to the UN and institutions such as the EC enabled the Canadian government to show to Canadians and a European audience that Canada was strong in its support of the UN and committed to finding peace in Yugoslavia through diplomacy. However, the determining factor of Canada's actions was the domestic and international circumstances facing Mulroney, especially the lack of American engagement, which created a leadership vacuum that Mulroney may have thought Canada could maneuvre in diplomatically.

Canada's diplomatic efforts dragged on, largely because of European and American inaction. The policy the government pursued since November 1991—trying to persuade the EC and other European institutions to find a peace settlement in the Balkans with minimal North American involvement—had failed. In addition to the lack of European support, the larger challenge for Canada was that none of their diplomatic engagement had brought the conflict in Yugoslavia any closer to an end. After contributing fifty soldiers to the EC's Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in Croatia and Slovenia from 1991 to 1992, by the fall of 1992 the Canadian government decided that UNPROFOR was too ineffective to prevent ethnic violence. ⁸² Explaining the difficulty of the situation, Bartleman wrote that “We now need to address how to use this [Canada's] diplomatic credit. Which priorities should we focus on beyond already existing extensive commitment to active peacekeeping mission in Former Yugoslavia?” ⁸³ However, the Americans and Europeans viewed Canada as well suited to peacemaking in Yugoslavia. The Canadian embassy in Washington reported “Sombre outlook [of upcoming winter in Bosnia] could have particular implications for focus of ongoing Canadian humanitarian contributions in Former Yugoslavia. Given our climate, requests for assistance (both for material and expertise) may well be oriented towards Canada.” ⁸⁴

The international community had no plan to end the conflict or decrease the violence in Bosnia. The US did not support the belated Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), ⁸⁵ which Mulroney supported during a February 1993 trip to Washington to visit newly inaugurated President Bill Clinton, adding that with American support, the VOPP could be successful. ⁸⁶ Clinton did not share this optimism, telling reporters during a joint press conference with Mulroney that “The United States at the present time is reluctant to impose an agreement on the parties on which they do not agree, especially when the Bosnian Muslims might be left at a severe disadvantage.” ⁸⁷ Canadian diplomacy in early 1993 was not working in tandem with the US.

By mid-February 1993 the Mulroney government made it apparent that they would not continue to follow the same policy direction that they had used in Yugoslavia for the previous fifteen months. Speaking before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, McDougall argued that “Real life is not political science…. Conditions in Bosnia, for example, have never been those of a classic peacekeeping operation and yet Canada is participating because the reality of human suffering is so compelling.” ⁸⁸ McDougall began to frame Canada's role in Yugoslavia as not a peacekeeping operation, but humanitarian intervention. This shift in framing was significant, as it made the deployment of Canadian peacekeepers an even more questionable decision. In response to a proposal by the foreign minister of France Roland Dumas to free civilian prisoners from Bosnian-Serb camps through unilateral French intervention, the External Affairs press line stated, “Canada has on many occasions recorded its support for international action to carry out humanitarian relief missions under the authority of the United Nations. We hope that any further action concerning the detention camps would proceed from the same authority.” ⁸⁹ External Affairs argued that Dumas's proposal would destabilize the search for a peace settlement because it was not approved by the UN. By February 1993, Canada's policy toward Yugoslavia had evolved from extensive peacekeeping to seeking humanitarian solutions through the UN. The options for developing a peace settlement were decreasing.

Conclusion

Canadian policy toward the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 1993 reflected a series of expedient decisions made by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, combined with the politicized diplomatic and military advice of the External Affairs-DND establishment. The military and officials such as Bartleman, de Chastelain, and Fowler glossed over the military operational challenges of deploying under-equipped peacekeepers, while the government and the Canadian public were drawn in by the benefits to Canada's standing, both domestically and internationally, that could be gained from the deployment. Despite facing limited military means, no lasting ceasefire agreements, and US disinterest, and given his knowledge of the diplomatic constraints and the ongoing war, Mulroney made a rash decision to deploy Canadian peacekeepers. This decision continued with Liberal prime minister Jean Chretien's drift over the Yugoslavia operations, when the Canadian military had even fewer resources. Canadians never seriously considered the consequences of these decisions.