Using an original data set assessing the effect of the 195 new constitutions worldwide over the past 40 years on levels of democracy, this article argues that when popular participation and group inclusion are both considered, inclusion is what matters. After showing that group inclusion generates more improvements in levels of democracy than mere participation in our data set of implemented constitutions, we address some of the prominent cases of constitution-writing failure that occur when individual participation is valued more highly than group inclusion. The article shows that even after unprecedented waves of popular participation through social media feedback (Egypt and Iceland) and focus groups and workshops (Chile), participation alone cannot generate constitutions that improve levels of democracy, or, sometimes, even the very promulgation of new constitutions. Indeed, using these cases as illustrations, we show how participation without inclusion is doomed to failure. We then show that high inclusion cases, even if they involve low participation (such as Tunisia 2014 and Colombia 1991), do generate democracy improvements.
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