The politics of economic crises brings distributive economic conflict to the fore of national political debates. How policy should be used to transfer resources between citizens becomes a central political question, and the answers chosen often influence the trajectory of policy for a generation. This context provides an ideal setting for evaluating the importance of self-interest and other-regarding preferences in shaping public opinion about economic policy. This article investigates whether self-centered inequity aversion along with self-interest influences individual tax policy opinions. We conduct original survey experiments in France and the United States, and provide evidence that individuals care about both how policy alternatives affect their own interests and how they influence the welfare of others relative to themselves.
AgranovM.PalfreyT. R. (2015). Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study. Journal of Public Economics, 130, 45-58.
2.
AlesinaA.AngeletosG. M. (2005). Fairness and redistribution. American Economic Review, 95, 960-980.
3.
AlesinaA.GiulianoP. (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In BenhabibJ.MatthewO. J.BisinA. (Eds.), Handbook of social economics (Vol. 1A, pp. 93-131). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland.
4.
AlesinaA.GlaeserE. (2004). Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
5.
AlesinaA.La FerraraE. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897-931.
6.
Ballard-RosaC.MartinL.ScheveK. (2016). The structure of American income tax policy preferences. The Journal of Politics. Manuscript submitted for publication.
7.
BarberB.BeramendiP.WibbelsE. (2013). The behavioral foundations of social politics: Evidence from surveys and a laboratory democracy. Comparative Political Studies, 46, 1155-1189.
8.
BartelsL. (2008). Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age. New York, NY: Russell Sage.
CavailleC.TrumpK. (2015). The two facets of social policy preferences. The Journal of Politics, 77, 146-160.
11.
DimickM.RuedaD.StegmuellerD. (forthcoming). The altruistic rich? Inequality and other-regarding preferences for redistribution. Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
FehrE.SchmidtK. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
14.
FehrE.SchmidtK. M. (2006). The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism—Experimental evidence and new theories. In KolmS.YthierJ. M. (Eds.), Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism (pp. 615-691). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
15.
FongC. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 82, 225-246.
16.
GilensM. (1999). Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
17.
HuberJ. D.StanigP. (2011). Church-state separation and redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 828-836.
18.
IversenT.SoskiceD. (2001). An asset theory of social preferences. American Political Science Review, 95, 875-893.
19.
KuziemkoI.NortonM. I.SaezE.StantchevaS. (2015). How elastic are preferences for redistribution? Evidence from randomized survey experiments. American Economic Review, 105, 1478-1508.
20.
LüX.ScheveK.SlaughterM. J. (2012). Inequity aversion and the international distribution of trade protection. American Journal of Political Science, 56, 638-654.
21.
LupuN.PontussonJ. (2011). The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. American Political Science Review, 105, 316-336.
22.
LuttmerE. (2001). Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 500-528.
23.
MargalitY. (2013). Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the great recession. American Political Science Review, 107, 80-103.
24.
McCallL. (2013). The undeserving rich: American beliefs about inequality, opportunity, and redistribution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
25.
MeltzerA. H.RichardS. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914-927.
26.
PageB.JacobsL. (2009). Class war? What Americans really think about economic inequality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
27.
PikettyT. (1995). Social mobility and redistributive politics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 551-584.
28.
RehmP.HackerJ. S.SchlesingerM. (2012). Insecure alliances: Risk, inequality, and support for the welfare state. American Political Science Review, 106, 386-406.
29.
RomerT. (1975). Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax. Journal of Public Finance, 4, 163-185.
30.
RuedaD.StegmuellerD. (2016). The externalities of inequality: Fear of crime and preferences for redistribution in Western Europe. American Journal of Political Science, 60, 472-489.
31.
ScheveK.StasavageD. (2006). Religion and preferences for social insurance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1, 255-286.
32.
ScheveK.StasavageD. (2010). The conscription of wealth: Mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation. International Organization, 64, 529-562.
33.
ScheveK.StasavageD. (2012). Democracy, war, and wealth: Lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation. American Political Science Review, 106, 81-102.
34.
ScheveK.StasavageD. (2016). Taxing the rich: A history of fiscal fairness in the United States and Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
35.
ShayoM. (2009). A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution. American Political Science Review, 103, 147-174.
36.
SobelJ. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 392-436.
37.
StegmuellerD. (2013). Religion and redistributive voting in Western Europe. The Journal of Politics, 75, 1064-1076.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
