Hastening the inevitable: American intervention in the Canadian elections of 1962–1963

Abstract

In recent years, there has been much research on foreign electoral intervention (FEI). However, it is an open question as to whether successful interventions “work” for the intervener. Does the newly elected government adopt the policies that motivated the intervener to intervene in the first place? This paper makes a first step toward addressing that question. It argues that FEIs work when the elected government can overcome veto players in legislatures, be they parliaments, national assemblies, or congresses. For minority governments or cohabitational presidencies, overcoming these veto players is no easy task and may necessitate further interventions by the intervening power. American interventions in the Canadian elections of 1962 and 1963 serve as an illustrative case. The findings suggest that governments with large majorities or control over congressional/legislative branches are more likely to cooperate with intervening governments. These findings have implications for how we assess the vulnerability of democracies to FEI.