While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically change the priorities of autocratic policies to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more money on redistributive policies in election periods. Using budgetary spending data from 63 autocratic countries between 1972 and 2015, this paper presents cross-national evidence of the existence of an electoral cycle in autocratic redistribution. Analyzing Afrobarometer survey data from 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015, this study also finds that citizens’ evaluations of redistributive policy fluctuate according to the electoral calendar. These findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian politics by exploring macro- and micro-level mechanisms through which authoritarian rulers improvise policy manipulation to cultivate electoral dominance.
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