There are already signs that the PRC is backing out of the non-interference policy. Perhaps this is the right time to ask if China’s policy of non-interference in other countries internal affairs is ending, especially in light of the BRI grand strategy. The study examines whether China’s policy of non-interference is sustainable in the age of the BRI. Will the PRC be able to maintain its non-interference and neutrality policy, especially if its commercial interests, investments, and citizens living in the GCC countries are threatened? China must moderate its non-interference policy and increasingly intervene to secure overseas economic interests by framing its engagement in a way that eases the perceived breadth and depth of its interference.
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