Organizations often announce their protest activities prior to their implementation to mobilize awareness, recruit supporters, and receive media attention. We are interested in the effectiveness of protest announcements—that is, under what conditions governments make concessions to avoid having an announced protest take place. Governments assess the costs and benefits of providing concessions by taking into account the level of credible threat of the announced protest and the costs related to concessions. We test these assumptions with a unique data set on protest announcements and concessions in Nepal (2007-2010). Using cross-sectional regressions, we demonstrate that protest announcements by unions, announcements with highly threatening tactics and announcements with minimal demands will bring about concessions from the government. We contribute to the growing literature on different protest tactics by providing systematic empirical evidence, for the first time, on the effectiveness of mere protest announcements.
AhlquistJ. S.LeviM. (2013). In the interest of others: Organizations and social activism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2.
AiC.NortonE. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economic Letters, 80, 123-129.
3.
AndrewsK. T.BiggsM. (2006). The dynamics of protest diffusion: Movement organizations, social networks, and news media in the 1960 sit-ins. American Sociological Review, 71, 752-777.
4.
BeissingerM. (2007). Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5, 259-276.
5.
BiggsM.AndrewsK. T. (2015). Protest campaigns and movement success desegregating the US south in the early 1960s. American Sociological Review, 80, 416-443.
6.
ButcherC.SvenssonI. (2016). Manufacturing dissent modernization and the onset of major nonviolent resistance campaigns. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60, 311-339.
7.
CareyS. C. (2006). The dynamic relationship between protest and repression. Political Research Quarterly, 59, 1-11.
8.
CarterD. B.SignorinoC. S. (2010). Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. Political Analysis, 18, 271-292.
9.
CedermanL.-E.WeidmannN. B.GleditschK. S. (2011). Horizontal in-equalities and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison. American Political Science Review, 105, 478-495.
10.
ChenowethE.StephanM. J. (2011). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
11.
CollierR. B. (1999). Paths toward democracy: The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
12.
CooperE. (2014). Students, arson, and protest politics in Kenya: School fires as political action. African Affairs, 113, 583-600.
13.
CunninghamK. G.BakkeK. M.SeymourL. J. (2012). Shirts today, skins tomorrow dual contests and the effects of fragmentation in self-determination disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 67-93.
14.
CunninghamK. G.DahlM.FrugéA. (2017). Strategies of resistance: Diversification and diffusion. American Journal of Political Science, 61, 591-605.
15.
DavenportC. (2007). Government repression and political order. Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 1-23.
16.
DavenportC. (2014). How social movements die: Repression and demobilization of the Republic of New Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
17.
DeNardoJ. (1985). Power in numbers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18.
DinardoJ.HallockK. F. (2002). When unions “mattered”: The impact of strikes on financial markets, 1925-1937. ILR Review, 55, 219-233.
19.
EdwardsB.McCarthyJ. D. (2004). Resources and social movement mobilization. In SnowD.SouleS.KriesiH. (Eds.), Blackwell companion to social movements (pp. 116-152). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
20.
FranklinJ. C. (2009). Contentious challenges and government responses in Latin America. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 700-714.
21.
GamsonW. (1975). The strategy of social protest. Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press.
22.
GelmanA.HillS. (2007). Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
23.
GerringJ.SeawrightJ. (2007). Techniques for choosing cases. In GerringJ. (Ed.), Case study research: Principles and practices (pp. 86-150). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
24.
GleditschK. S.RiveraM. (2017). The diffusion of nonviolent campaigns. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61, 1120-1145.
25.
GoldstoneJ. A. (2001). Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 139-187.
26.
GoldstoneJ. A.TillyC. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state response in the dynamics of contentious action. In AminzadeR.GoldstoneJ.McAdamD.PerryE.SewellW.TarrowS.TillyC. (Eds.), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 179-194). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
27.
GurrT. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945. International Political Science Review, 14, 161-201.
28.
HerkenrathM.KnollA. (2011). Protest events in international press coverage: An empirical critique of cross-national conflict databases. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 52, 163-180.
29.
HirschE. L. (1990). Sacrifice for the cause: Group processes, recruitment, and commitment in a student social movement. American Sociological Review, 55, 243-254.
30.
Inlogos. (2009). Assessment of village development committee governance and the use of block grants. Kathmandu, Nepal: Ministry of Local Development, United Nations Development Programme.
31.
IshiyamaJ.MarshallM. (2015). Candidate recruitment and former rebel parties. Party Politics, 21, 591-602.
32.
KriesiH. (1996). The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context. In McAdamD.McCarthyJ.ZaldM. (Eds.), Comparative perspectives on social movements (pp. 152-184). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
33.
LawotiM.HangenS. (Eds.). (2013). Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Nepal: Identities and mobilization after 1990. Oxon, UK: Routledge.
34.
LichbachM. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31, 266-297.
35.
LipskyM. (1968). Protest as a political resource. American Political Science Review, 62, 1144-1158.
36.
Lust-OkarE. (2004). Divided they rule: The management and manipulation of political opposition. Comparative Politics, 36, 159-179.
37.
McAdamD. (1983). Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency. American Sociological Review, 48, 735-754.
38.
McAdamD. (1986). Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of freedom summer. American Journal of Sociology, 92, 64-90.
39.
McAdamD.TarrowS.TillyC. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
40.
McCarthyJ. D.ZaldM. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82, 1212-1241.
41.
MooreW. H. (1998). Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and timing. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 851-873.
42.
MulcahyA. (1995). Claims-making and the construction of legitimacy: Press coverage of the 1981 Northern Irish hunger strike. Social Problems, 42, 101-119.
43.
MullerE. N.WeedeE. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence a rational action approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, 624-651.
44.
NepstadS. E. (2013). Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab Spring exploring military defections and loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. Journal of Peace Research, 50, 337-349.
45.
OberschallA. (1994). Rational choice in collective protests. Rationality and Society, 6, 79-100.
46.
PassmoreL. (2009). The art of hunger: Self-starvation in the Red Army Faction. German History, 27, 32-59.
47.
PearlmanW. (2011). Violence, nonviolence, and the Palestinian national movement. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48.
PearlmanW. (2013). Emotions and the microfoundations of the Arab uprisings. Perspectives on Politics, 11, 387-409.
49.
PersonsO. S. (1995). The effects of automobile strikes on the stock value of steel suppliers. ILR Review, 49, 78-87.
50.
PierskallaJ. H. (2010). Protest, deterrence, and escalation: The strategic calculus of government repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 117-145.
51.
RaslerK. (1996). Concessions, repression, and political protest in the Iranian revolution. American Sociological Review, 61, 132-152.
52.
Rojas HernandezJ. (1995). Globalisierungsprozesse, die Arbeiterklasse und die Gewerkschaftsbewegung in Lateinamerika [Globalization, the working class and the trade union movement in Latin America]. In BultmannI. (Ed.), Demokratie ohne soziale Bewegung? Gewerkschaften, Stadtteil- und Frauenbewegungen in Chile und Mexiko [Democracy without social movements? Unions, neighborhood movements and women’s movements in Chile and Mexico] (pp. 65-141). Bad Honnef, Germany: Horlemann-Verlag.
53.
SchulzW. F. (1982). News structure and people’s awareness of political events. Gazette, 30, 139-153.
54.
SchumakerP. D. (1975). Policy responsiveness to protest-group demands. Journal of Politics, 37, 488-521.
55.
SnellingerA. (2007). Student movements in Nepal: Their parameters and their idealized forms. In LawotiM. (Ed.), Contentious politics and democratization in Nepal (pp. 273-295). New Delhi, India: Sage.
56.
TarrowS. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
57.
TillyC.TarrowS. (2015). Contentious politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
58.
UpretiB. R.PoudelS. B.GhimireS. (2013). Ignored or ill-represented? The grievance of Terai-Madhes conflict in Nepal. New Delhi, India: Adroit Publisher.
59.
VogtM. (2016). A new dawn? Indigenous movements and ethnic inclusion in Latin America. International Studies Quarterly, 60, 790-801.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
