Authoritarian regimes adopt ostensibly democratic institutions for undemocratic purposes. Existing research emphasizes five different functions of elections under authoritarianism, driven by idiosyncratic assumptions about the type of dictator and the structure of information. In this paper, we connect the different functions through a three-actor “game-free” model where all aspects of the regime are determined endogenously, assuming only that elections can reveal new information. Signaling, information acquisition, power-sharing, cooptation, and peaceful exit all emerge as special cases in our model. The framework also integrates the two goals of authoritarian power-sharing with other elites and authoritarian control of citizens. We illustrate the model with examples of elections and non-elections in Brunei, Singapore, USSR, Romania, Mexico, and Benin.
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