The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity. When progressivity is high, politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify. When progressivity is low, and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap, redistributive struggles become politically less salient. We test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies. Our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution.
AlesinaA.GiulianoP. (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In BenhabibJ.BisinA.JacksonM. O. (Eds.), Handbook of social economics (Vol. 1, pp. 93-131). San Diego, CA: North-Holland.
2.
ArmingeonK.PotolidisP.GerberM.LeimgruberP. (2009). Comparative political data set 1960-2007. Berne, Switzerland: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
BeramendiP. (2012). The political geography of inequality. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
5.
BeramendiP.RuedaD. (2007). Social democracy constrained: Indirect taxation in industrialized democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 37, 619-641.
6.
BeramendiP.CusackT. (2009). Diverse disparities: The politics and economics of wage, market, and disposable income inequalities. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 257-275.
7.
BradleyD.HuberE.MollerS.NielsenF.StephensJ. D. (2003). Distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies. World Politics, 55, 193-228.
8.
De DonderP.HindriksJ. (2003). The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 2491-2505.
9.
De La OA. L.RoddenJ. A. (2008). Does religion distract the poor?Comparative Political Studies, 41, 437-476.
DionM. L.BirchfieldV. (2010). Economic development, income inequality, and preferences for redistribution. International Studies Quarterly, 54, 315-334. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00589.x
12.
DixitA.LondreganJ. (1995). Redistributive politics and economic efficiency. American Political Science Review, 89, 856-866. doi:10.2307/2082513
13.
DixitA.LondreganJ. (1998). Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 497-529.
14.
European Social Survey. (2008). European Social Survey Round 4 Data (Data file edition 4.0.). Bergen, Norway: Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Retrieved from http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/conditions.html
15.
FehrE.SchmidtK. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868. doi:10.1162/003355399556151
16.
FörsterM.WhitefordP. (2009). How much redistribution do welfare states achieve? The role of cash transfers and household taxes. CESifo DICE Report, 7(3), 34-41.
17.
FreezeK. (2015). Global progressivity and concentration indices database (freezelisdata4.2.dta). Luxembourg Income Study.
18.
GanghofS. (2006). The politics of income taxation: A comparative analysis. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
19.
GanghofS. (2007). The political economy of high income taxation: Capital taxation, path dependence, and political institutions in Denmark. Comparative Political Studies, 40, 1059-1084. doi:10.1177/0010414006288973
20.
GESIS—Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. (2012). Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS - Kumulation1980-2010 (ZA4574 Datenfile Version 1.0.1). Köln, Germany: GESIS Datenarchiv. doi:10.4232/1.11486
21.
GingrichJ. (2014). Visibility, values, and voters: The informational role of the welfare state. The Journal of Politics, 76, 565-580. doi:10.1017/S0022381613001540
22.
GingrichJ. R.AnsellB. W. (2012). Preferences in context: Micro preferences, macro-contexts and the demand for social policy. Comparative Political Studies, 45, 1624-1654.
23.
International Social Survey Program Research Group. (2006). International Social Survey Programme (ISSP): Role of government IV. Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany ZA4700, Data Version 1.0 (2008-08-18).
24.
IversenT.SoskiceD. (2001). An asset theory of social policy preferences. American Political Science Review, 95, 875-895.
25.
IversenT.SoskiceD. (2015). Information, inequality, and mass polarization ideology in advanced democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 48, 1781-1813. doi:10.1177/0010414015592643
26.
KakwaniN. C. (1977). Measurement of tax progressivity: An international comparison. The Economic Journal, 87(345), 71-80. doi:10.2307/2231833
27.
KatoJ. (2003). Regressive taxation and the welfare state: Path dependence and policy diffusion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
28.
KenworthyL.PontussonJ. (2005). Rising inequality and the politics of redistribution in affluent countries. Perspectives on Politics, 3, 449-471.
29.
KimK.LambertP. J. (2009). Redistributive effect of U.S. taxes and public transfers, 1994-2004. Public Finance Review, 37(1), 3-26. doi:10.1177/1091142108324423
30.
KorpiW.PalmeJ. (1998). The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality, and poverty in the western countries. American Sociological Review, 63, 661-687.
31.
MargalitY. (2013). Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the great recession. American Political Science Review, 107, 80-103. doi:10.1017/S0003055412000603
32.
McCartyN.PooleK. T.RosenthalH. (2006). Polarized America: The dance of ideology and unequal riches. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
33.
MeltzerA. H.RichardS. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914-927.
34.
MoeneK. O.WallersteinM. (2001). Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution. American Political Science Review, 95, 859-874.
35.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). How much redistribution do governments achieve? The role of cash transfers and household taxes. In Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (Ed.), Growing unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries (pp. 97-120). Paris, France: Author.
36.
PivenF. F.ClowardR. A. (1956). Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
37.
PontussonJ.RuedaD. (2010). The politics of inequality: Voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 675-705. doi:10.1177/0010414009358672
38.
RuedaD.StegmuellerD. (2015). The externalities of inequality: Fear of crime and preferences for redistribution in Western Europe. American Journal of Political Science. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/ajps.12212
39.
SteinmoS. (1996). Taxation and democracy: Swedish, British and American approaches to financing the modern state. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
40.
SteinmoS. (2002). Globalization and taxation: Challenges to the Swedish welfare state. Comparative Political Studies, 35, 839-862. doi:10.1177/0010414002035007004
41.
SteinmoS. (2010). The evolution of modern states. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
42.
StiglerG. J. (1970). Director’s law of public income redistribution. Journal of Law and Economics, 13, 1-10.
43.
SvallforsS. (2004). Class, attitudes and the welfare state: Sweden in comparative perspective. Social Policy & Administration, 38, 119-138.
