Political executives often influence how effectively citizens can monitor them, yet the link between executives and government transparency is not well developed in the literature. I begin filling that void by illuminating the relationship between media freedom—one dimension of transparency—and executive power. I theorize that politicians prefer to avoid monitoring and negative publicity, and that both presidents and prime ministers often can do something about it via their constitutional powers and influence accrued through partisan support. Using new panel data on Central and Eastern European prime ministers and presidents, I find that proactive legislative powers for both executive types and increased partisan support for prime ministers negatively affect media freedom. My model explains most of the variation in Central and Eastern European media freedom, predicts high press freedom in Western Europe, and has important implications for the broader relationships between executive power, transparency, and accountability.
AdseraA.BoixC.PayneM. (2003). Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 19, 445-490.
2.
AlesinaA.PerottiR. (1999). Budget deficits and budget institutions. In PoterbaJ. M.von HagenJ. (Eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance (pp. 13-36). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
3.
AndersonL. E. (2006). The authoritarian executive? Horizontal and vertical accountability in Nicaragua. Latin American Politics and Society, 48, 141-169.
4.
AndrewsJ. T.BairettR. L. (2014a, April). Executive strength in dual executive regimes. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
5.
AndrewsJ. T.BairettR. L. (2014b). Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Electoral Studies, 33, 307-321.
6.
ArnoldR. D. (2004). Congress, the press, and political accountability. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
BeckN.KatzJ. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section data. American Political Science Review, 89, 634-637.
9.
BeckN.KatzJ. N. (2011). Modeling dynamics in Time-Series Cross-Section political economy data. American Political Science Review, 14, 331-352.
10.
BeckerL. B.VladT.NusserN. (2007). An evaluation of press freedom indicators. International Communication Gazette, 69, 5-28.
11.
BergmanT.MüllerW. C.StrømK.BlomgrenM. (2003). Democratic delegation and accountability: Cross-national patterns. In StrømK.MüllerW. C.BergmanT. (Eds.), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies (pp. 109-220). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
12.
BesleyT.CaseA. (1995). Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 769-798.
13.
BesleyT.PratA. (2006). Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? Media capture and government accountability. American Economic Review, 96, 720-736.
14.
BoydstunA. E. (2013). Making the news: Politics, the media, and agenda setting. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
15.
BrunettiA.WederB. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1801-1824.
16.
Bueno de MesquitaB.MorrowJ. D.SiversonR. M.SmithA. (2002). Policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political Science, 32, 559-590.
17.
BunceV. (1997). Presidents and the transition in Eastern Europe. In von MettenheimK. (Ed.), Presidential institutions and democratic politics: Comparing regional and national contexts (pp. 161-176). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
18.
CareyJ. M.ShugartM. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14, 417-439.
19.
ChenX.LinS.ReedW. R. (2010). A Monte Carlo evaluation of the efficiency of the PCSE estimator. Applied Economics Letters, 17, 7-10.
20.
CumbyR. E.HuizingaJ. (1992). Testing the autocorrelation structure of disturbances in ordinary least squares and instrumental variables regressions. Econometrica, 60, 185-195.
21.
Di TellaR.FranceschelliI. (2011). Government advertising and media coverage of corruption scandals. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 119-151.
22.
DownsA. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
23.
DruckmanJ. N.JacobsL. R.OstermeierE. (2004). Candidate strategies to prime issues and image. Journal of Politics, 66, 1180-1202.
24.
DuvergerM. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. European Journal of Political Research, 8, 165-187.
25.
ElsterJ.OffeC.PreussU. K. (1998). Institutional design in post-communist societies: Rebuilding the ship at sea. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
26.
FerejohnJ. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice, 50, 5-25.
27.
FiskeS. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and extreme behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 889-906.
FryeT. (1997). A politics of institutional choice: Post-communist presidencies. Comparative Political Studies, 30, 523-552.
30.
GansH. J. (1979). Deciding what’s news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and Time. New York, NY: Random House.
31.
GrigorescuA. (2002). European institutions and unsuccessful norm transmission: The case of transparency. International Politics, 39, 467-489.
32.
GrigorescuA. (2007). Transparency of intergovernmental organizations: The roles of member states, international bureaucracies and nongovernmental organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 51, 625-648.
33.
HanrettyC. (2010). Explaining the De Facto independence of public broadcasters. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 75-89.
HibbingJ. R.Theiss-MorseE. (1998). The media’s role in public negativity toward congress: Distinguishing emotional reactions and cognitive evaluations. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 475-498.
36.
HollyerJ. B.RosendorffB. P.VreelandJ. R. (2011). Democracy and transparency. Journal of Politics, 73, 1191-1205.
37.
HowardM. M. (2003). The weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
38.
HuntP.KhoslaR. (2011). Holding pharmaceutical companies to account: A UN special rapporteur’s mission to GlaxoSmithKline. In GilbertG.HampsonF.SandovalC. (Eds.), The delivery of human rights: Essays in honour of professor Sir Nigel Rodley (pp. 39-67). New York, NY: Routledge.
39.
JacobsL. R.ShapiroR. Y. (1994). Issues, candidate image, and priming: The use of private polls in Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign. American Political Science Review, 88, 527-540.
40.
JakubowiczK. (2008). Finding the right place on the map: Prospects for public service broadcasting in post-communist countries. In JakubowiczK.SukosdM. (Eds.), Finding the right place on the map: Central and Eastern European media change in a global perspective (pp. 101-124). Chicago, IL: Intellect.
41.
JowittK. (1992). New world disorder: The Leninist extinction. Berkeley: University of California Press.
42.
KronholmA. (2013). Press freedom in Albania (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
43.
LauR. (1985). Two explanations for negativity effects in political behavior. American Journal of Political Science, 29, 119-138.
44.
LedermanD.LoayzaN. V.SoaresR. R. (2005). Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. Economics & Politics, 17, 1-35.
45.
LightP. C. (1993). Monitoring government: Inspectors general and the search for accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
46.
LindstedtC.NaurinD. (2010). Transparency is not enough: Making transparency effective in reducing corruption. International Political Science Review, 31, 301-322.
47.
LinzJ. J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In LinzJ. J.ValenzuelaA. (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy (pp. 3-87). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
48.
LinzJ. J.StepanA. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
49.
LupiaA.StrømK. (1995). Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections. American Political Science Review, 89, 648-665.
50.
MacakT. (2008, November). The media’s role in Slovakia is put in question by abusive government behaviour and statements (Report for the Association of European Journalists). Retrieved from http://www.aej-uk.org/media-08-Slo-3.doc
51.
McMillanJ.ZoidoP. (2004). How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 69-92.
52.
MetcalfL. K. (2000). Measuring presidential power. Comparative Political Studies, 33, 660-685.
53.
MüllerW. C.BergmanT.StrømK. (2003). Parliamentary democracy: Promise and problems. In StrømK.MüllerW. C.BergmanT. (Eds.), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies (pp. 3-32). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
54.
Mungiu-PippidiA. (2008). How media and politics shape each other in the New Europe. In JakubowiczK.SukosdM. (Eds.), Finding the right place on the map: Central and Eastern European media change in a global perspective (pp. 87-100). Chicago, IL: Intellect.
55.
PereiraC.MeloM. A.FigueiredoC. M. (2009). The corruption-enhancing role of re-election incentives? Counterintuitive evidence from Brazil’s audit reports. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 731-744.
PlümperT.TroegerV. E. (2007). Efficient estimation of time-invariant and rarely changing variables in finite sample panel analyses with unit fixed effects. Political Analysis, 15, 124-139.
58.
PlümperT.TroegerV. E.ManowP. (2005). Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 327-354.
59.
Political Risk Services. (2011). A business guide to political risk for international decisions: Part II. International country risk guide. East Syracuse, NY: The PRS Group.
60.
ProtsykO. (2005). Politics of intraexecutive conflict semipresidential regimes in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 19, 135-160.
61.
PuglisiR.SnyderJ. M. (2011). Newspaper coverage of political scandals. Journal of Politics, 73, 931-950.
62.
ReinikkaR.SvenssonJ. (2005). Fighting corruption to improve schooling: Evidence from a newspaper campaign in Uganda. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 259-267.
63.
SamuelsD. J.ShugartM. S. (2010). Presidents, parties, and prime ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
64.
SchedlerA. (1999). Conceptualizing accountability. In SchedlerA.DiamondL.PlattnerM. F. (Eds.), The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies (pp. 13-28). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
65.
SchudsonM. (1998). The good citizen: A history of American civic life. New York, NY: Martin Kessler.
66.
SchudsonM. (2002). The news media as political institutions. Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 249-269.
67.
SellersP. J.SchaffnerB. F. (2007). Winning coverage in the U.S. senate. Political Communication, 24, 377-391.
68.
ShugartM. S.CareyJ. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
69.
SiaroffA. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42, 287-312.
70.
SparksC. (2008). After transition: The media in Poland, Russia and China. In JakubowiczK.SukosdM. (Eds.), Finding the right place on the map: Central and Eastern European media change in a global perspective (pp. 43-71). Chicago, IL: Intellect.
71.
TavitsM. (2008). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do direct elections matter?New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
72.
VaidyaS. (2005). Corruption in the media’s gaze. European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 667-687.
73.
ZallerJ. (2003). A new standard of news quality: Burglar alarms for the monitorial citizen. Political Communication, 20, 109-130.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
